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WAR'S END AND AFTER

War's End and After

An Informal Discussion of the Problems of a Postwar World

BY

STUART CHEVALIER

If the people of the United States now believe, as a result of the experience of the last twenty-five years, that the security of our Republic is vitally affected by the fate of the other peoples of the earth, they will recognize that the nature of the international political and economic relations which will obtain in the world, after victory has been achieved, is to us all a matter of profound self-interest. SUMNER WELLES, 1942.

NEW YORK

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1943

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To
E. P. C.

THE PACT

They have no pact to sign—our peaceful dead;
Pacts are for trembling hands and heads grown gray.
Ten million graves record what youth has said,
And cannot now un-say.

They have no pact to sign—our quiet dead
Whose eyes in that eternal peace are drowned.
Age doubts and wakes, and asks if night be fled;
But youth sleeps sound.

They have no pact to sign—our faithful dead.
Theirs is a deeper pledge, unseen, unheard,
Sealed in the dark, unwritten, sealed with red;
And they will keep their word.

They have no pact to sign—our happy dead.
But if, O God, if WE should sign in vain,
With dreadful eyes, out of each narrow bed,
Our dead will rise again.

ALFRED NOYES, November 11, 1923.

FOREWORD

THIS BOOK is offered as a modest contribution to the general discussion of a postwar world and in an effort to supply some grounds for the hope of many that a better order can and will ultimately emerge out of the present chaos; that there will be enough intelligence among the people, enough statesmanship in high places, to avoid in the future the blunders, the blindness, and the greed that finally engulfed the world in this second suicidal conflict.

It is difficult while the War is raging to detach ourselves from the ever-present problems of trying to win it, or immediately afterwards to think clearly when men are pre-occupied with thoughts of vengeance and retribution, with satisfying ambitions and righting wrongs, or with getting back as quickly as possible to their own little spheres of ordered living. This book has attempted to attain a calmer perspective by projecting the setting at a time well beyond the War's end, and by considering the problems of the Peace as three typical Americans, somewhat removed from the conflict and with widely different views and backgrounds, might resolve those problems. There is no claim to any particular originality in their views. An effort has been made rather to distill the current thinking on this general subject and at the same time to contribute something that might appeal primarily to "the man on the street" who might

want a brief, impartial, and fairly inclusive statement of the problems that the War will leave for him and for mankind to face and solve. The book covers, therefore, a wide variety of subjects but none exhaustively—it does not pretend to be a textbook on any of the highly technical subjects which will require expert handling. It is designed rather as a primer for tomorrow, an attempt to state in outline at least, some of the political, the economic, the social, and the moral issues which will arise, and to suggest for consideration some of the possible solutions in which the whole world is concerned. It is stimulating to try to envision the shape the world might take in years to come. Furthermore, the realization of better things, however difficult, must first evolve as plans, hopes, or dreams.

It is not pretended, of course, that all the things mentioned in the following pages will certainly come to pass, but we may venture the warning that some of them may, and the hope that others will.

In order that diverse views may be both fully and fairly stated, the book takes the form of a round-table discussion which it is hoped will also make it a little more readable and not just another tract on postwar planning and politics.

March, 1943.

NOTE: In addition to the books mentioned in the text, I am indebted to several of the books published by the Foreign Policy Association, to numerous articles in the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*, and *Fortune* and *Life*. Some of the material in the last chapter will be found also in *A Window on Broadway*, published in 1936. The cases referred to on pp. 204-7 are the following: *Roberts v. City of Boston*, 5 Cush. 198; *West Chester, etc., R.R. Co. v. Miles*, 55 Pa. St., 209; *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537; *Berea College v. Kentucky*, 211 U.S. 45.

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PART ONE
WAR'S END

I. Taps and Reveille

It was the fall of the year which, because of the suffering and courage of the people of the Allied and occupied countries, was called by many the year Nineteen Fortitude. The Second World War had ended some months before. The people were now beginning to refer to it as the Last World War, which meant to some the most recent, and reflected the fervent hope of others that it would indeed be the last, World War.

The horrors of the final year of the conflict cannot be adequately described. For a time it seemed as though the whole of Europe was doomed to be destroyed in one grand orgy of starvation, disease, and violent death. The Continent was rapidly becoming a vast waste of scorched lands and ruined cities. Millions of human beings, the backwash of the War, a great tide of sick, maimed, hungry, helpless humanity gathered in or drifted across these war-stricken spaces seeking food and safety, and spreading misery and contagion wherever they went. The fighting itself had become indescribably terrible, a veritable war of extermination, which grew in intensity as the War neared its close.

It will be recalled that for a time after our entrance into the War in 1941, and when a stalemate seemed at least a possibility, a few in the Allied, and many in the Axis, coun-

tries urged the opening again of the Munich umbrella. Neither America nor Britain had lost faith in ultimate and complete success, but it was argued by these appeasers that Germany was now ready to make a generous peace, that she ought not to be beaten too badly because she was needed as a foil to communist Russia, that Japan was needed to restrain too strong a China, and finally that the War's cost in men and money was reaching a point where the United Nations found it almost suicidal to go on much longer. In both England and America the defeatists, the partisans of the old order, the isolationists, the pacifists, the timid souls fearful of giving too much freedom to the "lesser breeds without the Law" and of taking too much risk themselves—all these united in advocating a negotiated peace. But fortunately the origin and the bias of this propaganda were apparent, and after the emphatic declaration by the United Nations that nothing short of an unconditional surrender would be acceptable, this propaganda languished, although it never entirely disappeared. So the Second World War, unlike the First, ended not only with the overwhelming defeat, but with the unconditional surrender of our enemies.

But it is not the purpose here to describe the last phase of the War and the campaigns that brought final victory for the Allied cause. As a necessary background for the discussion in the following pages something should be said, however, about the conditions in both Europe and America after the fighting ceased, and the resulting problems to be faced.

After the collapse of the Axis, the Allied armies took over

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and tried to bring some sort of order out of the almost universal chaos; to restrain violence and to restore at least a semblance of normal economic life to the Continent. Germany had systematically pursued a policy of exterminating the cultures, the industries, and even the peoples of what she considered the inferior non-Nordic countries under her rule. Non-Germans who survived starvation and firing squads had been limited chiefly to agricultural pursuits and to work in German-owned factories for German-controlled markets—a vivid pattern and forecast of the kind of world Germany had proudly declared would be her world for the next thousand years. The very difficult task was to reconstruct on such a foundation a peacetime normal existence, and at the same time to police the Axis and other countries.

The situation of the women and children and other non-combatants in the Axis countries also was pitiable in the extreme. Not a few of these unfortunates were probably out of sympathy with the autocratic regimes under which they had been compelled to live, but they were as helpless as the rest of the people of Europe to protest. Financial and other assistance was given to these people, as to others in Europe who now came out of hiding, and they succeeded in establishing some order under the protection of the armies of occupation. Every effort was made to shield the Germans from the fury which was raging like the fires of hell all over the Continent. To such terror-stricken creatures the soldiers of the occupying forces appeared in the guise of angels of light.

The Nazi party leaders and members found themselves

now regarded as political pariahs throughout Germany. In fact, many of the charges against the Nazis which were tried by the Allied tribunals were brought by fellow Germans who had suffered so much at the hands of the Gestapo and others.

Just a few words about Japan. With the occupation of the islands by our troops, the rest of the sprawling empire gradually fell apart; but guerrilla fighting continued for some time in the remoter regions where millions of Japanese were strongly entrenched and amply supplied. In fact, it was suspected by some that Japan had been carrying out an ambitious plan to transplant the major part of the Japanese population from barren Nippon to the fabulously rich East Indies, and to make those islands the future center of the Japanese Empire. The enormous problem of dislodging and repatriating this horde of Japanese fell chiefly to the Dutch.

In Europe every help was extended to the countries formerly under German control as they tried to re-establish their old regimes, or other regimes of their choice, and to save their people from further disintegration. But many places presented a grim picture of mob rule, revolution, and even of civil war as rival factions sought to take over the government. In many countries there was a strong feeling against restoring the old regimes which were, rightly or wrongly, held responsible for the failure to meet the German menace. In all these countries it was necessary for the armed forces to preserve order while helping the people through something like a democratic process to choose a

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government. All Europe needed not only to be fed and clothed and put to work, but to be policed and governed while it regained its sanity and health. The fact that all factions looked to America for the very necessities of life, gave her power to bring about some sort of order; but inevitably it also brought accusations of undue interference in local politics, as America had often to choose between rival parties in her disinterested efforts to help the people themselves.

These tasks fell very largely on America, which had been touched relatively less by the War. But in some fields, at least, peace brought to America also something akin to chaos, for there had been little adequate preparation for the return to a peacetime status. The President's pleas for such plans had in the main been ignored by a reactionary Congress, and most of the administration's recommendations were either tabled for the duration, or talked to death. Millions were thrown out of employment by the sudden closing of the factories engaged in war work, and these millions were swelled by other millions demobilized from our armed forces throughout the world, although complete demobilization seemed likely to take at least two years. There was great scarcity of manufactured products of almost every kind, because of the diversion to war industry, and much time was required to readjust the ponderous machinery of manufacturing to peacetime work. There was great food scarcity caused by the long-time shortage of farm labor. Taxes were a heavy burden on every man and woman in America, even those with the most modest incomes, and

this burden promised to continue for years, hampering the provision of capital for rejuvenating enterprise, and lowering the scale of living. A dangerous inflation had become a reality in spite of the remedies belatedly provided by Congress to check its rise. Labor and capital were at each other's throats again, and many industries were completely paralyzed by strikes and lockouts. A strong anti-labor-union sentiment throughout the country encouraged Congress to pass drastic legislation regulating the unions, and particularly curbing the power of their leaders. On the other hand, there was a decided swing of sentiment against regulations in general since the end of hostilities, and Congress reflected this in repealing many of the war powers of the President. The extremes to which many of the authorities in Washington had gone in establishing bureaucratic rule for the country, though admittedly necessary to win the War, had done wonders in crystallizing sentiment against all kinds of centralized autocratic power. But unfortunately the pendulum swung too far to the right, and many of the controls of prices, and so forth, which were so quickly released, had to be restored as quickly in order to avoid runaway inflation and all the familiar evils of unregulated greed. Europe itself furnished an immediate and terrifying object lesson of what we might otherwise suffer in this country. As Washington again began to tighten its control on prices and on business generally, the public became somewhat more reconciled to a modified peacetime autocracy, with the hope that it would be short-lived. But many Americans, now unrestrained by arguments for a unified effort to win the War, exercised

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their full constitutional rights of free speech with characteristic heat and bitterness.

On the cessation of hostilities, the flotation of bonds to meet the mounting debt of the United States became somewhat more difficult. The appeal now was not to save America and the conquered countries of the world from slavery, but to restore American business to a normal basis and to save millions of people throughout the world from the consequences of the War—starvation, disease, and economic ruin. The administration, in conjunction with England, had launched extensive plans for the rehabilitation of Europe and of the backward countries of both hemispheres, requiring the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars. Americans now were interested chiefly in finding jobs or in rebuilding their own wrecked fortunes and showed little enthusiasm at first for these humanitarian plans, however clear it was that the economic salvation of the rest of the world was also essential to their own. There was, as stated above, a period of bewilderment and readjustment, as America tried to get back on a normal peace basis, and to put into effect too hastily devised plans for a revival of peacetime enterprises and the absorption therein of millions of men from the fighting forces and from the wartime work. But this was done with surprising rapidity and smoothness, considering the lack of plans and the enormity of the task, and the picture soon changed. The peacetime scarcities were so great both in this country and abroad, that there was work enough for every one, if it could only be organized and financed. American initiative and organizing ability

quickly took hold of the job, and in a short time the government had to take measures to prevent an incipient boom from taking on dangerous proportions. The new government issues of the so-called "prosperity bonds" at first went slowly, but soon were absorbed in enormous amounts. All Europe, particularly Russia and France, required vast sums for rehabilitation; and Europe as well as China and Latin America offered alluring opportunities for the investment of private capital, which was given every encouragement. The appeals of the President to help save Europe from chaos and extinction were soon translated into sales talks on the importance of building up mutually profitable markets throughout the world. The needs of Germany and Italy met with surprisingly generous response from their nationals in this country. With democratic and cooperative regimes in power in both those countries, American bitterness against them rapidly evaporated—too rapidly some of the less sentimental were inclined to think. Italy and Germany, as well as Japan, however, remained under the firm military rule of the United Nations, and were likely to be for many years to come.

Typical of the enlightened attitude of American business toward the new outlook were advertisements such as the following by a large engineering concern, which appeared in magazines throughout the country:

America has caught up with the idea that, as the war we fought was a global war, the peace must be global, a world-wide peace. Now as never before in the memory of man, industrial

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brains and business vision are face to face with world-wide opportunity. The world is waiting for a constructive industrial leadership, waiting for the resources, manpower, and markets, waiting and hoping *not for exploitation, but for cooperation.*

Typical also was a statement by Wellington Koo, Jr., concerning China and the opportunities awaiting American enterprise and capital in that country, and published as an advertisement in many magazines:

CHINA could develop her productive power threefold in a dozen years in an era of peace and international cooperation. COAL AND IRON—Our coal reserves are estimated at 250 billion tons. Our iron ore reserves should last 600 years. TRANSPORTATION—China, including Manchuria, has only 27 miles of railway per million population compared with 1,700 miles in the U.S.A. AGRICULTURE—China must first improve her agriculture. Industries producing clothing, food and other daily necessities are greatly needed. MINERALS—China possesses almost a world monopoly of tungsten and antimony. These and other minerals are awaiting development. INDUSTRY—China will need power plants, steel and chemicals; then mining and processing plants; and finally, machinery and machine tools. China can meet the modern challenge.

One of the striking achievements in the early months after the peace was the completion, under the general plan to give employment through great public works, of Vice President Wallace's suggested land and air highway, extending from Buenos Aires at the south on up through the United States, Canada, Alaska, into Siberia, Russia and Western Europe, and including China and India. This vast

area was linked together by the main highway with collateral land, water, and air routes to the rest of the world. It was under the control of a body known as the Joint International Highways and Airways Authority. Its beneficial effects, as was predicted, were immediate and far reaching, both in opening new markets for the western world and in bringing the products of Asia to the Americas. It also brought the culture and the peoples of these widely separated regions into an association of friendship and interchange undreamed of before. It furnished a living and vivid example of the possibilities for good to the new world, in easy and swift communications. Along with this association came great improvements among the more backward peoples in culture, in industry and in the whole realm of better living. Instead of flooding America with the products of the cheap labor of the Orient, as pessimists predicted and many feared, the highway played its part in increasing demand for everything that America could produce, food products included, and there dawned a new era of prosperity world-wide in its scope. Pessimists still doubted whether this era would last, once the Asiatics waked up to their opportunities and began to offer real competition in our markets, but there was nothing so far to indicate such a danger.

But it was a matter of common and disheartening comment that while industry and public opinion in general were thus alive to the hope awakening throughout the world and to the new horizons of opportunity and freedom opening up for us and all mankind, many of our politicians in Washington insisted on thinking and talking in terms of the nar-

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row provincialism of the 1920's. They had "learned nothing and forgotten nothing" since that time.

As stated above, there was a great scarcity of essential manufactured products as industry began to get back on a normal peace basis. The automobile companies, for instance, had largely scrapped their dies and heavy machinery designed for passenger cars, and at least a year was required to retool, and so on. In the meantime, the clumsy but sturdy jeeps were in demand, and great numbers had been converted to civilian uses. The increasing demands from Europe for everything we could raise or manufacture aggravated a serious situation, and but for such government controls as were in force, there would undoubtedly have been a more disastrous wave of inflation such as engulfed parts of Europe after the First World War. As it was, speculation and extravagance were everywhere in evidence. There were other and related departures from sound business and good morals as well as from the older standards of good taste, which were common following the previous War: dances borrowed from the remote and savage regions of the earth, art from the same sources, raucous and barbaric music, and other caricatures of things regarded in normal times as worthy of emulation and praise. This revolt against the old standards of perfection was particularly evident in the realm of fiction, where books and plays dealt *ad nauseam* with the abnormal and the bizarre, with degeneracy of all descriptions, and in a style that did violence to all that our earlier models of writing had taught us to enjoy and admire. The virtues which had an appeal in real life—courage, de-

gency, and right living—seemed to have no appeal to the writers of such fiction. As one critic said, such writings, though marked by great skill, were like Goya's brilliant paintings of the degenerate Spanish Court, done with the oily iridescence of decay. Eugene O'Neill, writing of the plays that followed the First World War, had described the action therein as "resembling the unclean antics of half-witted children," a description that fitted perfectly many of the plays of the present stage.

But the whole social order seemed to be undergoing a radical change or readjustment. There was no moneyed class in the old sense. Some saw a strong drift toward radical socialism under various political labels, and a real threat to the whole profit system.

Men viewed with mixed feelings the extraordinary revolution in industry and living conditions wrought by science since the War. With the great technological advances, many feared the effect on employment. With the hundreds of millions in China and India taught for the first time the use of machines, and with unlimited raw materials to feed those machines, many wondered about the effect on our domestic economy. With the guarantees of free and unrestricted trade throughout the world, many feared that the universal leveling process—up and down—would seriously lower our own standard of living.

The airplane had taken over much of the business of the railroads and steamship lines in passenger, express, and mail transportation. Even of light and perishable freight a considerable amount was carried by planes and gliders. For

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better or for worse, the plane had also brought the whole world into closer association, breaking down tariff and racial barriers, and with them much of the old antagonisms which they had caused. Synthetic products developed during the War had on the other hand tended to make many countries independent in terms of raw materials. Thus there disappeared all grounds for the old "have-not" arguments offered as justification for the wars of conquest. The disposition was to open the sources of raw materials to every country without restriction, as recommended in the Atlantic Charter, and many considered this one of the real gains of the War—or rather of the Peace.

For this and other reasons there was hope that the final peace conference would be more successful than the preceding one in devising some substitute for war and a workable plan for bringing the whole world together in friendlier relations. It was evident as never before in the history of the world that cooperation rather than trade rivalry or isolation was necessary to the very existence of any country. Therefore general disarmament seemed nearer than ever before in the new world. The airplane, which in its destructiveness had been such a curse during the War, now took on the character of one of the great blessings of humanity in bringing the world closer together. Its devastating power as a military weapon constituted one of the strongest arguments, in fact, for never allowing the world to reach a point again where a resort to war would be tolerated. Nothing short of the end of the race itself seemed to be the alternative to a permanent peace.

More will be said later about the work of the various conferences concerned with the Peace and the postwar world, which were being held in Washington, London, Moscow, and Chungking, in addition to the central meetings in Geneva. It was universally recognized, as was not done at Versailles, that the framing of a just and lasting peace was not a single act, but a continuous procedure likely to last many years and requiring many modifications from time to time as the problems reshaped themselves.

Fortunately it was also recognized from the start in these preliminary conferences that each one of the major powers—Britain, America, Russia, and China—had made an indispensable contribution to the winning of the War. In other words, each of these countries had so contributed, and it was conceded by all that but for the contribution of each country the War would in all probability have been lost. China's long and brilliant resistance to Japan made it possible for both America and Russia to prepare. But for Britain's magnificent defense, long practically unsupported, Germany would have found Russia and later the United States comparatively easy conquests. But for Russia's brilliant and heroic defense and the consequent wrecking of Hitler's entire plan for the conquest of the world, Germany would easily have overthrown Britain and later brought America to her knees. And but for America's services as the "arsenal of democracy," and the vast man power she later threw into the conflict, England, Russia, and China would almost certainly have been compelled to yield to the German might. In a fine spirit of cooperation these facts were universally con-

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ceded, furnishing a hopeful basis for the difficult conferences to follow.

Finally, it should be mentioned that great strides in the conquest of disease had also resulted from the War. Medical science had learned much about food and drugs and disease prevention in general, and the new generation seemed likely to live longer, live more happily and comfortably than any generation in history. But there was less likelihood that the race would return to its old luxuries, or that there would be a life of elegant ease for very many again.

It was in the realm of government that mankind still hobbled along on crutches. What has been said of the United States was also true of the rest of the world. There were the enlightened politicians who could think in terms of the future, but there were also many who thought only in the formulas of the past and allowed their political fortunes and narrow nationalism to come ahead of the wider public good. Democratic procedure, which was now becoming the policy throughout the Americas and Europe, as in other parts of the world, allowed the politician of the old order to flourish, along with his more enlightened brother. It was recognized that education was the remedy, and not the suppression of freedom of political thinking and action. Time was therefore required to teach men how to profit by democratic ways.

In spite of all the confusion of thinking and conflict of interests throughout the world, no one assumed that there would ever be a return to the old order, whatever the new

order might be. It could be said again, as General Smuts said in 1918: "There is no doubt that mankind is once more on the move. Tents have been struck and the great caravan of humanity is once more on the march."

Such in brief is the background for the following discussions of the problems of a world at last turned to thoughts of peace. It may be well to keep this background in mind—grim, beclouded, but hopeful as the picture is—in order that we may the better understand the kind of world which we all are about to enter, and in which we all shall have to live.

One further detail on the grimmer side has not been mentioned. Our hospitals were crowded to overflowing with thousands of casualties of the War. We are concerned with one such hospital on the Pacific Coast, in which three men were trying to regain their health. They were fairly typical Americans, although differing widely in points of view and in experiences and training. These men during their very active lives had found time to do a good deal of thinking, and during their months of enforced idleness in the hospital had done a good deal more. These are the three men:

1. ROBERT EMMET COLSTON, thirty-two, a young liberal from St. Louis, blinded by liquid fire in a commando raid on New Guinea. There was hope that careful treatment might partially restore his sight. He had made economics his major subject at Columbia and hoped ultimately to fill some post concerned with the reconstruction of Europe. Before entering the army, he had served first as a reporter

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in New York, and later as a correspondent in Washington of a St. Louis paper, and had found time to write articles for the magazines on his favorite subject. One of his fellow reporters had described him in the words of Sabatini as having been "born with the gift of laughter and a sense that the world is mad."

2. COLONEL JOEL WHITE, forty-six, a lawyer by profession, who called himself a conservative Democrat. He had fought bravely in the Pacific campaign, was on a ship torpedoed near the Solomon Islands but escaped to a raft, from which he was rescued after sixteen days and hospitalized to America, his health badly impaired by the experience. Born in West Virginia, he had graduated from the Virginia Military Institute and had gone to Harvard for the study of law. Following graduation, he practiced his profession for a number of years in the South, and later in New York as counsel for a large oil company. After Pearl Harbor, he volunteered in the Marines. Of a scholarly and judicial turn of mind, he had long been interested in international problems, his pet aversion being American isolationism.

3. MALCOLM MACDONALD, fifty-four, an old-line Republican and at one time an active isolationist, the head of a large concern on the Pacific Coast manufacturing refrigerators. He had gone to Washington in an administrative job following Pearl Harbor, but had had a nervous breakdown from overwork. Proud of his Scotch blood, a conservative of the old school, he had lived many years in Boston, where he was born and where he rose to the presidency of his company before moving to California on account of his health.

Hating radicals in every field, but open-minded in the face of sound reasoning, he was highly intelligent and widely informed; he had decided misgivings for the future of the country but did not lack hope, provided the radicals could be curbed and taught some sense. When accused of gross disloyalty for leaving his beloved New England, he would quote his favorite limerick:

There was a poor duffer in Boston,
Who the horns of a dilemma was tossed on,
As to whether 'twere best
To be rich in the West,
Or poor and peculiar in Boston.

Accident had drawn these men together in the hospital, and friendship resulted. They were all deeply interested in the issues growing out of the War and found it profitable to meet together for informal discussions every week or oftener, as the doctors permitted, first in order to give Captain Colston the benefit of their reading in the meantime, and then to indulge in a general exchange of views, to which he contributed more than his part, in spite of his inability to do any reading himself.

In one of their early discussions Colonel White laughingly called Colston a Red, and MacDonald proposed that to complete the color scheme they might call him a Blue, because he admitted he was an ardent bluebonnet Scot (but he would not admit that he was a Tory); and he added that it was something to be thankful for that he did not live in a country where everybody's opinion would have to be red,

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or white, or blue, according to the complexion of the party in power at the time. On which Colston remarked that it took all the colors of the spectrum to make a perfect white, which was the emblem of truth. Whereupon Colonel White thanked him for the no doubt unintended compliment and promised to try to deserve it.

An effort has been made in the following pages to reflect fairly and fully the different views of these men. It is of the genius of America to allow all sides a hearing, as it is a part of our judicial procedure, through which we try to arrive at the truth. This in the realm of public discussion and public action, as elsewhere in life, spells freedom, which we regard as our most precious heritage. If, in its exercise, we do not always reach the right conclusion or do the wise thing, we are still free men, which is far more to be desired.

PART TWO

TOWARD A BETTER WORLD

II. *Toward a Wider World*

RED: I hope you gentlemen have a little more cheerful news to report this morning. Have we given the world a new Charter of Democracy?

BLUE: We haven't gotten around to that yet, but it is pleasant to read that we have sent another fleet of mercy ships to Europe with food, drugs, and Red Cross nurses. It looks as if it will take at least another year to restore these undernourished millions to a semblance of health. The plague is still serious in southeastern Europe, and science doesn't seem able to do very much about it. Food is the chief remedy apparently, and America is responding with characteristic generosity to the appeals for help.

R.: In spite of that, I am ashamed of America. She reminds me of the sentimentalists who salve their consciences by giving baskets of food to the poor at Christmastime, but leave them to starve during all the rest of the year. They should rather rebuild the family structure by finding regular work for the head of the family, some medical attention for the sick, and better surroundings for the children the year around.

B.: But is not America now doing just that for Europe? I am proud of her!

R.: I repeat, I am ashamed of her—which, I hope is not

an unpatriotic statement to make. I am quoting the words of one of your great preachers I heard over the radio yesterday, and I am sure I speak for millions of Americans, those who have the courage and intelligence to think back twenty-five years and recall what we did, or failed to do, at that time. We had it in our power then to organize a peace that would have made this Second War impossible; we threw away that greatest opportunity in history because it might have cost us something to cooperate with the other countries of the world. We were sure we could get along safely, cheaply, and comfortably without cooperation. You see now what that kind of statesmanship has cost us and cost the world—of which we are a part whether we like it or not. And now we are raising another crop of that same brand of blind, selfish, small minded patriots, who are determined to see that America commits the same ghastly blunder again. No, this is not a time for pride. As Dr. Fosdick said, it is time for penitence and humility and contrite recognition of our sins. The democracies won the last War; they sat in the place of power; they could have prevented all this; they ought to be ashamed!

WHITE: I agree with you, Captain, that we should be ashamed of what we did after the last War, but I do not agree that we have failed to learn our lesson. I think you magnify the importance of these noisy isolationists. In fact, I believe they serve a useful purpose in reminding us, as they have reminded you, of our sins of the past and of the terrific price we have had to pay for their folly. I will tell you a parable:

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In a certain town there was a very steep precipice, and the citizens were constantly falling over and getting killed or maimed for life. It was a very charitable town, and whenever there was an accident its citizens would rush ambulances and nurses and doctors and drugs and bandages to the victims. This went on from year to year, until at last one wise old philosopher had the bright idea of building a wall at the top of the precipice to keep people from falling over in the first place. We are going to build such a wall this time.

B.: To continue your parable, I hope you put the right kind of masons and architects on the job, and not a lot of builders of air castles, thinking in terms of the millennium. These damned radicals and socialist dreamers! But the doctor says I mustn't discuss socialism. Please excuse me, Red.

R.: All I want to add is that I hope we won't pull down the wall before we get it half started, as we did after the last War!

W.: I think we have learned something in the last twenty-five years. I am willing to bet a goodly amount that something comes out of all the talk now going on that you both could agree is a real advance toward a better world. And that would indeed be an achievement in international politics! I have followed public opinion here and abroad rather closely since I have been in the hospital, and I can say with a good deal of conviction that in our international thinking we are far beyond the crossroads grocery era of the early twenties.

R.: And the late forties? I attended a political meeting

in a Missouri town in October, 1940, when a farmer jumped on his congressman because he had heard that Congress had voted "nigh onto ten thousand dollars to send a minister to South Americkey to sell our crops or something thar! By cracky, that was just throwing good American money away, when we ought to be fixing up our roads right here in Beasley County." I am willing to be called an internationalist dreamer for trying to plan for something better than the rotten state of things we have had during my short sojourn on this planet. The oldsters have had a quarter of a century of it, and you can see what a mess they have handed down to the younger generation to work out. It may be that what we need is more dreamers and fewer so-called statesmen. I am grateful to Colonel White for giving me something new to think about every now and then, and I hope we both can get out of this darned hospital before it is too late to be able to do some spadework toward putting these dreams into effect.

B.: You two remind me of the lines in Omar Khayyam:

Ah, Love,—could you and I with Him conspire,
To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
Remould it nearer to the heart's desire!

W.: I think you will admit, friend Blue, in that case we would have something of the advantage which the Creator had in the beginning of things: we could at least start with chaos in creating a new sort of world.

B.: I wish I had the idealism—or reckless imagination—

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you both seem to have. I am afraid we shall continue to have a "sorry scheme of things"—about what we have always had, if not a little worse, human nature being what it is. I must confess I don't see any great statesmanship displayed at the conferences so far held in London, Moscow, and Washington. On the contrary, there are the old hatreds, jealousies, and rivalries, the jockeying for position, each country suspicious of all the others, all the human meannesses that have cursed the diplomacy of Europe ever since there was a Europe. I am afraid you idealists ask the impossible in expecting a great deal of good to come out of such deliberations, much as I would like to think otherwise. I am waiting to be shown.

W.: Don't be too impatient. These conferences are going to last a good many years, I am glad to say—long enough for the passions of the world to cool down and for men to get their bearings. I have difficulty in getting mine, hard as I try, with the memories of all the wrongs committed by Germany and Japan still fresh. You are right: we are dealing with human beings, and we must allow for human frailties, and not expect perfection. It will take a long time, infinite patience, and rare wisdom to straighten out the awful problems of national boundaries, racial groups, repatriation, reconstruction; of just punishment of the guilty, restoration of stolen property, indemnities, guarantees, machinery for collective security and a permanent peace, and what not. I am an idealist, my dear Mac, to the extent of believing that hardheaded common sense will ultimately succeed in bringing something better out of this present chaos than we had

before; and I am a realist to the extent of believing that this is our last chance to do so. The consequences of failure are too horrible to contemplate. So let us at least hitch our wagon to a star and see how far it will pull us out of this hole.

R.: In that sense I suppose I am also an idealist, as some of my friends have called me. I tell them that we dreamers fix our eyes upon the stars, not because we ever expect to reach them, but, like the mariners, because we find them useful to steer by.

W.: My boy, a blind man can sometimes see much farther than we who have two good eyes! I take my hat off to you for that brave sentiment. You see why I find it so helpful to try out my ideas on you two. Blue is a good antidote for impractical idealism—and there is a lot of that in the world; but it helps to look a little farther than the natural eye can see when we are dealing with as troubled a world as now lies before us.

III. War's Aims

WHITE: I promised you gentlemen to discuss in outline some of the conclusions I have reached in my months of enforced idleness in the hospital, during which I have read what I could on the War and the problems which the peace has thrust upon us. I have been impressed with several things as a result of this reading.

The first is the very considerable amount of practical thinking on these problems that was done in both England and America while the War was still raging. This was in striking contrast with the First World War. When the Armistice was signed in 1918, while it came with great suddenness, it found us wholly unprepared to deal intelligently with the issues that then confronted the world. The result was a treaty reflecting not intelligent planning and sound statesmanship, but the worst of the old world diplomacy which was itself responsible for the War. Whether the Versailles Treaty was too severe or not severe enough, in any event it failed to accomplish its purpose; the machinery for enforcing it soon fell apart, because there was no adequate foundation laid beforehand for its support.

My second observation is the surprising unity of opinion during the recent War on the methods of dealing with the major problems growing out of the War. Men in both pub-

lic and private life, reflecting every shade of opinion, from the extreme radical to the most conservative Tory, seemed in agreement on the main outlines. Incidentally, in all the agreements and declarations of policy there was much more said about duties than about rights, about the responsibilities resting upon the great powers to help protect the weaker and less fortunate—a new and reassuring note, certainly, in international affairs.

But a further observation is that, with all this intelligent thinking and planning, our legislative bodies showed so little foresight and statesmanship in preparing for the Peace. In every quarter there had grown up a realization of the imperative necessity of reaching agreements wherever possible on the plans for peace before the cessation of hostilities, after which national jealousies and ambitions, and all the angry emotions carried over from the War, would inevitably shape or warp the policies of the treaty makers. As was stated by Sumner Welles as early as November, 1942: "We cannot afford to permit the basic issues by which the destiny of humanity will be determined, to evolve without prior agreement, in hurried confusion, by a group of harassed statesmen working against time, pressed on one side by the popular demand for immediate demobilization, and crowded on the other by the exigencies of domestic politics."

A final observation is that to the extent that such earlier agreements or declarations of policy were framed and accepted, the world was immeasurably the gainer. Not only was the shape of the future treaty or treaties thus largely

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determined in an atmosphere of fair dealing, mutual concession and farsighted statesmanship, but, as I believe, the course of history for generations to come was given sound and wise direction. The Atlantic Charter, provisions in the Lend-Lease Agreements looking toward the Peace, all the treaties, pacts, and accords entered into between the European countries in exile—all of these were invaluable contributions toward the future peace and welfare of the world, and laid strong foundations on which the treaty makers of the next few years can begin to build.

RED: I hope our Tory friends here and in England will not try to squirm out of these agreements, on the ground that they were not authorized or approved by those same shortsighted legislative bodies of which you spoke. Some of our postwar readjustments might begin with them.

BLUE: I think we can get along with a considerable change at least in their personnel, but I hope you radicals won't begin monkeying with the Constitution itself.

W.: I suppose we shall see some changes even in our Constitution, as after every war in our history. But I have no fears as to our form of government. I got very tired listening to our conservative friends declaring that the War would be the end of our democracy because of the broad powers conferred on or assumed by the President. The War certainly would have been the end of our democracy had the President not exercised those powers. I predict that the verdict of history will be that, in so far as the President failed, it was in not being more autocratic during that critical time when everything should have been subordinated to

winning the War. Too long we allowed "business as usual" and labor union strikes, dissensions and demands to slow up our efforts. These powers were conferred on the President by Congress and could be withdrawn whenever Congress saw fit—and we have seen ample evidence of the existence of that constitutional right of Congress in the steps taken by the present body to get back to normalcy. It seems to pride itself on reasserting its prerogatives, merely to show that they still exist.

R.: If I remember my American history aright, Lincoln went far beyond anything Roosevelt ever did in ignoring the Constitution. Did he not say something to the effect that it was more important to preserve the Union than to preserve the Constitution? But with our democratic processes intact (as they always will be) we at that time quickly regained whatever liberties we had allowed Lincoln to curtail.

W.: Let me continue now with the statement of the main points on which, as I said, all men of every shade of opinion seemed to agree:

First, we must have some form of universal disarmament short of hampering our ability to preserve order internally, to enforce the terms of peace and to restrain international brigandage wherever it may break forth. Therefore—

Second, we must have some adequate machinery for preserving the peace and for settling justly and promptly all international disputes, supported by a strong association or league of the nations of the world, or of most of them; which means that—

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In the third place, we must have a court of international relations and a police force to compel obedience to its decrees. Having achieved these three great objectives, we shall find easier the accomplishment of these other things:

Fourth, access by all the countries of the world to the natural resources they lack, recognizing that to a greater or less degree every country is a "have not" country. And from this it follows that—

Fifth, tariff walls, cartels, preferential tariffs, and all other trade restrictions must be modified and in many cases entirely removed. Here will come one of the acid tests of the willingness of a country to sacrifice some of its sovereignty for the good of the whole world. We are beginning to realize that what at the time appears to be an act of statesman-like unselfishness often proves later to be but a case of far-sighted selfishness. But at this time at least there is general recognition by our protectionist friends, like ex-President Hoover and others, that such concessions must be made if we are to have a permanent peace. And also—

Sixth, immigration restrictions and related problems must be reconsidered with a view on the one hand of giving the overcrowded nations a fair opportunity to expand into the favorable regions of the earth without the necessity of resorting to wars of conquest; but, on the other hand, each country must be allowed to impose fair limitations on immigration to its own shores. There is now in evidence a tremendous urge by the Europeans to come to America. Some we must admit, but we have the right to encourage most of these people to reestablish their own cultures, their own

governments, their own industries, in the lands of their birth, as many will prefer to do. The geographical and racial imperatives which have shaped the destinies of peoples in the past must still be recognized, in spite of what our German geopoliticians tried to establish to the contrary. Germany did violence to immemorial rights and fundamentals in trying to stamp out the cultures of the other countries of Europe, and to supplant those cultures with its own. The Germans sought to do this by force, but the same thing could be accomplished by overwhelming and unrestrained immigration, against which a country has a right to protect itself. Men have a right that is as fundamental as human nature itself to protect their own peculiar ideologies, and expand them within their own borders; and it is no concern of others whether these ideologies are good, bad, or indifferent. It will readily be seen that immigration is closely related to this right. There will arise also the question as to how far a country can go in excluding enemies of its own form of government. That should be a matter left to each country to determine.

R.: My guess is there will be a considerable latitude allowed to the emissaries of various political and religious faiths to go where they please. If their ideas are good, they should be welcome. If they are bad, there should be no fear of being able to show that they are such. While I am not a Bolshevist, I have no patience with Americans who are afraid to let the Bolshevists and all the others have their say, as though we lacked either the intelligence to recognize, or the strength of will to resist, what is patently unsound. One

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suspects that some of these fellows fear that the Bolshevik doctrines after all may have something to recommend them, and like the reactionaries in all ages, they are afraid of too much light.

B.: I am glad to know, Captain, that you are not really a Red, although we like to call you such.

R.: I am not even a pink, although I blush sometimes when I see what some of you capitalists get by with. For that you can call me a liberal, or even a radical or a socialist, if you like.

W.: But to continue my summary. In the seventh place, while we recognize to the full the freedom of speech and of action to be enjoyed by all, it will be permissible and even highly desirable to encourage in principle the establishment of representative or democratic forms of government throughout the world, making due allowance of course for the fitness of the particular people to exercise that form of government. As the President said in discussing the status of the Philippines, a period of preparation and training may be necessary before a people is ready to exercise the full rights of suffrage. We are all concerned when the form of government adopted by a free country is such as to constitute a threat to the rest of the world, and we are concerned also in seeing that that country has, not necessarily a democratic form of government, but the government that its people prefer—one which will give adequate expression to their wishes, or at least the wishes of those among them advanced far enough beyond the savage state to be capable of a valid judgment. Which may be another way of saying a form of

government that is compatible with a world committed to the peaceful settlement of disputes.

R.: Does all this mean an end of imperialism? or of the colonial system?

W.: I hope so, in the old sense. I suppose you have in mind the British Empire and Churchill's statement that he had no idea of presiding over its liquidation. It has been stated by Britain that she expects to allow her colonies to assume the status of commonwealths whenever they are ready for it. As General Smuts so well said, liberty is not to be enforced from the outside, it is something to be achieved and earned—although you may not agree with him that the British Empire as it exists today "is the widest system of organized freedom which has ever existed in history." India, he pointed out, could assume at once the status of a commonwealth if it so desired, but it must work out that problem within its own diverse elements. India must first frame and adopt a free constitution, allowing all those elements a voice in its government. During the War the Holland government in exile declared that it would see that the East Indies were given a similar opportunity to achieve their freedom. There are throughout the world colonial possessions of France, England, Holland, and other countries that must continue as colonies either under their present governments, or under mandates or protectorates which will guarantee ample opportunity to achieve independence, or an equivalent freedom of action. This latter will certainly be the method of dealing with the present territorial possessions of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

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And this brings me to my final point:

Eighth, territorial adjustments. These will be among the most difficult of all problems to face, but certain principles will govern. There should be a minimum of expatriation, and on the other hand as much repatriation as seems practicable. The Germanic idea that no Germans, for instance, can live happily under any other than a German flag, and therefore Germany must own all territory where large numbers of Germans live—this principle, of course, could never be recognized, although every encouragement would no doubt be given to Germans elsewhere to return to Germany. In fact, the danger is that some of the countries of Europe may be unduly insistent and direct in hastening such a return by the Germans to their beloved fatherland. In working out the problems of minorities, it is necessary to recognize that majorities must govern, and the minorities must be willing to accept this principle, or else return to the country of their own blood. The United States has demonstrated, as have Switzerland and many other countries, that many different races can live peaceably and happily under a single flag, provided—and this is important—provided they are guaranteed *equal* civil rights and a *proportionate* voice in the government.

B.: Thank you, Colonel White, for so full a statement. There is one further observation I would like to add, and that is that since Pearl Harbor, America for the first time in its history has grown internationally minded in the sense that it has come to realize that it is really a part of the world, and that what happens in the remote Pacific might

affect a factory worker in Detroit. But this has been a slow process, even since Pearl Harbor. I changed over fairly promptly, however, from being an isolationist as the issue was thereby made so clear. I remember my own reaction to the insistence that we state our aims. I suspected it was an effort of the Nazi propagandists to divide us. I could not understand why the question should trouble anybody, because at that time it seemed abundantly clear that England was fighting for her very existence, and for ours, since our future was so closely involved with hers. If in the process England saved her colonies and her commonwealths, all the better, as every one of them would have soon become the prey of either Germany or Japan but for the British army and navy, and an additional threat to us. I felt no great concern as to how she might manage her possessions in future years—she had done pretty well by her commonwealths, whether by compulsion or otherwise.

W.: I can recall very clearly that, before Pearl Harbor certainly, Americans showed no crusading zeal to assure freedom to all the oppressed of the earth. We neither knew nor cared whether the Hindus or the Moslems were getting a square deal in India. Our interest in that question was a new phenomenon in international affairs. We were, before the War, ready to let the Philippines go, because (as I believe the debates in Congress will show) we wanted to tax their sugar, and not because of any great desire that they should be free. There were many isolationists, let it be remembered, who thought Japan was probably entitled to the Philippines anyway—so why not let her have them for her

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crowded millions? Many argued also that the islands were too far away for us to defend, and we should therefore not attempt to guarantee their independence. We would get involved in another war, sending our boys to die in the far Pacific for a few worthless islands. That was the familiar argument. I had many isolationist friends, both Republican and Democratic, who at that time affected great concern at the possibility of our fighting to preserve the British Empire. That we were fighting to crush Hitler and all he stood for, seemed to me enough. But I was willing to agree that it would probably help the wavering ones to have a definite statement of our aims, if there was any one in a position to make such a statement for this country—a statement that we were not fighting for imperialism anywhere in the world. Remembering how Congress had refused to back up Wilson when he attempted to speak for this country on a similar subject, I could well understand that, even if such a statement were made, it would not carry very great conviction to these objectors unless and until Congress took formal action on the subject. And the last thing Congress seemed to be thinking about was what we were to do after the War. It had long since surrendered its old-time function of shaping public opinion to the many abler free-lance columnists and editorial writers, not to mention the specialists in various fields whom Congress despised as “experts.” But I am glad that, in spite of these objections, we have all done so much thinking and planning with a view to the future, and that we attempted to reach agreements wherever possible before the end of the fighting.

R.: Was it not true that the British had been more insistent than the Americans in demanding a declaration of postwar policy? At least that was true of the Liberal element represented by such papers as the *Manchester Guardian*, which succeeded in rounding up general approval of the Beveridge report on postwar social objectives. It was the *Manchester Guardian*, by the way, that stated that the position of Great Britain as a leading world power had become a thing of the past; that in order to restore the confidence and esteem which America could feel for Britain, she ought to make it very clear that Americans were not being asked to underwrite the old British regime, with its mixture of patriotism and repression. Now that the War is over and we have no such clear statement, does it not give our isolationist friends an excuse to say as some are saying, that we should leave Europe once more to stew in its own juice? But I cannot forget that it was that same ghastly brand of provincialism by which Lodge and his followers wrecked the League, to whom the present woes of the world are as clearly attributable as any sequence of events in history can be traced from cause to result.

B.: I am not sure you would find complete agreement on that statement. But what did we fight for in this latest War? What were our major objectives? Many are still arguing that question, and I am afraid the great body of our people are still vague in their minds in spite of all the publicity that has come out of Washington and elsewhere in the last few months.

W.: I think most of the fog has lifted. The people in

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England who demanded a fuller statement of aims were for the most part the Liberals who wanted more social justice, while in America the people who were insistent on a declaration of war aims were many of them interested in preserving the *status quo ante*, and were fearful of the great social changes which the War was certain to bring about; that the War would be used as an excuse or cloak to commit the country to such fundamental social changes. They apparently reasoned that to compel a statement of aims would disclose their existence and thereby eliminate them. But just the opposite was the result. The aims were stated and every effort was made to get the United Nations committed to them. The Atlantic Charter and the Lend-Lease Agreements were but a beginning. There was a vast amount of enlightening discussion of aims. Public opinion shaped itself in both countries about as follows:

There was of course the first great aim to beat the Axis, and to make sure by every means possible that no such horror should overtake the world again—in other words, not only to win the War, as we had done the last time, but also to win the Peace, which we dismally failed to do in 1919.

The second aim, and one very closely related to the first, was to guarantee the four freedoms, not only to our own people, but as far as we could to all the peoples of the earth; and this not only because we might have a benevolent interest in their welfare, but because their welfare, their freedom, their security were, as we now began to realize, essential to our own. We should have learned that lesson in the First World War, but we did not. Now in a world more closely

bound together by mutual ties of trade, of quick communications, of economic needs, and especially by the necessity for a peaceful order of living, the importance of assuring the enjoyment of these freedoms by all men was recognized as never before

R.: Even by the dullest midwestern farmer, let us hope. I know too well that type of mind, for I have lived in the Middle West.

B.: I am not so sure that all of us see why, as a war aim at least, we should go in so strongly for social objectives.

R.: I understand that it came as a shock to some, as an agreeable surprise to others, that the Beveridge plan could be launched in England in the midst of her war effort, and while the outcome was still open to doubt. But probably nothing could have been more effective in unifying the British common people in their determination to win. It was one thing to remove the danger of a Nazi domination of Europe. That was a negative thing. It was much more to offer them an assurance that they and their children would be free from want and the consequences of sickness, unemployment and old age. That was making the Atlantic Charter a living thing. I remember one Labor member stated in 1940 that the people of London were not dying merely in order that Lord So-and-So might hunt grouse in Scotland during the open season.

B.: But I am wondering whether there is any great enthusiasm among our people to see that the savages of Borneo or the Solomon Islands have an old age pension, or the right to vote at the next primary election.

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W.: I think there is a considerable understanding among our people of the need of giving all these backward peoples a chance to rise above their present state, not only because we are so much interested in their freedom and general welfare (for they have become our neighbors in a sense we never appreciated before), but because we have learned that an attack on Midway might affect the price of meat in Portland, Maine. It might even affect the question whether there will be a Portland, Maine. By assuring these people, as we have done, that we are concerned in their well-being, we have made them our allies and friends as we could have done in no other way. And by offering them a higher standard of living, we have in addition made them profitable traders with our people in the years to come.

R.: You are stealing my thunder when you argue that the best assurance of our future prosperity is to raise the standard of living throughout the world. It seems to me both stupid and shortsighted to advocate a restriction of production. We should increase production after first increasing the demands for our products here and in other lands, while at the same time we increase the means of distributing those products. We should pay more attention to the consumer, and the producer will take care of himself.

B.: But you cannot do all three things at once. As I understand it, until the world is ready to absorb our production, we must either decrease it, or else suffer the consequences of an overstocked market. I hope that with the new order in the world there will be swift improvement, both in demand and in the means of transportation. Certainly, as to

the latter, with the enormous tonnage now available in shipping, with shipyards geared to increase that tonnage almost indefinitely, and with the shortage of food and goods of every kind throughout the earth, we should for a time at least have nothing to fear. What I am concerned about is what will be the situation five, ten, or fifty years hence. Then will come into play the application of your doctrine of raising the standard of living throughout the world, but with it will undoubtedly come more and more economic self-sufficiency among those same backward peoples you are talking about. They will not need to buy from us what they can produce themselves.

R.: But of course, the desire to buy must be coupled with the ability to buy, and that means the purchaser must also have something to sell, and we shall profit to the extent that these people have developed products that they can in turn divert into the channels of world trade. In other words, we must not lose sight of the need of developing purchasing power as well as of creating the needs that such power might seek to satisfy. The world has always flourished on the basis of every country having some things to sell which other countries need. I am no more afraid of the economic consequences to us of an increased standard of living among the present backward nations (I wish we had some other phrase to describe them) than I am of an undue decrease in employment resulting from increased efficiency in our factories and from our technological skill generally. Temporary unemployment will soon be taken up in other and doubtless more useful occupations, while the whole com-

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munity benefits by the new scientific advances. The technocrats do not frighten me very much.

W.: I have not fully answered your question yet as to the extent to which we have formulated the aims for which we fought the War. The Committee on Information has issued a volume giving only the barest outline of what has already been accepted by the Preliminary Conference in the political, social, and economic fields. But that mere outline covers more than five hundred pages. So you see we have been very concrete in some of our planning, and many of the details set forth in this book were agreed to long before the so-called armistice. The result was that many possible grounds for long drawn out disputes were removed before the fighting ceased, after which agreement would certainly have been much more difficult.

R.: While you are talking about war aims, I would like to remark that it is not quite accurate to say that we were fighting to preserve the American way of life. Millions of us insist on our right to change that way of life from time to time, as we have so often done in the past. We fought, not for the American way of life, but for the American right to change that way whenever we saw fit to do so.

W.: But that is the American way of life. In other words, we fought for the American form of government, which provides for making such changes in an orderly and peaceful manner, and not by revolution and violence.

R.: Will you let me close this discussion with Stalin's statement of the war aims of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition? He defined these aims as "the abolition of racial

exclusiveness, equality of nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, and the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes."

B.: I shall be very happy if Stalin keeps that last clause in mind when he sends his missionaries into other lands.

IV. War's Causes

RED: What we seem to be having here is a sort of three-man Town Hall. The trouble is we do not have a chairman to keep us on the subject, or to call us down when we talk too long, and we do not have an audience to clap when I happen to say a wise thing, or to hiss when you or Colonel White say a foolish one.

WHITE: These are serious drawbacks, but I think we have managed to avoid argument and to keep our talks within the limits of discussion, as I remarked the other day.

R.: Do you lawyers make a distinction between argument and discussion? There is a rule which my friends accuse me of following with great consistency:

In controversial powwows,
My perception is quite fine;
I always see both points of view:
The one that's wrong, and mine.

W.: So do we all at times. But there is quite a difference between discussion and argument. Argument seeks to impose your opinion on the other man; discussion seeks to arrive at the right opinion, whether it is yours or another's. Argument is often to show the other fellow how much you know; discussion is a method of learning the facts. In argu-

ment you never expect to yield your opinion, but in discussion you start without an opinion, or with one that is open to change. You approach discussion with an open mind, an argument with a closed mind and a determination to pry open the other fellow's and to make it conform with yours. So let us try to confine our talks to discussion.

R.: I wish you could persuade the noisy debaters who are flooding the airways with their rantings on these international issues to follow your advice. It looks as if they are incapable of stating the simplest fact or the most obvious proposition without overstating it.

W.: You have touched upon a point that most lawyers and politicians seem unable to grasp, and that is what President Taft (who was for so many years a judge on the federal bench) once described as the persuasive power of understatement. It is a principle I have tried to apply to myself, but I am afraid not always with success. We all like to overstate what we feel very strongly to be truth, in the hope that thereby we shall be more convincing, but the result is generally the opposite. The man who is conscientiously in search of truth, or who wants to help his fellows to see the truth will carry conviction by understatement. I lose all patience sometimes with my friends, who with the best of intentions are doing great injury to the good causes in which I am deeply interested, by their virulent and violent overstatements. I feel a certain mean satisfaction when I hear some of the isolationists make their preposterous statements as to the catastrophes which might overtake America if she should enter into even a simple accord for international co-

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operation. I am sure the reaction of all sensible listeners is that anything such men say should be taken with a very considerable amount of salt. What we are all trying to arrive at is the truth, and we should be scrupulously careful to state what in our familiar legal phrase is "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." If you will examine that statement, you will see that it is not mere redundancy. A man may state the exact truth, but not *all* of the truth, and thereby make a very false impression, so he must state the *whole* truth; or he might state the whole truth, and then *add* to it an assortment of falsehoods; so he should also state "nothing but the truth." In the heat of argument, or the zeal to establish a point, the best of us may fail to measure up to that severe standard. There is a quaint and rather unfamiliar passage from Lord Bacon, which I like to keep in mind when I am dealing with this very difficult subject of Truth:

For myself I found that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of Truth; as having a mind nimble and versatile enough to catch the semblance of things, and at the same time steady enough to fix and distinguish their subtler differences; as being gifted by nature with desire to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert, readiness to reconsider, carefulness to set in order, and as being a man that neither affects what is new nor admires what is old, and that hates every kind of imposture. So I thought my nature had a kind of familiarity with Truth.

BLUE: That reminds me of another passage (I think it is also from Bacon) that has also helped me in my thinking,

though in a very different way. In fact, I may use the lines as a guiding motto for a book, if I should ever write one: "Gaiety clears the mind, tedium confuses it, tension warps it, the sublime refreshes it."

R.: If I ever write a book, it will probably be on the very sour, dull, tedious, prolix, dry, and very unsublime but rather important subject of Economics, and in doing so I would like to inscribe on the title page what Alfred Zimmermann once so wisely said:

It is one of the greatest dangers of modern life that we are inclined to give up the attempt to study difficult problems as a whole. We relieve our consciences by flinging parts of them to specialists, who, in their turn, disclaim responsibility for general conclusions.

I lose all patience with the average American who makes some pretense to intelligence and yet dodges anything but the most superficial study of the vital questions affecting his daily life, his future and that of his children. Boys in high school often have a more intelligent understanding than he has of the simple problems of government, of political and social science, economics, hygiene, and the like. He refuses to read anything longer than an occasional newspaper editorial, or to listen to anything more enlightening than a brief debate on the radio; and he usually tunes that out for a session of jazz. I must confess we are like children, even the wisest of us: we prefer to occupy our minds with simple undisturbing things, with the agreeable, superficial mental occupations which are but a degree above the nursery.

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We would rather not be bothered with such problems as the danger of inflation, or the supply of consumer goods, with unemployment and the threat thereto of technological advances, with the standards of living and the cost of social security, with the national debt, or with any of these vital international problems that we three have merely touched on in our daily talks. All these dry and perplexing matters we would prefer to "fling to the specialists"; or, if the question takes on a political aspect, to entrust it to our voluble congressman who knows all the answers, and thus escape the burden of trying to work out an answer ourselves. We prefer, I repeat, the various concerns of childhood, animals and flowers and toys, for our grownups must have their toys: their radios, their cars, and their numberless household gadgets. And even in our old age—our second childhood—we would rather walk through the woods with a dog and a cane than be pestered with these problems that priests, poets, prophets and politicians are everlastingly shouting at us, especially around election time. This may be one reason why, when we are at last stirred by our petty prejudices or our political emotions to try to frame an intelligent opinion on these great problems of life, it is usually so utterly stupid and half baked. But we shall have to think about these problems, because they insist on a solution. We shall have to grow up, whether we want to or not.

W.: I shake hands with you on that statement, and I will try to apply what you say to myself. Which brings me again to the question which is still uppermost in my thinking: Why do we have wars, and what must we do to stop them?

Writers on the subject are in agreement that the justifiable causes of war are few. Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, limits such causes to three: defense, recovery of property, and punishment. Our own great jurist, James Kent, puts the matter in more precise legal phrase: "An injury either done or threatened to the perfect rights of a nation, or any of its members, and susceptible of no other redress." But the causes of war, justifiable or otherwise, are many. Henry Kittredge Norton in his book *Back of War*, published some years ago, gives a long list of such causes, which he divides into four general heads:

First, the primitive causes of war, which he lists as plunder, land, conquest, honor, and revenge.

Second, the social causes of war—dynastic ambitions, racial rivalry, religious intolerance, patriotism, nationalism, and self-determination.

Third, the economic causes of war—food supply, surplus population, trade, colonies, and imperialism.

Fourth, the political causes of war—national unity, national prestige, internal unrest, foreign intrigue, armaments, alliances and treaties, diplomacy, and propaganda.

R.: I think I can simplify that statement into two words: vanity and greed.

B.: If the eradication of all war depends upon the eradication of those two vices from human nature, I fear we shall always have wars.

W.: Unless we can curb these vices in nations as we curb them in individuals, by having laws against them, courts to administer the laws, and a sheriff to execute the judgments

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of the courts. Is not that, simply stated, the whole problem of war and peace? If we agree to this formula, America along with other countries on the globe will have to resolve, even at some sacrifice of sovereignty, to cooperate in order to organize and maintain the peace. Our selfish isolationism, which is grounded in both vanity and greed, will have to yield to a more intelligent form of selfishness, working in the interest of the common good, and therefore for our own safety as well. I cannot do better than quote a few lines from what the President said on that subject in his Columbus Day address in 1942:

There are a few people in this country who, when the collapse of the Axis begins, will tell our people we are safe once more; that we can tell the rest of the world to "stew in its own juice"; that never again will we help to "pull the other fellow's chestnuts from the fire"; that the future of civilization can jolly well take care of itself in so far as we are concerned. But it is useless to win battles if the cause for which we fought these battles is lost. It is useless to win a war unless it stays won. We are united in seeking the kind of victory that will guarantee that our grandchildren can grow and, under God, may live their lives, free from the constant threat of invasion, destruction, slavery and violent death.

R.: These quoted phrases in the President's speech, which we used to hear after the First World War, lead me to make this observation: It was a matter of melancholy significance that the postwar generation of the twenties laughed at the slogans of that war: "a war to make the world safe for democracy," and "a war to end war." In the grim months

after Pearl Harbor men did not laugh, for the world seemed very unsafe for democracy, but very safe for the autocracies and all they stood for. That the older generation laughed was a solemn reflection on its mentality, or its morals, or both. Our greatest desire today is to make the world safe for the democratic countries—it is the chief aim certainly of this War; and the second aim is that it should be a “war to end war.” No laughing matter is either aim. It will cost millions of lives and hundreds of billions of wealth to achieve what, if men had not laughed in 1920, might have been accomplished then without another war. The great idealist of that time was the realist who foresaw and stated that another disastrous war would follow in a generation, unless we took the practical steps to prevent it. The “realists” of that time were the ultra-idealists who said that no other country would be either mean enough or foolish enough to attack great and good America; that men had learned that war did not pay. They mistook a lull in the storm for security. But I did not mean to change the subject, if I have done so.

B.: Referring again to your causes of war, where would you classify Germany, Japan, and Italy? Or would they come in the same class?

W.: To answer for Red, I would say that both Japan and Italy were actuated by greed and vanity, but in the case of Germany there is something additional that is not so easy to define. It is something akin to the motivation of the religious wars and of the Crusades. To understand this motive, you must regard Hitler not as the originator but as the product of the German doctrine of the dominant race, the

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German Volk—which in its plainest terms is that the German people have the divine right to rule the world, that they are racially superior to all others, and therefore that they have a mission to spread this doctrine, by systematic propaganda if possible, by fire and sword if necessary. It results from this entirely pagan creed that they believe they have a divine right and even a duty to exterminate races like the Jews who threaten to contaminate that superior race, and to destroy a creed like that of the Christians which disputes the soundness of such a doctrine. Civilized, Christian peoples have to rub their eyes to see if they are awake when confronted with these extraordinary conceptions of the mission of the German race. But we must understand it, if we are to understand the religious zeal with which the German youth responded to the Hitler appeal, and in order to deal intelligently and constructively with the re-education of the new generation of German youth which has been steeped in this vicious dogma. With them it undoubtedly has all the authority and appeal of a primitive religious faith. Some present-day writers argue with a good deal of force that the Germans long before Hitler's rise had exalted their nationalism into a religion. Writing more than twenty-five years ago, Professor Santayana in his *Egotism in German Philosophy* said of this deification of Germania:

It passes for a somewhat faded speculation, or for the creed of a few extremists, when in reality it dominates the judgment and conduct of the nation. No religious tyranny could be more complete. It has its prophets in the great philosophers and his-

torians of the last century, its high priests and pharisees in the Government and the professors; its faithful flock in the disciplined mass of the nation.

Years later Alfred Rosenberg, one of Hitler's ministers, worked out a detailed program for abolishing Christianity and substituting therefor a national Reich Church. Among its stated objectives were "to destroy that Christian belief imported into Germany in the unfortunate year 800, whose tenets conflict with both the heart and the mentality of the Germans"; to abolish Christian churches and worship; and to substitute for the Bible "our most saintly book—*Mein Kampf*."

R.: That certainly sounds crazy. I suppose religious fanaticism is closely akin to war hysteria, and the Germans seemed to have managed to work up a combination of the two, either of which is pretty bad. I can understand how Hitler worshipers and toadies might fall for the nonsense you describe, but I venture the Germans I have known here and abroad would be incapable of such tommyrot. They did not seem to me very different from the ordinary run of other human beings. Certainly the Germans over here, with few exceptions, have made good, honest, thrifty, and reasonably intelligent citizens leading normal lives.

W.: Curiously enough, that is what many observers say of the Germans in Germany. The individual German seems to take on an entirely different character when organized into mass action. Then this pagan side of his nature asserts itself and takes complete control. Apparently the German barbarian can be found under a very thin veneer of civili-

zation; or it may be some strange dual mentality that we do not find in other races. Did Goethe have this national characteristic in mind when he wrote: "Two souls, alas, dwell in my breast together; one wants separation from the other?" Correspondents in Germany have been mystified by this sort of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde German mentality. For instance, William L. Shirer in his *Berlin Diary* wrote:

The German has two characters. As an individual he will give his rationed bread to feed squirrels in the Tiergarten on a Sunday morning. He can be a kind and considerate person. But as a unit in the Germanic mass he can persecute Jews, torture and murder his fellow men in a concentration camp, massacre women and children by bombardment, overrun without the slightest justification the lands of other peoples, cut them down if they protest, and enslave them.

The members of a race, even the most civilized and moral, may do things as a mob that they would never do as individuals. One feels, however, that this fails to explain the depths of depravity to which the organized German descends. In his *Making of Tomorrow*, de Sales offers this explanation:

There is no reason to suppose that the individual German as a human being is essentially different from the individual Frenchman, Englishman, or American. The capacity for cruelty, kindness, brutality, or pity is probably fairly evenly divided among men who on the whole belong to the same biological stock and have been submitted to the same broad influences. This is why people are right, at least in theory, who say that it is at once unreasonable and dangerous to treat the Germans as if they belonged to a different species from the rest of the white

race. Germans who have migrated to America have given ample proof of their adaptability to a society which condemns practically anything now associated with the name of Germany . . . The truth is that whereas the individual Britisher or American—whether he is a decent citizen or not—belongs to an order of society which openly and constantly recommends law, moral discipline, tolerance, order and other *civilized* virtues, the German unfortunately has been submitted for centuries to a series of influences which have taught him that the great mission of the Teutonic people is to overthrow the Western World, to rid themselves of its moral discipline, of its rationalism, and of its concept that there is a law above men.

Speaking of Germanism and its continued threat to the peace of the world, he continues:

Human nature being what it is, a mixture of good and bad, this appalling thing called Germanism is certainly not sufficient to destroy in every German all the good that is in him as in any other man. But to expect anything but brutality, stupidity, and barbarism from this same German when acting as a unit in the mass is expecting too much. Germanism, in its most positive manifestations, is one of the most dangerous forms of human destructiveness that history has known. The trouble with it is that the sinister aspects of Germanism, far from being on the wane, are obviously in the ascendant. Hitler is the last phase of an evolution toward total evil which has been pursued under the various incarnations of the primitive Teutonic tribe, the German concept of state, Prussian militarism, and the notion of Volk for several centuries.

Of this German Volk, de Sales says:

Again I wish to state that I do not believe that this kind of diseased fermentation in which the Germans are maintained by

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their cultural leaders makes the individual German necessarily different from other people. But unfortunately it is not with individual Germans that the world has to deal but with this solid, organic, barely human thing called the German Volk. And the chances are that it is with this German Volk that the rest of the world will have to deal not only during the war but after . . . The Germans, as they are, have given no proof of being able to shake off the deadly burden of what they believe is their national destiny: the periodic rejuvenation of mankind through barbarism.

Carl J. Hambro, of Norway, who certainly knew his Germans well, has this to say in *How to Win the Peace*:

The sympathetic but terrible and tragic mistake of the Western World has been to act on the assumption that German mentality was not too fundamentally different from Scandinavian mentality, from English and French mentality, from American mentality, that the same words corresponded to the same ideas in their several languages. Even now comparatively few people seem to realize that in order to understand German mentality an American or a Norwegian has to divest himself of his entire conception of humanity and assume a totally different set of ideas and superstitions very strange to his nature. Few things are more illuminating in this respect than the German outlook upon peace and war, upon the social ideal as a whole.

Those who accept this view of the German character warn us against believing that with the downfall of Hitler all that he stood for in Germany will disappear. The disease is much more serious than that. Dorothy Thompson, who once thought otherwise, says in her fine book, *Listen, Hans*, that "Hitler turned out to be the expression of the whole

unconscious mind and history of the German nation." Erich Kaufmann's *The Essence of International Law*, which as early as 1911 was used in practically all the German universities as the leading authority on this subject, contains the astounding statement that "not a community of men of free will but victorious war is the social ideal . . . It is in war that the state displays its true nature." And as late as 1933 Fritz Lenz, the Nazi writer, after regretting that the rest of the world did not appreciate and grasp the German spirit in the First World War, came to this typically German conclusion in his *Race as Principle of Value*: "Far be it that humanity should, in our minds, refute war; nay, it is war that refutes humanity." On this Hambro comments:

To any non-German these words seem like a dark dictum by an old medicine man in an antipodal tribe of man-eaters; he cannot grasp the conception that war is the supreme principle, that mankind is taken on probation by war and may be rejected, and that it is a presumptuous usurpation of human beings to discuss questions of war and peace. But this is German mentality.

R.: If what you say about the German character is true, the outlook for a permanent peace in the world seems rather hopeless. In dealing with these German recidivists there are three courses open: we can obliterate them by slaughter or deportation; or we can police them; or we can treat them as equals. But we cannot transplant eighty million people; and we cannot police them for an indefinite period—we would grow sick and tired of the job in five or ten years; and if you try to treat a brigand as an equal or a brother, either (1) you

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will reform him, or (2) he will seize the chance he has been waiting for to kill you off and plunder your home again. It will take not a little faith in human nature, not a little Christian charity, to treat the German as an equal. But not many of us have either the faith or the piety of the good bishop who befriended the convict in *Les Misérables*.

W.: I should in fairness say that not all of the students of the German character agree on the diagnosis I have quoted. Edward Hallett Carr, Professor of International Politics in the University College of Wales, has this to say on the other side of the case in his very able *Conditions of Peace*:

The thesis of the inherent and irremediable wickedness of the German people, though often supported by an apparatus of somewhat dubious scholarship, is not really a reasoned case. It is the product of an emotional reaction, familiar in all periods of history, which has led men to brand their enemies as moral reprobates, particularly when it is desired to find a justification for treating them as inferiors and outcasts . . . The recourse to the Germans of Tacitus need not perhaps be taken seriously. Their blood probably runs in most nations of Europe; and Tacitus did not form a notably more favourable opinion of the ancient Britons. This argument may suitably be left to Benito Mussolini, who appears to have invented it, and to writers whose scholarship is of the same calibre.

Carr then advances this possible explanation of the German character:

The historical crux of the German problem resides not in any supposedly ineradicable national characteristics, whether Ger-

man or Prussian, but in the late date at which Germany attained national unity and the plenitude of her power . . . The legacy of the past has thus given to modern German political development its two characteristic reactions against individualism on the one hand and against internationalism on the other.

Carr offers this solution of the problem which will require a good deal of the Christian charity, so despised by the Germans, to apply:

The German dilemma can be resolved, not by destroying Germany or by diminishing her, but by making her a partner in a larger unit in which Great Britain will also have her place. Germany's belated nationalism can be overcome only by making internationalism worth her while . . . The problem most likely to confront us at the end of the war is not a German people clinging passionately to Nazi doctrines and ideals, but a German people which, having reacted violently against a system which has led it to defeat and humiliation, finds itself in a state of moral and intellectual exhaustion and chaos. In this respect the German state of mind may be less far removed than most people now imagine from that of other European countries, where consciousness of victory and deliverance may soon be tempered by the anxieties of the problem of reconstructing a broken civilisation . . . The only way to make young Germans into good Europeans is to give them a role to play in the reorganisation of Germany and of Europe which will restore and enhance their self-respect. Hitler appealed to the youth of Germany by demanding service to a narrowly national cause. Anyone who is to sway the destinies of Europe after the war must have the imagination to make an equally cogent appeal to the youth of Europe for service to a larger cause.

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J. H. Morgan in his study *The Present State of Germany*, written in 1924, said of the German people:

They are not a lovable people; they even take a melancholy pride in the fact. But they are unmistakably and with all their faults a great people, and they can never remain a negligible factor in the future of Europe.

B.: My conclusion from all this is that after two thousand years we have yet to learn that it is not enough to have "peace on earth." To realize the Christian ideal there must in addition be throughout the world "men of good will." This is the only foundation on which we can build a permanent peace. But this is no time for a sappy peace. Let us deal vigorously with men who are not of good will, and who insist on poisoning the minds of their fellow men by teaching them to hate. You can domesticate some wild creatures, but others you can only exterminate. Of course, if you can domesticate them, by all means do it, but if not—you know the story of those Nazi serpents the Norwegians warmed at their friendly firesides.

R.: I gather from a morning broadcast that Britain, America, and Russia (which we might not inappropriately call the BAR) are about to bring some of these serpents and their German leaders to trial before a bar of international justice, those who escaped assassination by their own people and others in Europe. The British especially love to do things decently and in order, which is to say according to the rules of law. You will recall that even their great Revolution of 1688 had to be strictly legal. Much can be said for

such procedure, but it would scarcely be possible with any other type of mind than the Anglo-Saxon.

W.: This is the time of all times when anger, hate, vengeance burn in men's hearts, and when there should be some curb to their passions. We have had enough destruction by Mars without having Minerva throw her scales away and take up a witch's broom instead. With a little wisdom we could get much helpful cooperation from the better elements in Germany itself; but without that cooperation we shall make Germany and much of the rest of Europe a witch's caldron—to continue the comparison. It requires real statesmanship to rise above mere punishment and vengeance to the plane of enlightened reconstruction. As Herbert Hoover has said, "We cannot have both peace and vengeance." One thing this War has accomplished, and it is a great accomplishment: it has brought the world together, and made us realize as never before that what helps or hurts one group, or race, or country, helps or hurts the rest. For two thousand years the preachers, prophets, and poets had much to say about the brotherhood of man. But no statesman was so foolish as to try to accommodate this silly theory to the hard realities of selfish nationalism. Instead we had bloody and unending wars of conquest, which men (other than preachers, prophets, and poets) were too blind to see only brought humanity nearer to the brink.

R.: That is all very fine and very true, but what are you suggesting that the BAR do with these German Nazis who were the militant exponents, as their antecedents were, of that worst element in the human race?

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W.: Of course, their punishment should be swift, sure, and severe, although many of them were under duress, and all were doubtless regarded as patriots in Germany.

R.: The finest illustration in history that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrell" I cannot work up much enthusiasm for giving them a jury trial with all the technical trimmings that you lawyers have built up around our Anglo-Saxon procedure, when these criminals tortured, starved, hung, and shot their victims without going to very much trouble even to ask their names.

W.: You are too intelligent to argue that we should not treat them fairly, if for no other reason than to be sure that we do not punish the innocent along with the guilty. Furthermore, we should set an example of the kind of justice that we had been preaching should be substituted for the Nazi tyranny. This was the banner under which many of us fought. As Sumner Welles said in his Arlington address in 1942: "I believe that these voices of the men who will make our victory possible will demand that justice be done, inexorably and swiftly to those individuals, groups or peoples, as the case may be, that can truly be held accountable for the stupendous catastrophe into which they have plunged the human race. But I believe they will likewise wish to make certain that no element in any nation shall be forced to atone vicariously for crimes for which it is not responsible, and that no people shall be forced to look forward to endless years of want and of starvation."

R.: I yield the point, provided none of the guilty escape. It will be hard, however, to persuade the French, the Dutch,

the Greeks, the Russians to enforce your exalted criminal code in meting out justice to these bloody barbarians. But speaking again of good will among men, I have to admit that the United Nations are not setting a particularly good example of that virtue in their eternal bickerings at the Preliminary Peace Conferences now being held in the various capitals. While there is much sound statesmanship in evidence, there is also much of the old-world diplomacy of selfishness, greed and hate which we had hoped to escape. In view of all this squabbling among the Allies, I am tempted to call China, Russia, America, and Britain the CRABS.

W.: What does the "S" stand for in your international anagram? Solomon, I suppose?

R.: No, I am afraid it stands for Satan. He has sat at every conference table since men have tried to settle their differences by peaceful means. He is careful always to see that the treaty makers are not so foolish as to shut the door against the certainty of the next war. He was the most influential personage at Versailles, for instance. Paraphrasing an old familiar household motto, I would hang up on the wall of every international conference room these words:

I am the unseen guest at every table,
The undisputed head of all your houses,
The discordant voice at all your feasts,
The decisive vote in all your parliaments,
In all your cabinets, on all your boards.

His Satanic Majesty.

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W.: That reminds me of an interview I once had with the devil—but I will save that for another day.

B.: I want to add a word to call attention again to a fact which Red has overlooked, and that is the unifying effect on Europe of the War. There are, of course, all these disputes, which are to be expected, but never before has there been such a successful effort to bring all the peace-loving countries of the world together on a common understanding for political and economic cooperation, where before there were only jealousies, rivalries, and hates which so easily break forth into bloody conflict, and which I lamented a short time ago. As Colonel White mentioned once before, the most encouraging and constructive thing, even before the end of the War, was the general agreement on the main essentials of postwar politics by men of the widest difference of opinion, of men like Laski, Carr, Hoover, and Quincy Wright, for instance. I agree with Wright in being a little skeptical about "world planning" and in hoping for a continuation of free competition under the price system, with such controls as will prevent monopolies, adjust tariffs, and contribute reasonably to human welfare throughout the world. I do not want to endanger those great gains which it has taken us so long to achieve and at such a cost. But I also agree with all these writers, in the ardent hope for some kind of world authority strong enough to prevent a recurrence of war, and for a World Court to settle all international disputes. I agree too that the framing of the peace should not be a single event, but a continuous process, covering it may be a period of years, not

only to let the passions of the world cool off, but to give ample consideration and study to all the complex problems which call for solution. And there is general agreement, as Colonel White has pointed out, that Germany must be rendered helpless to plunge the world again into such a catastrophe, but she must be given a chance economically to get back on her feet. The Peace must be politically severe, but economically generous. Within these general outlines there is much room, of course, for great differences of opinion. But there is no difference of opinion on the proposition, as the President expressed it, that those guilty of Nazi crimes will have to stand up before tribunals in every land where atrocities have been committed, in order that indelible warning be given to every age, and that successive generations may say, "So perish all who do the like again!"

W.: In view of all we have just said, I am wondering if something cannot be added in favor of the crab. He is a pretty tough customer, and has a disposition to hold his ground against all comers. While he moves slowly and not always in a straight line, he manages to arrive, and lesser creatures find it profitable to get out of his way. He is at his best when he is hard boiled, which is after he has been in hot water for quite a while. He is an awkward, ugly fellow, but can give a good account of himself when pushed into a fight, and on the whole he is very much liked. His tenacity is perhaps his outstanding quality.

R.: But the hermit crab is the least attractive member of his family. He lives safely in the shells that others have laboriously built.

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W.: Are you calling isolationists hermit crabs?

B.: And how they do multiply in peaceful waters! On reflection I would like to qualify what I said about delays in reaching agreements on postwar problems. I don't see any great advantage in a cooling off period for business at least. The sooner we know what the planners expect to do to us the better. I predict also that the longer we delay the terms of settlement, the more difficult it will be to get the diplomats to agree. Divisive elements will grow in strength and number with every month's delay, and the Axis countries will begin to work under cover to rally friends to their cause and to divide their former foes. I realize that it will take time to frame an international constitution and to settle boundaries and territorial questions generally, and these questions can wait. But justice should be both swift and certain, if not severe, and justice includes the whole political and economic setup for Germany, Italy, and Japan, as well as the punishment of their arch criminals. And surely the non-Axis countries (both the CRABS and those overrun by Germany) should be able to settle quickly most of the differences between themselves. What agreements we worked out before the end of the War were clear gain, and the sooner we now reach further agreements, the better it will be for this disordered world of ours.

R.: I agree with you. Delay on these great economic and political issues, as has been often said, simply puts the powerful weapon of time into the hands of the enemies of progress. People are tired after every war, and when people are tired they do not want to bother with change. They want

to be let alone. I suspect Churchill saw that when he recommended waiting until after the War to go more fully into the Beveridge Plan. The new League will of course make provision for meeting new conditions as they arise, treaty modifications, and the like, so we should not hold up these international agreements while we try to cover in them every possible contingency that might arise in the future.

V. *War's Aftermath—Hate*

BLUE: Colonel White, you spoke the other day of the treatment of the South by the North following Lincoln's death, and of the mistakes that were made then. I think it is generally unwise to revive the memory of old animosities, but at this distance I wonder if we cannot learn something from that "tragic era" in working out a policy for dealing fairly with the Axis countries.

WHITE: Let me say first, that the crimes of those countries are too fresh in our memories to give place entirely to Christian charity, but I think our leaders, our editors, and our writers generally should do all they can to minimize the hatreds the War has created, especially as the War is now over. We cannot exactly love such enemies, but we can give them a new chance—with adequate safeguards, of course. Lincoln once said that the best way to get rid of your enemies is to make friends out of them. Our British brethren, especially, are not hard haters. As an historical fact, I think you will agree that, compared with men of the German or Latin temperament, they are surprisingly generous in forgiving old offenses; and I suppose Americans have inherited something of that same spirit, although the feeling in the South which persisted for so long after the Civil War

might seem to belie that statement. But there were continuing aggravations in that case.

RED.: I presume you refer to that old bone of contention, the negro question.

W.: That was one cause. I think we are far enough removed from the reconstruction period now to view it with the cold judgment of the historian. The negro was given the franchise, not from any love for the race, but as a measure of retribution against the South, whose white citizens at the same time were denied the vote. The negro needed a period of probation and training before he was qualified for suffrage, as I believe is generally recognized now. Any one who has any doubt on that subject need only read the history of Haiti or Liberia. But the South, in the heat of this controversy, was as determined that the individual negro, however well qualified, should not have a vote, as the North was determined that, however unfit the negro might be, he should be allowed to vote. At the same time, the negro was turned loose to shift for himself in the impoverished South, and as a result there grew up all the vices of the share-cropper system, for which the South is blamed. This statement is useful to us at this late date, only as it may teach us the folly, first, of carrying over the spirit of revenge into the peacetime period; and secondly, of assuming that the backward peoples of the earth are fully qualified for self-government and the franchise without a period of education and training. The negroes were themselves the worst sufferers from the misdirected efforts of their northern friends. And perhaps we can learn something from Lincoln's attitude toward the South

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and toward the negro. He believed that the wise way to solve the negro question was to encourage the negroes to return to Africa, from whence they came, and he so advised their leaders. But it is not difficult to understand why the negroes preferred remaining in the South to going to Liberia; and the South has had the burden of caring for most of them, or the blame for failing to do so, ever since. I think the solution for the racial antagonisms of Europe may lie along the line of voluntary repatriation which is now being so generally discussed in Allied capitals. I would strongly disapprove of involuntary removal of large populations, but there may be means of making it worth their while to return to their native land while leaving them entirely free to make the decision.

Before I leave this subject, I ought to add that I think the negro throughout this long period has acted in a manner to deserve our admiration and respect. He has been the victim on the one hand of the northern and the southern politician fighting for power, and on the other of sentimental idealists in the North and narrow-minded racial bigots in the South. Throughout it all he has managed to grow in stature and to achieve a worthy place in every field of American life. His record in the War has been one of which we all may be proud. Let us hope that in the future there will be no effort to deny him any of the civil or political rights enjoyed by his white neighbors. I think he will have sense enough to know where to draw any social lines that the proprieties may require, in spite of the ill advised agitation by some of his own leaders and some of his northern

friends to encourage him to insist upon so-called social equality. This agitation has only served to undo much of the fine work that has been done by both whites and negroes in the South, where the negroes in largest number will have to live for many generations to come. I have lived in the South a great many years, and for a time in almost every state in the South, and I have never yet had occasion to feel that any negroes whom I knew had in any way overstepped the bounds of propriety.

R.: We shall have to argue out this social question some other time. I am afraid we won't agree altogether on that. I think any form of enforced segregation is pretty bad.

W.: A remark of Blue the other day set me to thinking on the very difficult subject of hate, on which we may also learn something from our Civil War period. As we look back now, we can see that it was an unwise policy during this World War to stress the preaching of hate as a part of our campaign to build up our own morale. As J. B. Priestley once pointed out, the British generally abandoned that policy during the War, their sense of humor often tempering their anger; but some of our people continued to preach it. Aside from the morals of the thing (and we generally assumed morals were to be suspended for the duration), the gospel of hate seemed to me wholly unnecessary as a matter of propaganda, for the simple reason that the Germans themselves with characteristic thickheadedness were constantly boasting of their own atrocities as did the Japs. By further stirring up the civilian population to hate we started a fire that was hard to extinguish when the peace came.

Certainly our soldiers did not need such urging to make them fight, and fight furiously, as they did whenever they met the enemy. The whole campaign, it seems to me, was based on a low estimate of both the intelligence and the courage of our people. And now some of that hate is being turned against our own citizens. We are guilty of many of the things for which we condemned the Nazis. But, what is more serious, the hate so engendered has made it much more difficult to rebuild our shattered civilization on a basis of peaceful cooperation with other peoples, the only basis on which an enduring civilization and orderly society can be built. The whole campaign was not only bad morals, it was bad common sense. In this day of skilled mechanized fighting, a clear head is much more essential than ferocity; the two do not usually go together.

R.: Are you so sure it was bad morals? The Old Testament has some of the bloodiest imprecations against enemies to be found in all literature.

W.: The morals of the Old Testament and of the New Testament cannot always be reconciled. The Old Testament was the product of a semibarbarous age, although far in advance of the age out of which it grew. The New Testament, coming centuries later, and representing the best of which our imperfect human nature is capable of ever attaining, held up the ideal which so many now ridicule, of loving our enemies. We might at least meet that teaching halfway by not hating them.

R.: As for the New Testament, it seems to me that I have read that Christ resorted to violence if not to hate upon

occasion, as when He drove the money changers out of the Temple with a whip—one of my favorite passages in the Bible. And He certainly had no great love for the Pharisees of His day; “hypocrites,” “whited sepulchers,” “devourers of widows’ houses,” are not exactly terms of endearment.

W.: You fail to distinguish between just condemnation and punishment of the guilty and an outburst of hate. The judge who condemns a criminal to death has no hatred in his heart for the poor devil; he may even have a great pity for him. But the judge has a profound respect for the law and its observance. And no doubt the sheriff can manage to hang the criminal without first working into a fever of hate against him. But speaking of Christ again, He also said that “whosoever shall smite thee on one cheek, turn to him the other also.” Not many of us can lay aside our feelings to that extent. But Christ never resisted His enemies when they attacked Him personally, and His condemnation was directed against offenses rather than against individual offenders, whom He was constantly calling to repentance, and the worst of whom He prayed on the Cross might be forgiven. But He did uphold the principle of just punishment when *others* were being wronged—a distinction which few of us make when we talk about righteous indignation, and which the pacifists entirely overlook. He drove out the money changers because they had made His Father’s house a den of thieves. And in condemning the Nazis, we are certainly warranted in using even stronger language than Christ used against the Pharisees.

R.: I hope we will do likewise with respect to dens of

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thieves. But I agree with you about hate. Is there not something rather infantile in trying to beat off our enemies by making faces at them? I think that with all this emphasis on hate today many of us lost sight completely of what we were fighting for. We were not fighting merely to kill Germans and Japs; we were fighting for freedom—freedom for ourselves and for the world in which our children were to live. Hate is proverbially a blinding thing, and it blinded many of us to the real objectives of all our sacrifices. Getting rid of the Germans and the Japs was only half the task, a fact we were led thereby to forget. We had to do something in addition to protect ourselves and our children in the future. On this subject we might learn a lesson from our Revolutionary War. When Patrick Henry exclaimed, "Give me liberty, or give me death," he expressed both the object for which we were then fighting, and the desperate determination to win. We were willing to die, not in order to kill so many redcoats, but to achieve liberty for ourselves and for our children. There was no preaching of hate in that slogan, or in any of that war, if I remember aright.

W.: As I have said, I think we can find in our own Civil War an object lesson on the folly of the opposite procedure. Lincoln never preached hate in trying to arouse the North to oppose the South, and had he lived his policy so nobly expressed would have been carried out: "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness for the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on . . . to bind up the nation's wounds." But Lincoln did not live, and when he died the preachers of hate, the "Vindictives," as

they were called, took over. The result was the horrible and disgraceful period of reconstruction in the South, the most shameful chapter in our national history, a period that sowed the seeds of discord that continued to bear bitter fruit almost to this day. It was a period of destruction rather than reconstruction, and its scars will long remain. I can speak with personal knowledge, for I have lived many years in the South. In the number of years the country has been overrun, in the brutality to which her people have been subjected, in the number of her victims—men, women, and children—in the ruthless devastation wrought on her cities and towns, her industries and institutions, I believe you will agree that China suffered more than any other country in the War. If any country, therefore, had a right to preach hatred of a cruel and savage foe, it was China. But many of us in America could learn a lesson in Christian charity from one of the leaders of that presumably pagan country. "There must be no bitterness in the reconstructed world," said Madame Chiang Kai-shek in March, 1943, when China was in the midst of her bitterest fight with Japan. "No matter what we have undergone and suffered, we must try to forgive those who injured us and remember only the lesson gained thereby. The teachings of Christ radiate ideas for the elevation of souls and intellectual capacities far above the common passions of hate and degradation. He taught us to help our less fortunate fellow beings, to work and strive for their betterment without ever deceiving ourselves and others by pretending that tragedy and ugliness do not exist. He taught us to hate the evil in

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men, but not men themselves." This statement led many to suggest that China might send more such missionaries to this country.

Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands, which had also suffered much at the hands of Japan as well as at those of Germany, had this to say in a message to the *New York Herald Tribune* Forum in November, 1942: "The thirst for revenge will be great and understandable. Let us not, however, let revenge be our guiding motive. Revenge is barren in that it breeds revenge. Let justice be our aim, justice and firmness tempered by wisdom. . . . For you and for us, as well as for everybody, international cooperation is the only salvation, not only in this War but after it. Every person who shares this conviction must, I think, see to it that it prevails. Let us all work and strive to that end."

B.: You have made a good case against the hate propaganda. I have only two comments to make: The first is that if the Germans themselves had not done such a good job for us in supplying abundant fuel for the fires of hate, possibly there would have been more reason for us to have taken a hand, as we did in the First World War, to supply the facts necessary to make our people at this distance realize the character of the enemy that threatened their liberties. For certainly this is no time for a soft inconclusive peace such as we had in 1919. A further observation is that there may be a distinction between arousing civilians, who have no actual killing to do, and stirring up the soldiers to hate. Some army men tell us that the chicken-hearted need some incentive at first at least, to nerve them to stick bayo-

nets into another human being, and I can understand that, though I would think the instinct of self-preservation would be all the incentive necessary in any case. But not much of our present-day fighting is hand to hand, and by the time it becomes so on a particular front, there must be few soldiers who are not ready to give the enemy everything it takes. I think the records of our fighting forces will bear this out. The civilians needed rather to be taught that what we were fighting was a vicious system (which we should hate with a consuming hatred), and that we have not demolished that system when we have killed off for the moment the men who have stood for it. As Red has explained, we must go further and absolutely uproot the system itself, and plant something better in its place. That is what the Peace Conference will do, unless our isolationists persuade the country that, having knocked out a few million Germans and Japs, we can now rest easy for the next fifty years.

VI. *Charters of Freedom and Opportunity*

WHITE: I promised to try to give you men a summary of the Atlantic Charter, or "Free World Charter," as it was later called—together with some comments on that and other international documents which are so much in the limelight at present. Our isolationists, as was to be expected, insisted that the President had no authority to bind the United States by his approval of these documents, and that Congress is free to amend or reject the "agreements." It is apparent, however, that public opinion is overwhelming in its approval and there is little doubt that formal approval of Congress, if that is necessary, will be forthcoming. It is hoped and believed that America has learned something of the bitter consequences of a refusal to cooperate with the rest of the world in efforts to establish order based on law instead of violence. (I hope I am not overworking that good word "cooperation.")

To state the facts briefly, in 1941 Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt framed and signed a document known as the Atlantic Charter. On June 2, 1942, it was officially endorsed by the governments of twenty-six nations, including all of our allies in the world conflict. Whatever the later action of Congress, the documents will be of fundamental importance in the peace conferences yet to

come. The charter states that it is deemed right to make known certain principles in the national policies of these respective countries "on which they base their hope for a better future for the world." There follows then a statement of eight such general principles.

First, Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

This is something new under the sun in a document following a victorious war—and the signers of this document were assuming they would be completely victorious. It is probably the first war in history in which the victors have relinquished their immemorial right to plunder the vanquished.

Second, They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

This is equally significant as a declaration of policy in dealing with the problem of territorial demands. It is the democratic principle of leaving people to decide for themselves under which flag they shall serve. It is to be presumed that some system will be worked out for a free expression of such opinion, that majority rule shall govern, and that the minority will at the same time be given adequate security against oppression.

Third, They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to

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see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Here is a clear expression of another phase of self-determination—of the fundamental right of each country to choose its own form of government, whether it be ours, or some other form of democracy, imperialism, or autocracy. How far the United Nations will attempt to quell civil strife or prevent civil war, which already threatens in some countries, cannot be determined in advance. But the principle is clear that every effort will be made to assure to each country a free choice of the kind of government it wants. We hope that it will be democratic, but we are determined to see that it shall be a form that will not threaten the peace of the world. There will also be, under this clause, the question of colonies and of backward peoples who are not yet ready for self-government but must be assured that every encouragement and opportunity will be given them to work toward that goal. It would be a misfortune to confer full suffrage, for instance, on the savages of the South Pacific, when what they need is the protection and security and general benefits of decent, orderly living that only a stronger and more enlightened government can assure them. They will have to go through the evolution through which we and all other peoples have gone before attaining to full statehood and independence. No doubt, a mandatory body like the prospective League will take general jurisdiction over the situation and see that these ends are achieved. In the light of these qualifications I would interpret Churchill's statement

that Article Three is not to supersede the announced policy of Britain in various parts of the Empire.

Fourth, They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

This guarantee of access on equal terms, both to trade and to the raw materials of the world will remove one of the familiar grounds, real or imaginary, that have been trotted out on all occasions as causes or excuses for war. Access to raw materials everywhere and the removal of treaty barriers will not only do much to remove these future causes of war, but improve the standard of living throughout the world to an extent undreamed of heretofore. In the past, many regions rich in natural resources but inhabited by the most backward races were exploited by a few rapacious powers, who in turn did nothing for the inhabitants of those regions, their rightful owners. At the same time, they established a monopolistic control over those resources, so that other nations had access to them only on the terms of the exploiting power. The "have-nots" in this case had a real grievance. But this clause, like all the others, will require considerable clarification, and it is hoped this will be done as early as possible, before national selfishness has gained the ascendancy in the conference. For instance, the clause "with due respect for their existing obligations," might be used to perpetuate many existing abuses, and to

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restrict unduly the beneficent effect of the general provisions. Will Britain and Holland, for instance, allow the other nations of the world access to the rich resources of their colonial possessions? And if so, on what terms, or subject to what qualifications? And how far will the United States be obligated to share its wealth in oil with the countries lacking oil? How far will the United States be permitted to help in developing all the immense resources of China, of India, of Africa, of the South Pacific? And will trade barriers be completely abolished, or will there be provisions varying with special conditions?

Fifth, They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all, improved labor standards, economic adjustment and social security.

Here for the first time in history is official recognition that there is need for fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, and that labor standards, economic maladjustments, and social security may have an international aspect, or may offer problems for global solution. But as the President said in his address to Congress in January, 1943, "in this War of survival we must keep before our minds not only the evil things we fight against, but the good things we fight for . . . Let us remember that economic safety for the Americans of the future is threatened unless a greater economic stability comes to the rest of the world. We cannot make America an island either in a military or an economic sense." And what is true of America is true of

every other signatory to the Atlantic Charter. We are living in a rapidly shrinking world as we progress with the conquest of the air and with other methods of global communication. No nation can any longer live unto itself. These facts have become commonplace in our thinking, and it seems almost banal to be constantly reiterating them. But, like signposts, we need ever to keep them before our eyes, lest we lose our way.

Sixth, After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

This provision voices the hope that the nations of the world will be able to establish a peace that will not only assure safety to all nations, but will assure freedom from fear and from want to all men. The machinery for accomplishing these great ends is left to be worked out later, but the general principles could not be more clearly stated. The two of the four freedoms are mentioned that are international in character, in that, as I stated under "Fifth," they may require international guarantees or action for their full achievement—freedom from want and freedom from fear. The other two freedoms, freedom of speech and freedom of religion, each country must achieve for itself and without outside aid or interference.

BLUE: It will be interesting to see how Russia interprets and enforces these last two freedoms.

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W.: She, no doubt, thinks that already she guarantees both, consistently with the best interests of the state itself. While we shall have to leave each country to make provision for these two freedoms as it sees fit, world opinion will certainly have an influence never had before in deterring a particular country from doing violence to these great rights.

Seventh, Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

This is a simple and unqualified declaration in favor of the freedom of the seas, so much discussed in the First World War. In wartime there will arise the question of the right of a belligerent to limit the freedom of neutrals (if in the new world there should be any such) in dealing with other belligerents, or with one another; the right to make searches and seizures, to establish blockades, etc. In peacetime there will be no question as to the complete freedom of the seas. It is hoped that some effective agreement can be reached to outlaw the submarine. That depends on the effectiveness of the new League and the machinery for enforcing its decrees. It is to be presumed that freedom of the air, now so important, is also to be included under this Article.

Eighth, They believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a

wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Here is a recognition that for both realistic and spiritual reasons the nations of the earth must abandon the use of force. (Incidentally, who ever heard before of an international document concerning itself with spiritual reasons?) Two great reasons are stated in favor of a policy of general disarmament: (1) Armaments are a continual threat to the future peace of the world, and therefore, pending an establishment of some system of permanent security, complete disarmament of the nations which threaten aggression is essential. (2) Peace-loving peoples should be relieved of the crushing burdens of armament. Economically, disarmament has a dual aspect. Not only is there relief from the burden of debt which armaments involve, but the energies, wealth, and man power devoted to warlike purposes would be available for constructive peaceful enterprise.

One point you should notice: After the overthrow of the Nazi tyranny (and I might add also of the Japanese war lords), the Allied Powers are to undertake to maintain world order "pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security." This will no doubt involve the use of large contingents of air, sea, and land forces throughout the world, such as now takes place wherever trouble threatens. Not only will these require a continued use of armed forces for some time to come, but it should be

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noted that unlike the makers of the Versailles Treaty, the United Nations do not hold out to the vanquished the promise that the victors will disarm as of any particular time. Security must come first; but general disarmament is a goal to be attained ultimately, for both realistic and spiritual reasons. It will no doubt take time to determine how far the military potential of Germany, of Italy, and of Japan has been reduced to the point where there is no danger of another explosion, and where the United Nations can agree upon an "equality" of disarmament. Let us pray that we remain *united* long enough to accomplish these great aims so essential to the security of our children and children's children for generations to come. But the realization of these aims will require statesmanship of a high order, as well as intelligent understanding and approval by the people themselves. Men do not like to surrender their weapons of defense unless they are fully convinced that their security is not imperiled thereby. A free people are also inclined to think of a police force as for the other fellow rather than for themselves; but under any workable international arrangement all must be willing to surrender a certain amount of sovereignty to a central body, just as the states of our American Union surrendered not a little of their sovereignty to the central Federal Government. But for that surrender we would not now have the *United States*. Attainment of these ends requires vision and more statesmanship than we have seen in evidence in the ordinary piping times of peace. But let us hope that the memory of the awful peril through which America has just passed—certainly the most serious in

all our history—will remain fresh long enough to enable us to accomplish what we failed so miserably to accomplish in 1919. Our aim should be to establish such an effective machinery for settling international disputes and restraining the resort to force by recalcitrant countries that we can soon realize this dream of universal disarmament. It is interesting to speculate what would now be the state of the world if the expenditures for war during the last quarter of a century had been devoted to health, education, social security, and the curbing of crime.

RED: Let me interrupt you to say that it cannot be assumed that all the money expended on armaments would have been devoted to schemes of human welfare, but certainly in any case the world would have been better off in a thousand ways. Little Switzerland is a sort of laboratory example of what a country can accomplish when it does not have to devote too large an amount of its budget to war purposes. But I do not believe we will ever reach a point where complete disarmament will be either desirable or feasible. In your plan for a league, for instance, you emphasize the importance of having an international police force; and with civil wars now raging in several countries of Europe (and civil wars will always be a possibility, even in the best of worlds) the countries of the world will insist on armaments for their own security. Let us not forget that we are dealing with very imperfect human beings endowed with all the passions and meannesses that have caused the wars of the past. The most you can ever hope for is to devise a method of curbing these passions and of keeping

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them from overflowing national bounds; and to do this we shall always have to have some kind of land, sea, and air armaments.

B.: I hope it will be possible to work out a general policy of disarmament, but—even aside from the necessity of allowing each country a protective police force, and the League a police force of its own—enforcement will be very difficult for another reason. Wars of the future will no doubt be waged largely by the airplane, which has already revolutionized much of our military thinking. Armies and navies, as we now know them at least, I predict will cease to exist. What we shall have instead will be immense air armadas with almost unbelievable destructive powers, such as some of our air experts have delighted to describe. But we showed in this War how quickly peacetime aviation factories, and even automobile and other non-defense enterprises, could be diverted to the manufacture of war planes. Therefore, it seems to me, an effective enforcement of disarmament will be almost impossible for the simple reason that these peacetime enterprises constitute potential armament facilities of the most complete and easily convertible character. Of course, no one would propose that such factories be dismantled merely because they can be so easily changed over to wartime purposes. I notice that the Preliminary Conference has recommended that Germany be denied the right either to make airplanes, or to conduct air lines of any character. This of course will be effective as to Germany, but only so long as the other countries elect to see that the prohibition is strictly enforced. The danger is that they will in

time become weary of this task, and also that Germany, with the aid of Germans and other sympathizers in other parts of the world, will find many ways of circumventing such restrictions.

W.: That leads to the conclusion that the only hope of the future is to educate men into the belief that war does not pay. Some day the race may reach a level where for spiritual reasons they may renounce war as a method of achieving their aims, or, as the futile Briand-Kellogg Pact expressed it, as "an instrument of national policy." But for both spiritual and realistic reasons, I believe war can be and will be abolished from the earth.

But let me continue my story. After the formal acceptance of the Atlantic Charter by the twenty-six governments, some question arose as to whether it was limited to the Atlantic region—the name giving rise to that possible misconception; and in order to clarify the question the President in his radio address of February 23, 1942, said:

We of the United Nations are agreed on certain broad principles in the kind of peace we seek. The Atlantic Charter applies not only to the parts of the world that border the Atlantic, but to the whole world; disarmament of aggressors, self-determination of nations and peoples, and the four freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear.

Whether or not technically the twenty-six nations were committed to the four freedoms, the general assumption in the discussions which followed the declaration by the Presi-

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dent seemed to be that America and Britain recognized that they were applicable to all mankind. These documents are unique, therefore, in world diplomacy in that their emphasis is not on the *rights* of the signatories, but on the *obligations* of the signatories to secure certain benefits to the rest of the world. Instead of insisting upon their own rights, they voluntarily relinquished certain rights in favor of countries not parties to the agreement. Red might well say that this marks the dawn of the Golden Age. But we shall have to see how these general declarations are worked out in practice. It was something of a disappointment to note that, when the Atlantic Charter was made public, no great enthusiasm was manifested either in this country or in Great Britain. The attitude was rather of waiting to see how the statements would be implemented by the parties involved. England made a very practical and far-reaching move towards offering at least its own people freedom from want when Sir William Beveridge submitted his plan for consideration. That plan was designed to insure social security to the individual from the cradle to the grave; and because it was proposed when England was still deeply involved in the War, it was rather remarkable that it should have been received with such universal approval, even from the most conservative elements in Great Britain. But I will tell you more about the Beveridge plan when I have had a chance to examine it. As you know, we are now committed to a somewhat similar plan, which the President proposed in 1943.

As to freedom from fear, the only way the world can be assured of such a freedom, as it seems to me, would be by

the formation of some sort of association of the countries of the earth with enough power to compel good behavior. That is now one of the main considerations of the Preliminary Conference, and we are watching with the most intense interest to see what will come out of their deliberations. It will probably be a matter of years, however, before such an organization can be perfected and put into full operation. In the meantime, armed forces throughout Europe and in Japan are keeping the lid on very effectively.

R.: I can readily understand why thinking people should not be satisfied with mere generalities. I cannot conceive, for instance, of any one holding that these four freedoms are not highly desirable for all members of the human race; but these are indeed glittering generalities. I am sure the Atlantic Charter as it now stands will be open to much difference of interpretation. For instance, did not Churchill shock us all some time ago by declaring that "we mean to hold our own"? I would say that the Atlantic Charter, as you have read it, requires both England and America to surrender a good deal of their own.

B.: I have the same misgivings that you have. One of the many wise things that Sumner Welles has said is that "in the fundamentals of international relationships there is nothing more fatally dangerous than the common American fallacy that the formulation of aspirations is equivalent to the hard won realization of the objective." So I am afraid some Americans are going to be bitterly disappointed when these objectives are clarified; but I hope the conference will proceed to remove all doubts as soon as possible. The longer

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we wait, the more the old national barriers of self-interest and distrust will multiply to complicate the task.

W.: I think there is much merit in what you both have said. Nevertheless, I feel that even the framing of these general principles and the acquiescence therein of the twenty-six nations, was a great step forward in international cooperation. Do we not have to start any new intellectual undertaking with statements of general principles? Anne O'Hare McCormick said in the *New York Times* on the first anniversary of the Atlantic Charter:

These principles are generalizations, the platitudes of international life. They are going to be variously construed when the time comes to put them into effect. They will be very hard to reconcile with the ambitions of the winners and the ideas of the governments in exile. But man has discovered in travail that the platitudes are his articles of faith.

Continuing my discussion of the international agreements entered into prior to the Peace, I will next refer to the ones since the Atlantic Charter. They will certainly have an important influence on the negotiations now under way. Many of these wartime pacts have a long-range bearing of the greatest importance. Red will be particularly interested in the Master Lend-Lease Agreements which are in the economic field, and which were acts of broad-minded statesmanship. There have been, all together, about thirty of these agreements. After much debate, they had been authorized by Congress in March, 1941. The President was empowered to transfer war equipment, food supplies, and

in fact almost anything of importance in the waging of total war, to any country whose defense was considered vital to our own. We were to pay for these "defense articles" either through congressional appropriation, or through a transfer of funds already appropriated for our own defense services. The other countries might return unused supplies to the United States after the War, but the Act specified that we would accept "payment or repayment in kind, or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory." In pursuance of this power given the President, these Lend-Lease Agreements provided in the terms of repayment that—

the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States . . . shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action . . . open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.

You will notice that the parties are authorized to take proper measures to expand "production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peo-

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ples." The agreements further authorized measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination in international commerce and to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers. So you see Lend-Lease, first designed to help win the War, will be a powerful weapon for winning the Peace. The United States as the main creditor nation will have the power, if it elects to use it, to lay the foundation for a new world order of economic cooperation and general human welfare.

R.: Provided the politicians in Congress and the selfish leaders in industry are willing to give up the worship of the golden calf of high protection.

W.: I think both Congress and industry have learned that that doctrine has long since served its purpose—if it ever had any beyond electing certain men to Congress. Our one-time infant industries are now straddling the world. They are themselves now shouting for free markets in other countries where they want to sell their goods.

R.: It seems to me that Lend-Lease in actual operation was rather onesided—we seemed to have done all the lending and the leasing.

W.: It is not quite fair to say that. Of course, we did most of it, as we intended to do. But Britain, Russia, and China showed a fine spirit of cooperation to the extent of their ability, and this was very considerable. These countries did much to assist the American expeditionary forces in getting locally food and other supplies, in establishing bases of operation, etc. They put their own facilities at our disposal—sites, factories, repair docks, etc. In some sections, in fact, the material aid we thus received compared in volume with

what we furnished, as in Australia and New Zealand. And we had British barrage balloons in the skies over our west coast and British anti-aircraft guarding our east coast; British corvettes and other naval vessels cooperating with our own ships in patrolling the American waters. We even received free an entire gun factory, which was assembled in England and set up again in America. Britain shared her inventions with us and gave us indispensable expert advice on hundreds of our industrial and other war problems.

R.: I hope she will continue to let us use the magnificent air bases which we constructed at such great expense throughout the world, and which will be so useful to our air transport companies now that the War is over.

W.: These are not only on British soil, but on Chinese, French, Italian, and Dutch territory, and undoubtedly there will be an agreement for their use by all countries, similar to the provision under which the Panama Canal has been operated. But we should have a right to charge something corresponding to a toll, since ours was the cost of the construction, although the land belonged to these other countries. Possibly China would consent to a revival of extra-territoriality for the American and British air bases on her soil, provided she is given a voice in the management of the territory. What is true of these air bases should also apply to docks and other transportation facilities throughout the world. You see we are living in a time when, as never before, generous cooperation is absolutely necessary to a decent existence.

I want now to mention another international agreement

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of great significance, which should be of considerable interest to Red, the Mutual Assistance Pacts negotiated by Great Britain and the Soviet Union in 1941 and June 11, 1942. The skeptics may doubt that Russia will keep a treaty; but if the spirit as well as the letter of that second treaty is kept it will be a great step forward in European politics, and will furnish the cornerstone for the new structure of international cooperation which we have all been talking about.

R.: Let me interject that Russia has a better record of treaty observance than almost any country in Europe, not excepting England and France. If I could get at my books I would cite many instances in support of this statement.

W.: In addition to undertaking not to make a separate peace with Germany, the two countries proposed to work together for the building of a peaceful order in Europe. For a period of twenty years they agreed "to take all measures in their power" to ban aggression, and to come to the rescue of the other country if either was attacked. Each agreed "not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other." What was most significant in connection with the conferences now going on in Moscow, London, and Washington was the provision in the treaty declaring that each government desired "to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the postwar period." And, what may be surprising to Blue but not so surprising to Red, the later agreement went so far as to provide that the two powers should

"render one another all possible economic assistance after the War." As a matter of fact, with all her wealth in natural resources, with all her efficiency in the production of war materials, Russia is in desperate need of the things which Britain and America are ready to supply—food, clothing, heavy machinery, railroad and shipping supplies, and much else necessary to rebuild her cities, her industries, and her water-power plants. And she will need cash as well. Already there has been much in our papers about the opportunities which Russia is eagerly offering to American capital in that uncaptalist country.

To complete the picture, I might mention a few of the treaties or agreements entered into by the governments-in-exile, which are now taking on great importance. We wish that there had been many more such. By the Soviet-Polish agreement of July 30, 1941, the U.S.S.R. "recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity"—thus apparently relinquishing any claim to that part of Poland occupied by Russian troops in September, 1939. And on December 4, 1941, these countries declared their intention of basing their peacetime relations on "good neighborly collaboration, friendship, and mutually honest observance of the undertakings they have assumed." They declared their belief in the achievement of peace only "through a new organization of international relations" based on "respect for international law," and "backed by the collective armed forces of all the Allied States." The statement voices the Russian ideal of a "unification of the democratic countries in a durable alli-

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ance." Let us hope Russian-Polish relations will not grow less friendly, and that the old animosities will not prevent a fair settlement of Russian or Polish claims.

R.: You fellows should express some surprise that Russia should count herself a democratic country, as this statement shows she does. If by democracy you mean a country run for the good of the greatest number of the people, who are also given a free voice in their government, you may soon have to admit Russia to the family of democracies—however far she may yet have to go in perfecting democratic procedure.

W.: Before we go into that, let me finish this catalogue of such agreements. The legal Polish and Czechoslovak governments in November, 1940, and in January, 1942, signed agreements affecting their relations after the War, and looking toward the possible creation of a confederation in Central Europe with these two countries as a nucleus. The two countries agreed to coordinate their defense, economic and social policies, to create a joint general staff, and to give their citizens a common constitutional guarantee of civil liberties. A similar but much more explicit agreement was negotiated on January 15, 1942, between the Greek and Yugoslav governments. It provided for joint meetings of parliamentary delegations from the two countries at regular intervals for the exchange of views on common problems, and it also invited other Balkan States to join. There were also agreements in January, 1942, between Britain and our old friend Haile Selassie, restoring him as the head of liberated Ethiopia and promising economic assistance to the

country. There was no doubt an understanding also that the United Nations might occupy or pass through Ethiopia, as their military necessities required. Such action was allowed in the treaty between Britain, Russia, and Iran of January 29, 1942. It was agreed that all forces belonging to Britain and Russia were to be withdrawn within six months after the end of hostilities, and the independence of the country was to be respected both at that time and in the future. The declaration issued by the Dutch government in exile was also important in clarifying the future status of the Netherlands East Indies. The agreement has been a material contribution to the discussions of the self-determination of subject peoples. The Indies were assured of an "autonomous regime" after the War under the "protection" of Holland. There are a number of other agreements of more or less importance which I need not take time to mention.

But our long-standing pledge of complete independence for the Philippines has probably been the chief contribution in crystallizing world policy toward subject peoples. As President Quezon said in a broadcast on August 9, 1942, referring to the Atlantic Charter: "It is a charter for Europe and for America, and—let us be clear on this—it is a charter of freedom for the peoples of Asia and all the Far East."

R.: I remember the President once remarked that our method of dealing with the Philippines might be a model for other countries having colonial possessions. We freed the islands from Spain in 1898; in 1935 we declared that they should be given complete independence in 1946. I suppose they were thankful in 1941 and after that we had

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not freed them earlier, and that we had promised to protect them from foreign aggression for an indefinite time to come. That, I venture, is the general pattern that will be followed by the other powers, although it is to be hoped they can speed up the educational process a little for the good of all concerned. Sun Yat-sen, who was one of the world's greatest realists, may have meant something like that when he declared that there were three basic principles of national revolution: national independence, progressive realization of democracy, and a rising level of living conditions for the masses. I think I can subscribe to that statement, provided the progress is encouraged and not retarded by the temporary overlords, who will want to put national independence last.

VII. *Charters of Security—Freedom from Fear*

RED: I understand from a broadcast this morning there is a revival of the old discussion of a Federation of Europe, or at least of the English-speaking peoples. That idea once appealed to me very strongly, but the more I have thought about it, the more difficult it seems to work out practically, and the more unnecessary such a federation appears if we have a workable League of Nations including all the countries of the world. And if we cannot now work out such a league, God have mercy upon this stupid old world!

BLUE: I have also gone through an evolution in my thinking on this subject. I first opposed, with what I thought were very strong reasons, any sort of league—or association of nations, as President Harding called his scheme. I thought the best way to keep out of such a mess as we got into in 1917 was to keep out of agreements or commitments that might bring us into such a fight again. Then, when I saw this War coming on, and the likelihood that we would get mixed up in it, at least as innocent bystanders, whether we liked it or not, I was all for a union of English-speaking peoples, who seemed to have a good deal in common—language, culture, ideals, democracy—and also to have some sanity and some civilized instincts left. But on reflection it seemed to me that this would be but an invitation to the

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rest of Europe—to the non-English-speaking peoples, particularly Russia and the southeastern Europeans—to get together themselves, with Russia probably dominating the group, as England might dominate the first group. So we would have nothing more than the old balance of power business under a new disguise, and there would be no place for an all-inclusive league which I was coming around to favor. It would be rendered helpless, as in the twenties and thirties, by those various countries that found it more to their interest to unite in smaller groups. So I finally swung around again to the idea of the League, as at least the lesser of these evils. But all such schemes, it seemed to me, were based on the assumption that these war-loving countries of Europe were now ready to implement the Golden Rule.

WHITE: As you know, I am strongly for a league of some sort; and the fact that human nature is not perfect is no reason why we should not try to improve. Such a league is the only substitute for war that any one has yet been able to devise. No one can deny that such an organization is theoretically highly desirable, and I say again that there is surely enough statesmanship in the world to make it successful.

R.: How do you mean successful?

W.: I mean that no single country or group of countries within or without the League could successfully resist the power represented by such a group, whether its power be exercised by sanctions or boycotts, or by the threat of its combined military strength.

B.: That raises the old question of arms again. Where

are the advocates of the League going to draw the line between what they call a police force and a force that amounts to a regular military establishment such as we hope to get rid of entirely? Where does the dream of universal disarmament find a place in such a setup?

W.: Of course, this is a matter of degree, but with general disarmament it would not require a large military force to keep the peace.

R.: And if there is ever a time when we could get all the countries of the world around a table and have them agree to a permanent dissolution of their armed forces, this is the time. The people of every country are war-weary. They were never less able to carry the huge burden which would now be necessary to arm adequately against unfriendly neighbors. War has long since gotten to such a point that a country must face the fact that the alternative to disarmament is little short of national ruin. I am speaking only as an economist now.

W.: I am not at all sure, as you gentlemen seem to be, that we cannot have in addition to an effective league a union of English-speaking peoples. The Australians and Canadians made overtures some time ago to the United States, looking towards a cooperation for economic and defense purposes. They both felt that the United States, at least geographically, was the logical country to look to for these purposes. I do not see why the English-speaking countries of the world could not find enough in common to band together to their mutual advantage. And this could be done within the framework of the League—without weakening

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the League in the least, but rather providing one strong unit committed to its policies. This group would speak with one voice, as it would speak with one language and with one great purpose to preserve the peace of the world, having suffered so much in both wars in the effort to achieve such a peace.

R.: Don't forget China that fought so many years when we were doing nothing, and Russia with its millions of men that held Germany at bay while we were making up our minds whether we would depart from our precious neutrality. Except for Pearl Harbor— But I dread to think what would have been the fate of the world if Japan had not jumped on us first.

W.: Let me be a little more specific. Neither a federation of Europe nor a union of English-speaking countries would be inconsistent with friendly cooperation of Russia and China. The British Commonwealth already is such a union. There we have a union of democratic countries for common ends, with no loss of their sovereign rights in any essential respect. Our own federation of states may furnish a model for a federal union in Europe. Russia claims to be a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, so the idea is not unfamiliar there. China has its various states or provinces united into the Chinese Republic. All these "republics" could therefore as units come into the League, reducing thereby the number of separate and potentially antagonistic units to be dealt with. At the same time they would be free to work out, within the framework of their own organizations, many cooperative policies to the great advantage of

the constituent elements within each unit. These would include finance, migration, tariffs, trade agreements, transportation and intercommunications of all sorts, interchange of educational facilities, etc., thereby eliminating petty irritations that were so easily magnified into *casus belli* in the old days; and on the other hand they could increase the interchange of both material and spiritual things which makes for international friendships.

R.: I still don't see why we need have both a federated Europe and an English-speaking union. Would they not overlap one another?

W.: If they did, it would be an advantage, as I see it. A man serving on two different committees or boards may help them to cooperate all the better. But don't think I am expecting that any such schemes will bring the millennium. All I ask is that we try to travel along a road that leads, however far, to an attainable Utopia, if you want to call it that. We should not expect too much too soon of any such scheme. The point is we would be on the right road and not the wrong road. It seems pretty clear to me that the other road led straight to hell, and we got there in a surprisingly short time. A volume would need to be written to work out even a few of the details of such a plan of federation as I have in mind. It would have to have something like a constitution, along the general lines of our own, defining the limitations under which the federation as such was authorized to act in dealing with the affairs of the respective states within the unit, and with outside authorities. There would, of course, be no attempt to dictate the form

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of government or to control the elections of the individual states, and there would be allowed as large a degree of local self-government as these countries might choose to exercise, consistent only with the proper handling of international matters.

R.: Would you have as close a union as we have?

W.: By no means—at least not for a long time, for the reason that in the case of a federated Europe there would be such a wide diversity of language, traditions, forms of government, etc. It would be what we know more as a confederation than as a federation. With such a union there would disappear most of the old causes of friction which led to war—boundary disputes, mistreatment of nationals, tariffs, access to waterways or other means of transportation, etc. Here would be the foundation at least for a successful Federal Union. What is true of a European Union would apply to a Pan American Union, which would be much easier, no doubt, to achieve, in so far as it would concern itself only with such things as national defense, markets, tariffs, migration and communications. I do not think in any case we are ready yet for a union approaching the close association called for under Clarence Streit's "Union Now" plans, and I am not sure whether such a close union would ever be practical, although it may be an ideal to work toward.

R.: I am more of a dreamer possibly than you, Colonel, but I am still unconvinced that you would not by such schemes merely bring about more blocks and more racial or geographical groups for selfish purposes. Is it not true that precisely to the extent that those within a group unite

for their own interests, they unite against those outside the group, who in turn would be induced thereby to form a rival and conflicting block?

B.: For once I agree with Red, as I think the outsiders would at least suspect hostile purposes, and the result would be the same. I have just been reading the very illuminating book *How to Win the Peace*, by Carl J. Hambro, President of the Norwegian Parliament and of the League of Nations Assembly, which Colonel White mentioned the other day. I agree with him that "any formation of any block would lead to the formation of other blocks, would speed up the armament race and divide the world into two or more camps, distrustful of each other, each hoping to steal a march on the other group." And, as Viscount Cecil said of the Streit plan, "I am afraid that the immediate result of this would be the crystallization of a counter-group of those countries which believe in some form of autocracy." But an all-inclusive league of nations would accomplish all the good of such regional unions without bringing on the evils of the old regional or political alliances that were the curse of the world in the past. If we cannot now organize such a league, we certainly could not organize a succession of harmonious regional blocks. Harold Butler in *The Lost Peace* has well said:

The world will still continue to be organized in a number of separate nations. The violence of the reaction against Nazism was due more to its attempt to stamp out national freedom and individuality than to anything else. To suppose that nations which have made unprecedented sacrifices in order to preserve

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their national identity are going to surrender it once they have regained it is surely contrary to common sense. To remake their national lives will be the first and dearest wish of all of them, even the smallest, and their right to do so is implicit in the conception of democracy. The national ideal is still the source from which the vitality, the culture, and the rich diversity of our civilization will be drawn.

Nothing short of a league including all the countries of the world and covering all the matters of common interest to its members, such as defense, international trade relations, communications, access to raw materials, and a world court, would appeal to such countries, now that the War is over. The virtue of the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration on the Atlantic Charter was that it emphasized this universal character, that it was to include "all states, great and small," and "all men." Even with a purpose so clearly common to the interests of all mankind, it will be difficult enough to secure the adherence of all countries to the League so essential to its success. The prediction which Hambro made in 1942 is being fulfilled today:

The explosive outbursts of personal and political animosity against President Wilson after Versailles will be repeated on a grander scale against President Roosevelt when the war is over. All the atavistic ideas of savage senators in every democratic country, every power of prejudice, every instinct of individual ill-will will be marshaled against those who with wisdom and foresight try to build up an orderly international world organization. People cannot be expected to understand that the efforts to win the peace are as important for mankind as the efforts to win the war, and that even more self-restraint and discipline will

be needed after the war than during the war, if we hope to arrive at a just and durable peace and not lapse into international chaos and anarchy.

The intensified nationalism which is inevitable now that the War is won, must be taken into consideration in any practical scheme for international cooperation or for collective security. While under the Atlantic Charter we are interested in seeing every country achieve the degree of freedom possible for it, we must, as I have said before, let each country work out its own salvation under its own definition of freedom, which may be very different from ours. One of our great mistakes during the past twenty years was the refusal to cooperate with any country that did not practice our particular brand of freedom, or that did things admittedly contrary to any conception of freedom. We were not enthusiastic about helping China in 1931 and later because we thought she was becoming communistic; we had misgivings about the Ethiopians because they still practiced slavery and did a good many other undemocratic things; and we were violently opposed to helping the Spanish government against the Nazi-Fascist attacks because the Loyalists were committed to communism, burned down churches, etc.; and later still, there were many of us who argued that to help Russia was to perpetuate the rule of the godless Bolsheviks, who stood for everything we were taught to hate and fear. Obviously such differences, however extreme, should not prevent cooperation on common matters of external as distinguished from internal politics; and I say this,

much as I hate everything that bears the stamp of Karl Marx.

W.: One of the most serious obstacles either to an all-inclusive league or to a more limited regional block is the very practical and important problem of working out a method of electing representatives to the central governing body, and of determining the weight to be given to each country, large and small, in voting on any common issue. Shall the small countries have a representation and a vote only in proportion to their size? And, if so, shall they be given a compensating power to veto the action of the larger countries? These are not new problems in any scheme of a federation of more or less antagonistic or rival groups. We had a Confederation in America up to 1787, but its weakness was that any of the states could easily balk the action of the majority. Then we worked out the present Federal plan with two houses of Congress; in the lower house the vote was proportionate to population; in the Senate each state, irrespective of its size, had an equal vote. But it took a bloody four years of civil war to settle the question as to how far each state could assert its independence, and we are still having bitter arguments as between the advocates of states' rights and those of a strong federal government. Those who drafted the constitution of the League of Nations had the same almost insoluble problem to handle. One of its great weaknesses was the fact that the veto power was lodged in the smaller nations—unanimous action being required on some questions in the Assembly, while the Council was organized so as to give control to the larger

countries, the ones on whom actually fell the burden of making the thing work. But even as a prospective member of the Council, the United States did not like the idea of going into an international arrangement under which we might be outvoted by other countries. You can see how the demagogues, or even the honest isolationist, could argue that we ought not to delegate to any foreign body the right to say whether our boys should be sent to fight in some foreign land. It is true in this country and in every country of the world, that nationalism reasserts itself once the danger of general war is past. The average man has no imagination when it comes to international affairs (as Red says, he always mistakes a lull in the storm for security), although I am hoping that two great World Wars, from both of which we and other innocent neutrals tried our best to keep out without success, will help to supply this lack of vision. We can speak now in terms of deadly actualities, and not as "impractical internationalists" trying to barter away our independence.

It may be that the new League should be a league of the people rather than, as it was before, a league of governments. But no one can say that the old League would not have worked if it had been given a fair trial. We withdrew before that trial could be given. The main things to keep in mind are: (1) we must have some sort of international organization; and (2) there will be many problems to work out in framing such a league, but these should not be allowed to discourage us from making an attempt, when any other course would be to yield to the doctrine of despair. As

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the President said in his speech on the state of the Union in wartime, "at this period in the War we should confine ourselves to the larger objectives, and not get bogged down in argument over methods and details." If history repeats itself, it will require years for us, now that the War is over, to work out these methods or details.

R.: Before we leave this subject in which I am so much interested, I wish we could suggest a better name for the new League of Nations. The old League in many minds is still disfigured and obscured by the ashes—as well as the still smoldering fires—of the old conflicts that burned so fiercely, both here and abroad, during the twenties. Furthermore, the word "league" may mean anything or nothing, and the word "nations" is possibly too restricted and carries also something of the import of the autocratic powers that continued within the League to ply their selfish games of old-world diplomacy. Merely as something to think about, I would suggest the name "World Congress of Free Lands." "World Congress" implies a deliberative representative body membership in which is open to all the world; "free," that any country joining the congress will retain its freedom and, in fact, strengthen it; and "lands"—that word embraces every form of government, every race, and every geographical division that might be included in the new organization.

W.: I think your suggestion is worthy of consideration. Possibly a shorter and equally inclusive name might be "Congress of Free Nations," or "Congress of Free Lands." But before we inter the League under those ashes of old

controversies let me pay a word of tribute to the deceased. The League was a great dream, and its failure of full realization was the failure of its creators to invoke in the first stages of aggression the powers with which it was clothed. Had they done so, the most terrible war in the history of the human race would have been definitely and effectually prevented by the League, with at most only a negligible cost in money and human lives. "There never was a war more unnecessary and easier to prevent than the War we have today. It was clear to every man with the senses to see and hear that the totalitarian leaders were aiming at the destruction of the democratic powers and at the domination of the world. A functioning and fearless League of Nations, resolved to use force to prevent wars, could at any time up to 1938 have suppressed German and Japanese aggression at relatively insignificant cost. Suppose the United States had joined with other nations in a league to preserve peace; how utterly trifling would have been the 'sacrifices of national sovereignty' we would have had to make, compared to the ghastly toll this War will exact from us for years to come!" Thus wrote Emery Reves in *A Democratic Manifesto* published in 1942.

"No rational man or woman today can question the fact that had the nations of the world been able to create some effective form of international organization in the years that followed the close of the last great World War, and had they been able to bulwark that organization with judicial and police powers, the devastating tragedy which hu-

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manity today is undergoing would have been avoided." Thus spoke Sumner Welles in Toronto in 1943.

"If we had kept together after the last war, if we had taken common measures for our safety, this renewal of the curse need never have fallen upon us. Do we not owe it to ourselves, to our children, to tormented mankind, to make sure that these catastrophes do not engulf us for the third time? . . . Five or six years ago it would have been easy, without shedding a drop of blood, for the United States and Great Britain to have insisted on the fulfillment of the disarmament clauses of the treaties which Germany signed after the Great War. . . . The chance has passed, it is gone. Prodigious hammer-strokes have been needed to bring us together today." Thus spoke Prime Minister Churchill to an applauding Congress in December, 1941.

It is an interesting fact in American history that when we were weakest nationally we showed the greatest courage and statesmanship in making international commitments, as when, for instance, we bravely proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine and stuck by it. One wonders why the isolationists of that day (if there were any) did not rise in their wrath and declare that the President would be sending our boys to die in the jungles and waste places of South America, and that we would soon get involved in old-world squabbles and power politics. As a matter of fact Monroe did have an understanding with England before the doctrine was announced that she would be willing to stand by it.

VIII. *Charters of Security—Freedom from Want*

WHITE: It was interesting to see how both this country and Britain, without waiting for the War's end, began to prepare to put into effect the article of the Atlantic Charter looking toward freedom from want. The cynics, who refused to take seriously the generalities of the Atlantic Charter, had to admit that the Beveridge Plan was detailed enough to suit any critic, and its reception by the British people of all parties and shades of opinion silenced many skeptics. About the same time that the Beveridge Plan, which dealt with freedom from want within national bounds, was submitted in England, the United States and Canada signed one of the model agreements of cooperation, looking toward efforts to meet the specter of want, which even now is gripping the whole world, the agreement dealing more particularly with want in its international aspects. That accord included Article VI of the Lend-Lease Agreements, which provides among other things for the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, and generally for the attainment of the objectives of the Atlantic Charter. Since the War great progress seems to have been made in perfecting this cooperation, not only with Canada, but with

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other countries which joined in what so many then called a Utopian undertaking.

BLUE: These undertakings did indeed seem Utopian to many of us. I recall how bitter the discussion was in this country and in England of the disposition to do the ideal thing without counting the cost. Some of these great objectives will certainly involve great outlays of money, such as does the Beveridge Plan. As we have modified the plan over here, I understand it will not be as inclusive as the British plan in taking care of human beings from the cradle to the grave, such as maternity benefits, the cost of rearing children, and funeral expenses; and it requires, like the British plan, a certain proportion of help from the individuals. But our Roosevelt plan as drawn up by the National Resources Planning Board in 1943, covers not only social security to which the Beveridge Plan was limited, but also youth education and nutrition, including free lunches, health and housing for all, jobs, wages and working conditions for those formerly in the armed forces or in essential war industries. It was even proposed that the government participate as a "partner" in many crucial industries or industries having a more or less close relation to war effort—such as rubber, mining, chemicals, shipbuilding, aircraft, railroads and transportation generally—and that labor have a voice in management. Some of these recommendations, as Colonel White has told us from time to time, have been adopted, but Congress is still heatedly debating others, I am glad to say. I suspect that we shall have to wait a very long time before we can enjoy all these blessings, desirable though many of

them are. I wonder, as many do, if our national economy can stand the strain. Where are we going to get money to do all these fine things while we are trying to liquidate the almost astronomical public debt? There is some consolation in the fact that this debt is owing to our own people and not abroad. Economists try to convince us that we are merely taking money out of one pocket and putting it into another, but of course it is not as simple as all that, as it may also involve taking the money out of the pocket of one man who has saved a little and putting it into the pocket of another who has never even tried to save. The employer has had to foot most of the bills of the Utopians, and some day they may wake up and find that there is no more profit to tax. The corporate cow may go dry, and then we shall have to go without milk. It will be particularly hard on the labor union leaders and members who have been living for so long on cream, although since the War they have been having rather hard going. My fundamental objection to all of these relief plans is that they tend to destroy the incentive to work and to save, the two great incentives that have made America great on the industrial side. It was not so easy, for instance, for the government in its Victory Bond sales to persuade employees that bond buying would protect them from want in their lean years to come, when at the same time the government was proposing to remove all fear of want by large Social Security payments, taking care of almost every misfortune that flesh is heir to.

W.: I am hopeful, as Sir William Beveridge was in Eng-

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land, that the plan will not have the effect of discouraging thrift, and that it can be financed without an undue burden on either the government, the employer or the employee. We had already in America a degree of Social Security that accomplished many of the objectives of the British plan, and we only extended our provisions to make them more inclusive and the relief more adequate. "We who live in the United States," said Vice President Wallace in May, 1942, "think there is nothing very revolutionary about freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom from fear of secret police. But when we begin to think about the significance of freedom from want for the average man, then we know that the revolution of the past one hundred and fifty years has not been completed, either here in the United States or in any other nation in the world. We know that this revolution cannot stop until freedom from want has actually been attained." Liberals and Conservatives alike in England recognized that the Beveridge Plan, or something like it, was necessary after the War, and men of all parties united in trying to make it as workable as possible. From the Conservative *London Times* to the *Daily Herald*, the report was received with general enthusiasm. "We are seeing the end of an epoch," said one Liberal member in the Commons. "Even the terminology of the nineteenth century is inapplicable to the middle of the twentieth. Old conceptions of free trade and production, for example, do not square with the economic needs of today." I recall how many at the time regarded Article VI of the Lend-Lease Agreements as mere wartime rhetoric, while others who

took the agreements more seriously thought we were selling out our independence to the impoverished countries of the old world. But since the War, we have gone ahead to implement these agreements with very definite and constructive action, which has met surprisingly little opposition in this country. I promised to give you both a short report on the Beveridge Plan after I had had a chance to look into it. Briefly stated, it is a plan of state insurance, and, in England at least, was expected to eliminate many of the private insurance companies after it had gone into full effect in 1945. Sir William states in his report that the following three principles guided him in making the recommendations:

The first was that any proposals for the future should use to the full the experience gathered in the past, unrestricted by considerations of sectional interests. Now, when the War is abolishing landmarks of every kind, is the opportunity for using experience in a clear field. A revolutionary moment in the world's history is a time for revolutions, not a time for patching.

The second principle was that organization of social insurance should be treated as one part only of a comprehensive policy of social progress. Social insurance, providing income security, is an attack upon Want; but Want is only one of five giants on the road to reconstruction, and in some ways the easiest to attack, the others being Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness.

The third principle was that social security must be achieved by cooperation between the state and the individual. The state should not stifle incentive, opportunity,

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or responsibility, and in establishing a national minimum it should leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family.

I will not attempt to do more than give the substance of the arguments advanced in support of this somewhat revolutionary report, using wherever possible the language of the report itself.

The social survey showed the interesting fact that the standard of living in England had risen rapidly in the past thirty or forty years, which, as Mac once remarked, shows that the workingman had not fared so badly under the capitalistic system. The standard of living of the working people of York, for instance, was in 1936 about 30 per cent higher than it was in 1929; the infant mortality fell from 161 to 55 per thousand; and nearly two inches was added to the height and five pounds to the weight of school children. A statement of corresponding figures in this country would probably show as high an advance during that time, although it included the disastrous depression which followed the First World War. The report then goes on to state that the rise in the general standard of living in Britain during that period has two morals: First, growing prosperity and rising wages diminished want, but did not reduce want to insignificance, and hence new measures to spread prosperity are needed. The second lesson is the encouraging one that since the periods covered by the comparisons between 1900 and 1936 included the First World War, "it is wrong to assume that the present War must bring economic progress

for Britain, or the rest of the world, to an end." There are bound to be acute difficulties of transition; there are no easy, carefree times in early prospect. "But to suppose that the difficulties cannot be overcome, that power of readjustment has deserted the British people, that technical advance has ended or can end, that the British of the future must be permanently poor because they will have spent their fathers' savings, is defeatism without reason and against reason. . . . Abolition of want cannot be brought about merely by increasing production, without seeing to correct distribution of the product; but correct distribution does not mean what it has often been taken to mean in the past—distribution between the different agents in production, between land, capital, management and labour. Better distribution of purchasing power is required among wage-earners themselves, as between times of earning and not earning, and between times of heavy family responsibilities and of light or no family responsibilities. . . . Unemployment and disability are already being paid for unconsciously; it is no addition to the burden on the community to provide for them consciously. Unified social insurance will eliminate a good deal of waste inherent in present methods. Properly designed, controlled and financed, it need have no depressing effect on incentive."

Further meeting objections similar to those raised by Mac, the report continues: "There are some to whom pursuit of security appears to be a wrong aim. They think of security as something inconsistent with initiative, adventure, personal responsibility. That is not a just view of social

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security as planned in this Report. . . . The plan is one to secure income for subsistence on condition of service and contribution and in order to make and keep men fit for service. . . . The Plan for Social Security is put forward as part of a general programme of social policy. It is one part only of an attack on five giant evils: upon the physical Want with which it is directly concerned, upon Disease which often causes that Want and brings many other troubles in its train, upon Ignorance which no democracy can afford among its citizens, upon the Squalor which arises mainly through haphazard distribution of industry and population, and upon the Idleness which destroys wealth and corrupts men, whether they are well fed or not, when they are idle."

Meeting the objection that such a plan should be put to one side so that Britain could concentrate upon the urgent tasks of war, the report pointed out that "the purpose of victory is to live into a better world than the old world; that each individual citizen is more likely to concentrate upon his war effort if he feels that his Government will be ready in time with plans for that better world; that, if these plans are to be ready in time, they must be made now. . . . The object of government in peace and in war is not the glory of rulers or of races, but the happiness of the common man. That is a belief which, through all differences in forms of government, unites not only the democracies whose leaders first put their hands to the Atlantic Charter, but those democracies and all their Allies. It unites the United Nations and divides them from their enemies."

The final paragraph of the report, though it may sound a little rhetorical to Blue, is well worth quoting:

“Freedom from want cannot be forced on a democracy or given to a democracy. It must be won. Winning it needs courage and faith and a sense of national unity: courage to face facts and difficulties and overcome them; faith in our future and in the ideals of fair-play and freedom for which century after century our forefathers were prepared to die; a sense of national unity overriding the interests of any class or section. The Plan for Social Security in this Report is submitted by one who believes that in this supreme crisis the British people will not be found wanting, of courage and faith and national unity, of material and spiritual power to play their part in achieving both social security and the victory of justice among nations upon which security depends.”

It is scarcely accurate, therefore, to call this plan revolutionary, unless social security is revolutionary. Some in England were for rejecting the proposition as impractical when they read it would cost £700,000,000 the first year, overlooking the fact that the largest part of that amount was already being paid out annually for similar charges. The idea that each man should contribute towards the support of the plan was not new. What was new was the extension of the plan to every British citizen irrespective of his rank, occupation, or financial status. Everybody may share in the benefits, but everybody must contribute. This is at least economic democracy.

I would like to read an interesting comment on the re-

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port, fairly typical of the liberal view in this country, from an editorial in the *Saturday Review of Literature* by Norman Cousins:

Isn't this socialism? You can call it that if you wish, but it is more accurately the logical (and inevitable if democracy is to survive) extension of government planning into an area where free enterprise is unable to do the job alone. More than that: it actually looks toward the salvation of free enterprise, for it seeks to create and maintain the only condition in which a free economy can exist—a consistent flow of purchasing power. But whatever it is called, it tries to prove that democracy can work—provided it uses its head. And heart.

This sounds too obvious to be noteworthy. Yet much of the appeal of the Beveridge Report stems from this very affirmation of the obvious. You think it ridiculous to have to be reminded that "all people when they die need a funeral," until you realize that people who are impoverished are sometimes unable to afford funerals. There are other simple and shocking truths to be found in the report, and they come as a much-needed balance wheel for thinking that gravitates only to the complicated or the supposedly profound. . . .

If it is true, as William James and Adam Smith and countless other thinkers and writers back to Aristotle and Homer have pointed out, that the real tragedy of war is that peace is not sufficiently more attractive—if this is true, and any one looking back over the depression years and surveying the casualties of the peace, measured in terms of poverty and unemployment, knows it is true, then the Beveridge Report is dynamic in its implications. It not only wants to make peace sufferable; it wants to make it downright appealing.

IX. *Some Lesser Freedoms*

BLUE: The fourth freedom, the freedom of religion, reminds me of what some one has called the four things men live by—work, play, love, and worship. I hope while we are guaranteeing freedom to America we will not forget the appeal of all four of these essentials to free and normal living.

RED: I did not suppose you conservatives would go so far as to ask the state to meddle with these freedoms. That would be dangerously like socialism, and you might also have a mixture of church and state, which we all abhor.

B.: I think you know what I mean. I want the state to guarantee to protect the free exercise of all these things—in the case of religion, to leave men free to worship, to teach, and to preach according to their consciences, so long as they do not teach doctrines subversive of the government itself; in the case of work, play and love, to protect all these rights by laws that leave men *free*. I think Germany, for instance, furnished an example of the complete negation of every one of these great rights. In Germany, the country that gave us Martin Luther, the state not only did all it could to suppress and destroy Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths alike, but substituted therefor a paganism brought over from the period when the Germans were naked savages roaming the forests along the Rhine. It is rather interesting, by the way, to recall that the poet Heine, whom Nazi Germany

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rejected as a Jew, predicted this very return to paganism. "The talisman [the Christian Cross] has become rotten, and the day will come when it will pitifully crumble to dust. The old stone gods will arise from the forgotten ruins and wipe from their eyes the dust of centuries, and Thor with his giant hammer will arise again, and he will crush the Gothic cathedrals." I hope you radicals will have some influence on Russia in persuading her to lay off from her efforts to destroy Christianity in that country. I know that some of you do not agree that she did interfere with religion, but she could have no objection to making very clear her intention to let men worship as they please.

R.: Just what do you mean by freedom to love? I would hardly suspect you, Mac, of advocating a doctrine which the Bolsheviks have been accused of spreading.

B.: Again I think you know what I mean. Germany furnishes once more the example of the opposite. She did everything she could to destroy love in the human heart. She taught and compelled her people to hate—to hate one another, to hate her neighbors, to hate those of a different race or color or creed. She even prostituted the love of husband and wife to the sordid purposes of the state. She did everything she could to destroy what we know as the love of God, the foundation of our faith. Had Hitlerism not been crushed, we would have had a gangster rule throughout the world, instead of the rule of law founded on the essential kinship of all mankind, the doctrine which Paul proclaimed in Athens on Mars' Hill. It would have been a horrible world in which to live. If, as Henry Drummond said, "love

is the greatest thing in the world," hate must be regarded as the greatest enemy of mankind. That, my dear Red, is what I mean by freedom to love. And you know my sentiments on guaranteeing the freedom to work. You and I seem to interpret that freedom in different ways, but we both agree there should be freedom. I insist that the government should see that every man is free to work when and where he pleases, at whatever wages he pleases and without the domination of either employer or labor union. The practice of blackjacking a man into joining a union or several unions before he is permitted to make an honest living for his family is Hitlerism and not Americanism. It is a perversion of democracy that can compel an employer to sign a contract with a union, but refuses to compel the union to live up to it.

R.: Men never would have had the right to work when and where they pleased, and for a fair living wage, had that right not been established through long and bitter struggles by those same labor unions. Men would have been industrial slaves in every sense of the word, as they were in England, for instance, before the rise of the trade guilds and unions. With all their abuses—and there will always be many before these organizations come of age—the gain to labor through the unions has been enormous, and it has been a gain in terms of freedom. It is not surprising that Hitler did everything he could to suppress the unions wherever he extended his rule. He enslaved millions, not only in his own country, but throughout Europe, herding them from place to place as though they were lower animals, and

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giving them no voice in what they should be paid, or how long or under what conditions they should work. The history of industry in this country shows clearly enough that capitalism, if unrestrained by law, would do these very things to labor, even in this free land.

B.: I am not arguing against labor unions—I am arguing for the privilege of the individual to join whatever union he pleases, or to work without union membership if he so elects.

R.: Which is like the case of the ornery guy who stands by while his neighbors fight for all the civic advantages which he, at no cost to himself, is enabled to enjoy. The man who works for a good movement or organization or party that brings to him the blessings of a decent social order, deserves encouragement and support, but a man warrants only contempt if he stands by while others fight for these common benefits and then steps in to demand his share. I am a democrat with a small *d* in this as in other things. That means I think the majority, a free majority, should rule, whether a selfish minority likes it or not.

B.: I think the modern labor union is the most undemocratic thing in America. The whole setup of their governing machinery seems designed to vest all the power in a few leaders, who, as we know in far too many cases, run the unions for their own dishonest purposes. Any man who raises a voice against these leaders is soon cashiered as a dangerous agitator. There is no freedom of election when it comes to the choice of officers—not even a secret ballot, in many cases. There is no accounting, either to the member-

ship or to the public, for the expenditure of funds, and no member seems to have the right to inspect the books. Strikes are called without consulting the membership, and, as we know in hundreds of cases during the War, absolutely against the public interest. I know there were millions of honest, loyal union men working in the wartime industries, but they had little or no voice in preventing such disgraceful strikes. These unions as they were governed, gave us a very concrete and profitable lesson in what Hitlerism might be like right here in America. As you know, many members of this new Congress were elected on a pledge to correct some of these abuses. In a wave of anti-union sentiment, which is not difficult to understand, Congress has passed laws with most of which I am in full accord: enlarging the jurisdiction of the Labor Board, giving full right to judicial reviews of its decisions, requiring labor unions to be incorporated, to have annual audits of their books which are to be open to public inspection; making unions liable in damages for any breach of their contracts to the same extent as their employers are; requiring the election of officers to be held at regular intervals with secret ballots, and no one not a citizen of the United States to be allowed to vote or hold office. The courts may not uphold all these laws, but they show very clearly what the public wants. The feeling against the unions is directly traceable to the arrogance, stupidity and corruption of their leaders, to the conflicts between rival unions in which the employer and the public are the victims, to the requirement that workers should pay dues to a number of different unions before they are allowed to

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work, that employers should pay men who merely stand by while others do the work—and to many petty requirements that may originally have had some justification.

WHITE: I doubt whether all these laws will be upheld, and some of them should not be. Many of my clients have been the victims of the abuses these laws are aimed to correct. Nevertheless I doubt whether drastic legislation is the remedy for these evils. It is an American habit to think that Congress need only pass a law, and all will be well thereafter. And in all this agitation it is too easy to forget that the great body of labor union members are both industrious and honest, and that they did a fine job in supporting the war effort.

R.: I am glad to hear you say that. It is most unfair to condemn the thousands of honest labor leaders, or the millions of loyal labor union members, for the faults of a few whose misdoings make news. Many of these unions, as I have said, have not yet come of age, and they are going through something of the moral evolution through which our corporations passed in emerging from the days of the "robber barons." I think the state should take a firm hand in regulating both the unions and the employers, although I think some of the present legislation is going much too far. We should not lose sight of the word "liberty," even in dealing with labor.

B.: All I ask is that men should be allowed the freedom to work, and I welcome any legislation to that end, even though it may restrain the liberties of some of these corrupt labor leaders.

R.: I want to say a word right here about your freedom to play, as one of the things that men live by. I do not know exactly what you mean by this freedom, but what I would like to see in this new world which we have been talking about, is a guarantee to every man of sufficient leisure to develop a well rounded physical, mental, and spiritual existence; and that is one of the aims of a six-hour day or thirty-hour week, which is coming sooner than you gentlemen may expect.

B.: I think leisure is one of the most vicious things you can offer a human being, unless at the same time you make some provision for directing his leisure. Call it restraint if you like; and, if so, you may consider that another one of my corollaries of freedom which I would like to discuss on some other occasion. We have come to recognize as entirely legitimate the efforts of the state, for instance, to restrain or to ban vicious plays, gambling, prostitution, and the sale of intoxicants (especially to minors). If we are to have more leisure, the state should do everything it can to restrain the improper use of that leisure without unduly infringing the freedom of the individual.

R.: It should in doing that also supply all the proper recreation it can for its citizens, and especially for the underprivileged—playgrounds, music, theaters, parks, radio programs, etc. I don't know where conservative statesmanship ends and socialism begins, and I don't think it makes much difference, as we are constantly enlarging that field of state activity with the entire acquiescence of even old-fashioned conservatives like Mac. The better world we are all talking

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about, which I hope we shall soon begin to do something about, will give first, or at least serious consideration to this whole subject of guaranteeing leisure, and then provide the facilities for enjoying that leisure. And you, Mac, should take courage in the thought that the energies men expend in wholesome recreation will not be expended in thuggery, in crime, in outlaw strikes and in efforts to overthrow the social order. For men are likely to support rather than hate a government that gives them a reasonable amount of pleasure, or the opportunity for it, along with the glorious privilege of working a given number of hours a day.

W.: I am glad we can close this discussion with a general agreement on your last proposition. I had intended to say something about censorship, but that might open up more disagreement between you and Mac. Let us keep to discussion and avoid argument.

B.: And I might have said something about the freedom of private enterprise, which the Atlantic Charter failed to mention. However, since Russia was expected to be a party thereto, it would have been asking too much to expect her to subscribe to a document that in effect stated that communism was all bunk. I don't think the critics of the Charter were quite fair on this point.

R.: But don't forget there were a lot of people in this country who seemed to think that it would contribute to the winning of the war to keep on slapping Russia in the face.

X. *Freedom Versus Restraint*

BLUE: I do not want to elaborate on this subject, but I think it might be profitable to keep in mind that not only do the four freedoms involve corresponding obligations, but that there may also be corresponding restraints. Take the freedom of religion, for instance. Our Supreme Court has held that one cannot use his religion as a cloak for disseminating seditious literature. Nor should a religious cult be protected that teaches subversive morals, many instances of which we have had in our courts. These restrictions apply equally to the freedom of speech, which we all treasure so highly. There is a limit even to freedom of speech. The signers of the Atlantic Charter had in mind, of course, the free expression of political views; but even in this field there are limitations no one would dispute, as where anarchists or others preach violence, or mob rule, or the overthrow of our government. We have orderly and peaceful methods for changing our Constitution, and there is no place or occasion in this country for political violence. But there are other cases on the border line, on which we get into heated controversy, as, for instance, on the question of academic freedom, of censorship of the press, of books, of the theater, etc. Again, freedom from want and freedom from fear are highly desirable objectives. We think of freedom from want

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as providing employment and social security for our own people, and economic opportunity and a degree of decent living for the rest of the people of the world. But none of us want to pauperize our own people, or to undertake to guarantee freedom from want to all the poverty stricken nations of the earth. In either case we must not destroy or weaken the incentive for initiative and self-help. And we think of freedom from fear as meaning primarily freedom from the curse of aggression, or freedom from the fear of war and all its horrors. But no one wants to eliminate a wholesome fear of the law from the world, or fear of the consequences that may be visited upon a nation that does violence to the principles of peace. In fact, the world has suffered from a lack of that kind of fear, and we hope that our proposed League or Court will be strong enough to strike terror into the heart of any aggressor in the future. And I hope also we shall be able to instill the fear of God and of the law into the irresponsible younger generation, both here and abroad. Some fear is good for the soul! All these observations are mere truisms, but it may be helpful to state them occasionally, so that our thinking on the subject won't get too lopsided. It is hard to be a realist and an idealist at the same time.

RED: I think I am a realist enough to see that we should not attempt forthwith to impose all these freedoms on all the peoples of the earth. As we have so often remarked, some regions are certainly not ready for them. Children require a good deal more restraint than grownups. Furthermore, I think we should allow a certain amount of freedom

of choice (since we are talking about freedom) to every country in deciding how strong a dose of freedom is good for it. Too strong a dose even of freedom might kill the patient.

B.: While on this subject of freedom and restraint, I want to put in a word of vigorous protest against the increasing enthusiasm shown in some quarters for the so-called progressive system of education. It is a system which teaches that youngsters, without experience and without instruction in making decisions that baffle even the wisest of their elders, are to be left free to make those decisions for themselves, freely to express themselves, as these misguided interpreters of freedom choose to call it. The old distinction between liberty and license seems to have been forgotten, as well as the fact that civilized society as distinguished from barbarism is based on the eternal principle that human nature in old and young alike has to be restrained for the common good. Human nature, undisciplined and unrestrained, is the raw, and very raw material which both organized society and organized education have to shape and whip into some kind of order if we are to save society itself. And that means not license, but restraint. J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has just released some figures showing an "alarming breakdown" in the moral standards of young people of eighteen and nineteen; and we were warned that unless conditions are corrected, this country faces the worst wave of crime in history within the next few years. A deplorable lack of guidance, discipline and restraint was the explanation offered for the appalling in

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crease in juvenile delinquencies. It is difficult to understand how intelligent people, and especially those who have had experience in training youth, could have two opinions on this subject of progressive education. But I suppose if we knew the answer to that question we would know why fads, fakers, and silly isms of every description so easily get a following among presumably sensible human beings.

WHITE: I am glad you brought up that subject. I heartily agree with Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, who said a short time ago that "nothing could be more reactionary or damaging to youth" than this fool system of progressive education, and that the main reason for the outbreak of crime in the nation was that "the fundamental place of discipline in education seems to have been forgotten."

R.: I can go all the way with you gentlemen on that issue. And let me venture this further comment suggested by something the nurse read me this morning. The great contribution of the Hebrew teachers to the modern world as I see it, was restraint in the realm of morals, which we call virtue, as the great contribution of the Greeks was restraint in the realm of art, which we call culture. These two great heritages from these past civilizations, culture and moral restraint, when combined in proper balance, make our modern life on the moral side, decent and orderly, and on the cultural side, balanced, beautiful and fine; and both the community and the individual are fortunate that can achieve culture and moral restraint in the right proportions. Our quarrel is with those who fail to do so. The man who emphasizes moral restraint to the exclusion of culture becomes

a narrow ascetic or bigoted fanatic; the man who exalts culture to the exclusion of moral restraint is usually a failure, because he has missed what in the last analysis the most sophisticated of us value above all else—character. The Germans attained a considerable degree of culture, but with no moral restraint. They were entirely devoid of character in our old-fashioned Anglo-Saxon sense of the word, because they had no moral restraint, or even a moral code as we understand the term.

B.: Speaking of restraints in the political field reminds me of one other point that I should mention, although it may not be very flattering to our national pride. It may be helpful as we consider the international scene, to recall that as a nation, and particularly as individual states, we have been throughout our history reluctant to give up any of our freedom. It may do us good to be reminded now of the bitter fight that was involved in persuading the colonies to adopt a strong Constitution in place of the very loose Articles of Confederation, under which the states were free to do pretty much as they pleased. So bitter was the opposition to that early effort at restraint of freedom that many of our most honored founding fathers refused to sign the Constitution when it was finally submitted, and there were others who, having been elected to the Constitutional Convention, even refused to attend. The states were very slow to ratify the new Constitution, and many did so with reservations. Rhode Island, for instance, which did not ratify until about three years after the Constitution had been submitted, reserved the right to withdraw whenever her interests

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demanded it. Patrick Henry, the great advocate of liberty, refused to sign the Constitution, as he considered that Virginia would thereby be surrendering an undue amount of her sovereignty to the federal government, and he spoke eloquently against the adoption of a Constitution that would invest that government with the purse and the sword. The federal judiciary, he argued, by absorbing jurisdiction, would destroy the liberties of the states. But the struggle did not end with the signing of the Constitution in September, 1787. The Federalists, the Republicans of that day, continued to advocate a strong central government, in which I, as a present-day Republican, thoroughly believe, while the Democrats contended for a strict construction of the Constitution in favor of states' rights. And so the struggle went on for nearly three quarters of a century, and it finally took a Civil War to cement the Union and to persuade these liberty-loving Americans to consent to a restraint on their liberty, and particularly the liberty to secede from the Union whenever they saw fit.

W.: I think this is the first time I have ever heard a Bostonian admit that the Civil War was fought not to abolish slavery, but to establish a stronger Union. It is one of our pet perversions of history that that war was fought to free the slaves. So far from that being so, President Lincoln gave the country a solemn pledge when he went into office that he would not interfere with the institution of slavery, and later when there seemed a chance to make peace with the Confederacy, he is said to have remarked that if he were allowed to write the word "Union" at the top of the page,

he did not care what the Confederates might write underneath. The Emancipation Proclamation, it should not be forgotten, was issued as a war measure, and Lincoln justified his departure from his earlier pledge on that ground. In justice to his memory we should keep that fact in mind. Lincoln is inscribed in our school histories as the great apostle of freedom. But the liberty-loving Patrick Henry were he alive today, we may be sure, would have protested that Lincoln, so far from fighting for freedom, was fighting to forge new chains and bonds on the sovereign states in order to prevent them from leaving the Union at will, as one or two of the states had reserved the right to do. Freeing the slaves came as a later by-product of the war, but only as a by-product of the fight to further restrain the freedom of the states. As Lincoln said in August, 1862: "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it."

B.: Of course, slavery was always an issue in the Civil War, and but for that question I doubt whether my New England antecedents of that time would have rallied to the flag in such numbers. In fact, some of them were on record in the famous Hartford Convention as being in favor of secession. But *Uncle Tom's Cabin* dramatized the sufferings of the slaves and made a magnificent issue on which to appeal to the crusading instincts of the Puritan New Englanders, who had long before sold their slaves to the South. And I would have heartily joined the crusaders had I been around at that time.

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W.: And at this distance I can say as a southerner that I am glad both that the North won on the Union issue, and that Lincoln freed the slaves.

R.: Don't you think that particular chapter in our history shows that Americans at heart are great lovers of freedom, that we are willing to fight and die for it if necessary, and that Lincoln still stands out as our greatest President? I am proud of our record on the slavery question, which some other countries I might mention might emulate.

B.: I suppose you mean England again. But don't forget that Britain freed her slaves nearly a hundred years before we freed ours, and without the necessity of a civil war to do it.

W.: While we are on this subject, I would like to say on behalf of the South, and to correct another perversion of history, that the South would almost certainly in time have freed the slaves but for the interference of the reformers of that day, the abolitionists. For instance, the state of Virginia, which had the largest number of slaves, as early as 1830 came within a few votes of emancipation. As one historian had said: "The popular surge for emancipation, with other liberal movements, would undoubtedly have occurred in succeeding sessions of the Virginia Assembly until the demand had been met, had not the violence of abolitionists and the incitement of sectional politicians made free discussion difficult, or impossible." It is always easy to rouse the crusading spirit of an audience to the highest pitch when the supposed sins of others which the audience is under no temptation to commit, are made the object of attack.

But I agree with Mac that there are times when the freedom of the states should be restrained, as on this great issue of the Union. I am sure most intelligent southerners today would heartily echo that sentiment, although they may feel that Washington is going entirely too far in curtailing the rights of the states for which they fought so hard in the sixties.

B.: I think this discussion furnishes a good illustration of the importance of getting our histories right in the future, as a contribution to international understanding. For instance, the British and American versions of the War of Independence scarcely read like a description of the same affair. And, as Walter Lippmann has pointed out in several of his brilliant editorials, our school histories have been inexcusably silent in failing to show our dependence on British sea power during the past hundred years or more. Anything that contributes to friendly understanding between nations in the realm of historical accuracy is certainly a contribution to international harmony. But the point I started out to make was that Americans can be persuaded to give up their rights when necessary for the general good, and, had they not surrendered very substantial rights as sovereign states in 1787, we would not have a *United States* today, or possibly any free states at all. It might be helpful to think about that when we come to frame a constitution for a new Society of Nations. I might close this discussion with a quotation (let us hope it is prophetic) from John Fiske's *Critical Period of American History*. Referring to our Constitutional Convention of 1787, which I have been studying recently, he said:

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Thus, at length, was realized the sublime conception of a nation in which every citizen lives under two complete and well-rounded systems of laws,—the state law and the federal law,—each with its legislature, its executive, and its judiciary moving one within the other, noiselessly and without friction. It was one of the longest reaches of constructive statesmanship ever known in the world. There never was anything quite like it before, and in Europe it needs much explanation today even for educated statesmen who have never actually beheld its workings. Yet to Americans it has become so much a matter of course that they, too, sometimes need to be told how much it signifies. In 1787 it was the substitution of law for violence between states that were partly sovereign. In some future still grander convention we trust the same thing will be done between states that have been wholly sovereign, whereby peace may gain and violence be diminished over other lands than this which has set the example.

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BLUE: I have thought a good deal of the effect of the Four Freedoms on the non-English-speaking world, particularly on the Asiatic peoples. We are for the first time in history proposing to endow what we regarded as the more backward peoples of the world with a measure of freedom—economic and political—which the white race, and particularly the English-speaking people, have enjoyed for nearly two hundred years. It is interesting to stop and reflect what this may mean in the future course of history, and what it may mean to our own freedom. It may be a little selfish to suggest now that in extending freedom to these peoples, we are endangering, in the decades—or centuries—to come, our own. But that, as I see it, is precisely what will happen. We are scattering this potent leaven of liberty where it will activate great masses of mankind for the first time, and for all the future years. Of course in time—it may be in a comparatively short time—they might take on these freedoms without our help and whether we want them to do so or not. Right now we may be able to confer freedom; later we may have to fight for our own freedom. There are now hundreds of millions of human beings, some of whom for the first time are throwing off the restraints of a foreign yoke, and all of whom are coming into a new consciousness of their own great powers. Consider these four countries:

(1) *China*, with her four hundred and fifty millions, is indeed a dragon about to awake, a highly intelligent, resourceful people, who are now armed with the industrial and military tools we have taught them so well how to use. Under an enlightened and cooperative government such as China is now, she would be a stabilizing influence in the peace of the world. But with an ambitious regime in control the yellow peril, of which we used to hear so much, would become reality. America would probably be one of the first and most inviting fields for China's expansion by peaceful or other means. We greatly underestimated the intelligence and virility of the Japanese. I hope we shall not make that mistake in dealing with China. Napoleon, when he stood under the pyramids, remarked rather sententiously to his soldiers, "Forty centuries look down upon you." When I stand in the presence of a highly intelligent Chinaman I have somewhat this same feeling, with the emphasis on the down." When we talk about the brotherhood of man and all men being equal, we should not be too sure that the Chinese might not dispute that statement. Many of them, considering the age of their civilization and the soundness of their philosophy, no doubt feel that they are superior to these upstart Westerners.

(2) *India*, a subcontinent with immense undeveloped natural resources, has three hundred and fifty millions of highly intelligent people, now seething with the consciousness of a new freedom and a new power. Like China, she will first organize her diverse elements, and then may begin to look about for new worlds to conquer. Her millions, too,

will need a breathing space. Those well meaning Americans who were clamoring for the freedom of India from every vestige of British rule may be asking for the Indians and for millions of others anything but freedom. It is quite conceivable, even probable, that if India were completely cut loose today, the strong, aggressive, and militant Moslem minority would take over and in a generation make of India, with her vast resources and man power, not only one of the great autocracies of the world, but a threat to the peace of all the neighboring regions. Would these gentlemen who are now demanding a free India advise in that case that America should step in and see that the Hindu followers of Gandhi are protected from that catastrophe? India, which for over a hundred years has been freer from bloodshed than any other comparable area in the world, may then become the bloodiest. This insistence on an India free from British rule furnishes a good example of criticism that is detached from all responsibility for action thereon.

RED: I would like to interrupt to say that all this doesn't quite excuse the British policy, so long pursued, of holding back for selfish purposes the development of the immense natural resources of India, which would immeasurably have raised the standard of living in that most poverty cursed region of the entire British Empire. It should have been the richest, not merely for the few fabulously rich rajahs, but for its ignorant, naked and half-starved millions.

WHITE: I am not sure but Englishmen would be as quick as you are now to see and condemn that error, if all you say is true. But we are concerned with the future. If we insist

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on looking to the past, we find as little to be proud of in our dealings with our own Indians, who were actually *dispossessed* of their richest lands and happy hunting grounds and transported to the deserts of the Middle West—those who were not slaughtered in the process. It certainly cannot be said that India would have been farther along on the road to peace and economic independence but for the British rule.

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves that we are underlings.

In any event, it is clear now that Britain is giving India every opportunity to achieve all the independence she can absorb—and probably more.

B.: I may have a good deal more to say about India later, but I will continue my story with (3) *Japan*. Although momentarily defeated and bankrupt, she will certainly show great recuperative powers in the decades to come. Her highly efficient people, animated now with a new and consuming desire to regain face by regaining her lost position among the great powers of the world, to say nothing of the territory rich in the natural resources she coveted for so many years, will be a potential threat to the peace of the world for a long time to come. We should not lose sight of the fact that during the War Japan controlled a population about twice that of the United States, and a territory much larger and much richer in its natural wealth. Much of that territory, though now wrested from her, will continue to be the coveted goal of her ambitious and highly competent people, living on their crowded little islands. We may keep

seventy-five or a hundred million people under restraint for a few years, or possibly for a generation, but not much longer. No Geneva treaty can keep Japan indefinitely in bonds, however severe its terms, and however strong the means used to enforce those terms. The proposal now being carried out, to take from her Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa, will only intensify her desire to regain her lost possessions.

(4) Russia, more Asiatic than European, is still a youthful nation, and a nation that has acquired an immense accession of confidence and real power as a result of the War. Like India, she has almost unlimited resources; but, unlike India, her peoples have apparently learned to live and work together in great harmony. The one hundred and fifty widely different races have been fused quite remarkably into one great country of nearly two hundred million people; even with the unifying influence of war and the threat of outside aggression for the time removed, they are still pulling together in a manner that furnishes a profoundly significant example to the rest of the world. Having established so successful a unity within her own bounds, and with her dreams of a world-wide acceptance of her political and social ideology, she will no doubt in time begin to expand her influence throughout the world, first by infiltration used so effectively before the War, and later, if necessary, by the sword. Russia loves peace dearly, but many think she loves her dream of world-wide socialism more. This is not an immediate threat, however, for it will probably take Russia a generation to get on her feet again internally. But after that has been accomplished she will, we may be sure, begin to

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project her plans beyond her borders, as she has done before. Wendell Willkie did a real service in giving Americans a graphic picture of Russia's growing potentialities. As he points out, these two hundred million people subject to the U.S.S.R., control the largest single land mass in the world under one government; they have almost inexhaustible supplies of timber, iron, coal, and oil which are, practically speaking, unexploited; with their elaborate systems of hospitalization and public health organization, the Russian people are one of the healthiest peoples in the world, and they live in a vigorous, stimulating climate; within the last twenty-five years through a widespread, drastic educational system, a large percentage has become literate, with tens of thousands technically trained; and from the topmost official to the most insignificant farmer or factory worker, the Russians are fanatically devoted to Russia and supercharged with a dream of its future development. The geopoliticians, beginning with Mackinder of Scotland, and later Haushofer of Hitler's Germany, argued that the heartland of the world, or World-Island, is northwestern Europe plus eastern Asia, which would include Russia and Germany, so that if Russia controlled Germany, or Germany controlled Russia, the combination would control the world. Whether this theory is sound or not, a glance at the map shows what enormous potentialities belong to the country that controls this vast territory. The octopus occupying this rich and strategic region could reach its arms east and west and south and encompass most of the world.

These four countries are naturally bitter rivals of one an-

other, and no one should be so foolish as to think any one of them will allow any other to acquire the ascendancy without sooner or later challenging that ascendancy. The most fundamental of all motives in history, that of self-preservation will stir them into action; and it will be hard to persuade them that self-preservation is not the controlling issue in their practical existence, although we may call it greed or vanity.

If we turn to Europe, we find an interesting situation to oppose to this Asiatic picture. We must first distinguish between Continental Europe and the British Isles. Unless history completely reverses itself, it will be extremely difficult to get Continental Europe to work together as a unit, however great the threat to its security, and however appealing the present scheme for a Federation of Europe. At the moment, possibly for the rest of our generation, and irrespective of what may become of the League plan, Great Britain will be sufficiently powerful to keep the peace by the threat of siding with any particular belligerent against any other. Two World Wars have taught Europe to realize that the combination of Britain with any other power is enough to insure success to her armies and a crushing and devastating defeat to her enemies—too great a risk for any nation to take again. But if in the more remote future—and I am talking about the world fifty years or more beyond the present—Britain should lose her grip on Europe, there might be another war of extermination, the result of which would be to lay the continent open an easy prey to any one of the Asiatic countries I have just mentioned. Britain and the United

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States will be both natural and necessary allies for generations to come. It will be a defensive and not an offensive alliance. Britain has all the territory she wants, and the United States wants none beyond her present bounds. There will of course be strategic outposts which both countries must control and maintain, and which will be continual causes of dispute. But their control involves a policy of self-defense to which both countries are necessarily committed.

As I see the future, therefore, looking beyond the immediate generation, there are three great forces that we may reasonably hope will preserve the peace of the world: (1) the common interests, alliance if you will, of the English-speaking people to preserve the *status quo*; (2) the rivalry of the Asiatic peoples among themselves, with an Asiatic "balance of power" that may preserve the peace for a long time to come—or sooner or later shatter it; (3) an international peace enforcing organization, a League or Society of Nations, whatever it may be called, that as long as it functions with the effective cooperation of the English-speaking peoples, plus at least one of the great Asiatic powers mentioned, would be able to keep the peace. It must with sanctions, boycotts, and, if necessary force, compel obedience to its decrees. Its effectiveness will be in direct proportion to the number of countries included and to the extent therefore that it removes the possibility of outside antagonistic blocks being formed.

W.: I agree in general with your analysis. The world is now so heartily sick of war, and of the sufferings and bur-

dens war has imposed on victors and vanquished alike, that I think it will welcome now and for years to come this third means of preserving the peace; and, as I have so often said, if an organization for the peace is sufficiently strong, we shall need nothing more. My hope—and it is a strong hope—is that once the world sees an efficient League at work, it will be convinced for all time to come that it is the best machinery for settling disputes, and is therefore to be preferred to a resort to war.

B.: That is almost self-evident. But will the League be sufficiently strong? That means not only a surrender by countries both large and small of a considerable segment of their sovereignty, but the maintenance through long years to come of a fighting force on land and sea and in the air sufficiently strong to enforce its orders anywhere in the world. You may have read the very sensible words of General Marshall on that subject, which were published some time ago:

I think we will have to compress theories into words. We will have to bear in mind the inevitable human reactions of the postwar reversion to military matters and of the taxpayers' pressure to reduce military preparations. We will have to take the nations of the world as they are, the prejudices and passions of the peoples as they exist, and with these considerations develop a method so that we can have a free America in a peaceful world.

R.: You and Colonel White have said a good deal about the importance of each country relinquishing some part of its sovereignty, which you may be sure each will be reluctant

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to do. Can you be a little more specific as to what a country would be asked to give up for the good of the whole?

W.: I might first state, in the words of the Commission for the Study of the Organization of Peace, the powers a sovereign state at the present time claims: (1) to judge its own controversies; (2) to enforce its own conception of its rights; (3) to increase its armament without limit; (4) to treat its own nationals as it sees fit; (5) to regulate its economic life without regard to the effect of such regulation upon its neighbors. You can readily see that national sovereignty in all these particulars must to some extent be surrendered in order to establish a workable world order, just as our states surrendered to the federal government a good deal of their sovereignty in those particulars to achieve "a more perfect union," and just as the individual must make a drastic surrender of his "rights" in order to get the benefit of an organized society. But you can see how much room for differences of opinion there will be in all these five enumerated fields. Nations will surrender their sovereignty only to the extent that they are convinced that the international body will wisely administer that power. Therefore, the organization of such a body—the framing of its constitution and bill of rights, the definition of the powers of its legislative and executive branches and of the world court—will require the greatest wisdom and broadest statesmanship. Furthermore, "the movement creating such an authority must emanate from the people of the various nations and they must give it not only their consent, but their resolution, faith and will." A difficult but by no means hopeless task.

XII. *Around the World*

WHITE: Suppose this morning we take a little trip around the globe—"around the world in eighty minutes," we might call it. The morning papers are full of the discussion by those in high places of the great complexities confronting the Preliminary Peace Conference, and of the hopelessness of getting any considerable number of countries together on any subject, however plain the necessity for cooperation. The editorials, etc., were precipitated by reports dealing with conflicting markets and trade barriers, with clamoring minorities and selfish majorities, with territorial disputes and racial aspirations, with outlets to the sea and the need for living space, with charges of prewar imperialism stifling postwar democracies. What genius will be able to fit these shapeless cards into an orderly and intelligible design?

RED: Oh, I don't think this world is very different from what it has always been, or rather that human nature is very different. I am far from being discouraged by the outlook because I have long since realized that the most we can hope for is slow progress through the years, through the centuries, with frequent setbacks like the Dark Ages and the religious wars that may make the progress almost undiscernible. But I repeat, I am an optimist, and I do not see how any competent observer can deny that the human

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race is still on the move, and moving forward in spite of all the obstructions placed in our path by the Tories, the conservatives, the reactionaries, by the whole laissez-faire school of political and economic philosophy which has flourished as a barrier to progress in every age of the world, and of which our good friend Blue is an example, but a very broad-minded example. Prince Metternich, you may recall, was largely responsible for the return to despotism after the revolutionary period in Europe—a return that greatly discouraged the liberals of that day, one of whom said that if Metternich had been present at the Creation, he would have prayed, “O God, don’t let this state of chaos be changed!”

BLUE: We conservatives have, it is true, many sins to answer for, but we supply the tracks on which you young radicals run. Whether you realize it or not, we give you direction and keep you from running around in circles or crashing into the nearest building and destroying both yourselves and the building. I venture you are in fact able to move much faster toward your goals because of the restraint and direction we conservatives give to your noisy and hustling locomotives. Even then you are constantly getting off the track, or dashing headlong into one another, or getting into wrecks that hold up normal traffic for long periods of time—we call such things revolutions.

R.: And what blessed things they have generally been for the human race—like the French Revolution and our own! A better name would be evolution.

W.: Would you call this last World War an evolution?

B.: It was a general smash-up of the whole transportation system—tracks, locomotives, and all—and we have got to start all over again from scratch, with oxcarts, so to speak.

R.: But you will begin sooner or later to see much good come out of all the chaos, although of course I am no advocate of war. To mention physical things first, take London with its slums, its miserable streets, its dark, unsanitary, medieval buildings that were wiped out by the bombings. But for that destruction London never would have started from scratch, as you say, to rebuild what is now one of the best planned cities in the world, but typical of many of the great changes which this War will bring about in the less tangible field of the spiritual, political, and economic world. But I suspect that some of the conservatives in London are still lamenting the disappearance of that squalid region, simply because it had about it the pale aura, the musty flavor, the rank odor of antiquity.

W.: But it is too bad that your revolutions have to destroy our cathedrals and museums, our hospitals and schools, while destroying the slums and the strongholds of conservatism, to say nothing of so many innocent human beings.

R.: In rebuilding on these ruins today it will not be so much of cathedrals and palaces which our overlords used to erect to their own glory in ages gone by when they planned their great cities, but the emphasis now will be first on building homes for the common people themselves, together with schools and places of amusement and humbler churches for the multitude. I predict we shall find few of

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these grand marble monuments to the rich—palaces and museums and cathedrals and the like—in our future city planning; although I do not object to having the marble monuments, provided the homes and schools and churches come first.

B.: I think it should be mentioned to the credit of the British that their revolutions were bloodless as a rule, and that they did not find it necessary to destroy the ancient monuments while they were clearing away the rubbish, the weeds, the hoary abuses that had accumulated about the monuments.

R.: But I think it is encouraging to be able to say that in spite of all the destructiveness of war and revolution, so much good can often result. I recall that in 1939, Geoffrey Crowther, the editor of the *London Economist*, for whom I have very great admiration and respect, put the question: For the ordinary man in one of the countries that fought right through the First World War, was the world after the War a better or a worse world? Crowther answered the question by saying that while it was a less secure, more worried, more irregular world, nevertheless in a great variety of ways it was a better world. It was richer both in income and in leisure, freer in the social conventions, deeper in the self-respect it accorded to the ordinary citizen, more democratic in the share of control over his own destiny that was allowed to him. In spite of the mess we made of the international problems after that War, I believe we can say much the same of the ordinary man in this country; and I am sure it can now be said after this Second World War,

for those who survived. The War was certainly a leveling process; for some, good, and for others, bad.

B.: That is an important qualification, "for those who survived." We must not fail to take into consideration, especially when we are dealing with a total war such as was this one, the irreplaceable human and material losses too terrible to measure which we could have avoided with a little cooperation and common sense. It is absurd that we should have to pay such a terrific price for such relatively insignificant gains. Stupidity and selfishness stood in the way of preserving and advancing those gains in 1919 and after. Let us see what we will do today with what may be our last fair chance to rescue mankind from its greatest curse. We are faced once more with the Great Alternative. The issue is as clear as was any in all human history. In the memorable phrase of Lincoln, "We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth." And to the timid souls let us add what our distinguished Chinese visitor said in 1943, that we all may have both the courage and the sense "not to accept failure ignominiously, but to risk it gloriously."

W.: Let me bring you back to the present day again, which I started out to discuss. We do need a chairman to keep us to the subject. As I survey the world through the always revealing glasses of the morning paper, it seems to me that I see signs of its jelling again into three general groups, in spite of the effort of many to avoid regional coalitions. The Americas fall very logically into one group, with the new feeling of friendship between the two continents. Europe inclines again to go her own separate road,

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with divisions within the continent growing more and more pronounced; and Asia is showing a greater and greater sense of independence of the rest of the world, with here and there a disposition to regroup within its own bounds, India and China having something in common, and Japan looking for friends among races of her own color. Russia, both European and Asiatic, seems to find it to her interest to be identified exclusively with neither continent. She remains something of a lone ranger in the new world.

R.: Before you leave that subject, I would like to say something about South America, which has always fascinated me. There is a great continent with unlimited resources, and little bound by the traditions of the old world, but proud of the culture of the new. I think of it as a region whose cities are far more civilized and advanced than most of ours, but whose outlying regions are far more backward—a continent with great extremes of wealth and poverty, with no strong middle class so essential to a real democracy. I have traveled a little in a number of the South American countries, and the impression I took away was of great and beautiful cities having the worst and the best of the old world, while in their rural districts one finds the worst with little of the best of the new.

B.: Where then do you think South America will fit into our jumbled map of world democracy?

R.: The thing that interests me is that the new generation of leaders, not only in South America but throughout all the Latin-American countries, is profoundly concerned in improving those century old conditions I have men-

tioned, rather than, as in the past, exploiting the abjectly poor and plundering the great natural wealth of the country for the good of the very few. These leaders are giving the peon and the peasant an education and a chance to make a living, with an honest government and a voice therein. It is not surprising that South America thinks itself more democratic than its northern neighbor, or at least less imperialistic.

B.: We have certainly given our Latin-American friends no cause, in recent years at least, to feel that we have sought to exploit them.

R.: I would rather not say very much about some of our corporations which have in the past taken advantage of the need of these countries for North American capital. But there is a new approach today. I gather from some talks I have heard over the radio from South America that one of the most constructive things to come out of the War has been a sound economic plan for developing the boundless resources of the Latin-American countries both by private capital from the United States and Britain, and by judiciously placed government loans. The fine exploits of our navy and air forces in the latter months of the War in defending the Brazilian and Chilean coasts against enemy attacks contributed no little to the friendly feeling between the two great continents. There was no fear anywhere expressed, as there might have been a generation ago, that we had any territorial ambitions in that part of the world. I believe the fair-minded throughout Latin America gave us credit for having no other motives in Panama and the Carib-

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bean than to protect our own very much threatened security.

B.: I think American capital has just cause for complaint in some of the treatment it received in the past from several of the Latin-American countries. I need not be more specific, as these countries have now extended the hand of friendship even to the much despised oil companies. But there is one phase of this so-called exploitation of backward countries that you liberals have overlooked. To the extent that the richer countries like the United States through their capitalists develop these other parts of the world, they will often destroy their own markets by helping such countries not only to supply their own needs, once supplied from the outside, but to become competitors of the so-called exploiting countries. For instance, to the extent that British capital developed India's industries—textiles, steel, etc.—India ceased to buy from British manufacturers, and instead sold her surplus products to other Asiatic countries, goods that had theretofore been supplied by Britain herself. And so of the United States in Mexico and in South America.

R.: Of course you don't mean to imply that these American and British capitalists were investing abroad from any other motives than to increase their own earnings?

B.: Men may have a variety of motives, although one may be the controlling. I am still fearful that some crackpot will suggest that we try to run business without the profit motive. There is much agitation in communistic and other quarters in this country to legislate profit out of business

directly or indirectly, and otherwise to change the fundamentals of human nature. But fortunately the hardheaded politicians who have to frame and pass the laws know that this is just another airy economic theory with no relation to a practical everyday world.

W.: There are many earnest thinkers whom you would certainly not call crackpots who are advocating what comes pretty close to the abolition of the profit system, as we have known it in the past at least. For instance, a group of archbishops and bishops of the Catholic Church in 1942 declared: "In the postwar world the profit element of industry and commerce must be made subservient to the common good of communities and nations. The inequalities of nations and of individuals can never give to governments or to the leaders of industry and commerce the right to be unjust . . . or to encourage conditions under which men cannot live according to the standards befitting human personality." The Archbishop of Canterbury, in his book *The Hope of a New World*, also said that "so long as we rely on the profit-motive (as distinct from a secure but limited return on capital invested) as the mainspring of production, so long we shall be in a condition always verging towards faction within and war without . . . The profit-motive in industry and in finance, when given such freedom and prominence as it now has, becomes a profoundly and pervasively disturbing factor. The one thing that has become international in our world is Finance; it is arguable that it ought to have been the last."

In January, 1941, the famous Malvern Conference, speak-

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ing for the Church of England, resolved that, while property is necessary to fullness of personal life and all citizens should be enabled to hold such property as contributes to moral independence and spiritual freedom without impairing that of others, "where the rights of property conflict with the establishment of social justice or the general social welfare, those rights should be overridden, modified, or, if need be, abolished." You may object that such views are to be expected from religious leaders, but I have here a clipping from the *New York Times* of May 21, 1942, reporting an address by Walter D. Fuller, president of the Curtis Publishing Company, and chairman of the board of the National Association of Manufacturers, of which I believe you are a member. Mr. Fuller had this to say to a large group of bankers by way both of warning and of prophecy:

One thing is certain, the people of this country are fighting this war for a better world in which to live. They would like to get it through democracy, liberty, and free enterprise. But they are determined to have this better world of greater security one way or another, and if they don't get it through present principles they will look elsewhere. The handwriting is on the wall. We either must cut the cloth to fit that pattern or the reformers and demagogues will. We can point to past accomplishments of free enterprise until hell freezes over, but people are concerned about the future, not the past.

This country cannot return to "the good old days" after this war, because those days just weren't good enough. They were the days when twenty-eight million people were receiving some form of public assistance; when there were ten million unemployed; when there was want amidst plenty . . . Even in 1929

there were more than 42 families in 100 with incomes less than \$25 a week.

This is not saying that the profit motive is a thing of the past, but it must at least not interfere with our having what Mr. Fuller calls "a better world." And it is encouraging to see that in a *Fortune* poll taken in 1942, twice as many of our people believed we would have a better world after the War as those who thought otherwise; and more than twice as many thought our young men would have greater opportunity after the War than ever before.

R.: I would have so voted. I admit some of the plans for the future look a little visionary and far removed from the kind of competitive struggle with which our business methods have made us all too familiar. But in other realms we find many human beings who have laid aside the profit-motive for some higher aim in life. I have in mind particularly the men in medical science and research in various fields, missionaries, explorers, and others, to say nothing of the millions who fought so willingly for their country's freedom. So why not in business?

B.: I protest against saying that the desire to make an honest living, to provide for your dependents and save enough to support good causes in your community and for your old age—I protest against saying that this motive is any lower than the motives of which you speak.

R.: The point is the dominant motive, whether it is to amass wealth for its own sake (which you will have to admit is the controlling aim of many of our great industrialists),

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or to serve our common humanity or the welfare of the community as a whole—a motive wholly inconsistent with the code of the robber barons, however they may try to conceal their performances under the garb of respectability and material success.

W.: It is unfortunate that most of us are so blinded by material success that we fail to analyze motives, good or bad. Is it not possible for a man to work zealously for the success of his business and at the same time for the best interests of his community? I too would vigorously protest against limiting good motives to those who for one reason or another are not concerned with making money. In the language of Scripture, we should seek *first* the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and it is no sin if thereafter all these other material things are added unto us.

B.: We cannot be reminded too often that the great American virtue of thrift is what has done so much to make America great, and the absence of this in an individual or a nation spells ruin. A young fellow who has a keen sense of the value of the dollar and a desire to make and save is the one we expect to become a useful member of his community, and not the wastrel, the idler, and the spendthrift. I wish I could devise some educational system that would instill the profit-motive into the hearts of pleasure-seeking youngsters who crowd our cities and later degenerate into the tramps and misfits and ne'er-do-wells who burden our charitable institutions, which have to be supported by the men and women who have a proper appreciation of the value of a dollar. I agree with Colonel White that we must

not of course become worshipers of Mammon, but we are headed for destruction if as a nation or as individuals we lose sight of the need to cultivate a sense of values. It is usually the people who have no responsibility for raising cash and for meeting the budget who prate about doing away with the profit-motive. I have no patience with them!

W.: You have made a good case, with which I generally agree. Our difference is mostly a matter of emphasis. But the recognition of the importance of thrift and of preserving the profit-motive in business is not inconsistent with having as a goal something more important than merely accumulating money for its own sake. This is not preaching, it is stating a great political truth, for we are now considering political problems. Most wars, as we have agreed, have been produced by selfish interests who want to grab or hold on to more than their share of the world's goods, or territory, or trade. Sometimes I feel like exclaiming with Sidney Lanier:

O Trade! O Trade! would thou wert dead!
The Time needs heart,—'tis tired of head.

B.: I am glad, however, the business world is not in the hands of poets and textbook economists—we might all starve to death.

W.: But even hardheaded businessmen like yourself ought to realize, after all the agonies the world has gone through to achieve peace and security, that men do not live by bread alone.

R.: I would like to believe with the British economist

Tawney that we are passing through what he describes as the "acquisitive society," in which men and nations were concerned only with aggrandizement in one form or another, to the stage of the "contributive society," in which the common welfare comes ahead of the individual interests. While such a conception is fundamental in communism as we saw it in Russia, I do not think that it is at all inconsistent with the capitalistic system, in which I still firmly believe. The point is, which is to be uppermost, the interest of the individual or private corporation, or the interests of society at large? For over half a century in this country under both Democratic and Republican rule our legislation and its administration have been in the direction of curbing individualism in favor of society as a whole. The age of the robber barons, thanks to such legislation, is a thing of the past; and the successors to the robber barons, the large corporations and the small, are themselves by far the better off for the change. Piracy benefited only a few, and sooner or later most of the pirates were themselves hanged and quartered. That was rugged individualism at its worst. It is foolish to argue, as many half-baked economists and "practical" businessmen argue, that reasonable regulation of business with a view to fair competitive conditions is inconsistent with private initiative. The facts and figures show that never in the history of our country was there such prosperity shared by so many of our people and in the hands of so many corporations, large and small, as in the period when our regulations of business were most numerous and severe. The bankers railed against the Federal Re-

serve Act, which later saved their financial lives. Mark Sullivan in his brilliant history *Our Times* has shown how bitterly Theodore Roosevelt's reforms were fought by the very people who later benefited most thereby, such as in the case of the federal inspection of meat and the many corporate abuses which were carried on by those whom Teddy described as "the malefactors of great wealth." The average businessman is incredibly dumb when it comes to understanding his own best interests—he doesn't seem able to see further ahead than the monthly calendar on his desk. Macaulay once said that, "if any considerable financial interest should find itself opposed by the law of gravitation, powerful arguments would be forthcoming to demonstrate that the law itself was grossly erroneous."

B.: It was the dumb businessman who had the vision and initiative to plan and carry through the mass production of war materials, ships, planes, guns and food that won the War, and not the impractical pacifist dreamers, and the smart legislators in Washington, who did everything they could to obstruct that effort, especially before Pearl Harbor woke them up to our peril.

W.: Don't be too unfair to the men in Washington who did have the vision to cooperate with the businessmen and who gave them a chance—men who pleaded with the people to prepare for the coming conflict, and who were roundly cursed by the isolationists and others as warmongers and promise-breakers.

B.: My criticism of the reformers and economic dreamers is that they are entirely too indiscriminate in their con-

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demnations. They indulge in those very generalities that Red is constantly railing against. They pick up a few abuses in business practice and then proceed to attack our whole business structure. Their legislation is consequently often stupidly ill adapted to the abuses it seeks to cure. A man has a sore toe and they proceed to cut off his leg, and in their haste often amputate the wrong leg. They find it all too easy to arouse the "have-nots" by appealing to their cupidity, and the result is a mass of regulatory legislation that does the gravest injustice to honest and legitimate business. That is Huey Long demagogy, and not statesmanship.

W.: We have just cause to complain of much of our legislation against business—I say *against* business, because it is often such both in the laws and in their unfair administration. It is sometimes the result of trying to do too much at once. I have always insisted that such things should be done gradually, giving us an opportunity to study the effect of legislation before taking the next step. Our young reformers are too zealous to reach their objectives forthwith, and are too inexperienced to know that such haste may wreck a good cause. I claim to be a liberal in such matters, but my work has been largely with corporations who have suffered from such ill advised legislation, so I think I can speak on the subject with fairness to all parties. The trouble with the average reformer is not that he is fighting for a good cause and deserves support therefor, but that he almost invariably loses his sense of balance and feels it is his mission to make the world over and make it over at once.

B.: The only difference between you and me is that I would like to have a careful diagnosis of the disease before prescribing the remedy, and then would administer the remedy only to the sick brother and not proceed like the quack doctors who give the same pills for all ailments, even administering them to sick and well alike.

R.: The difference between you and me is that, after there has been an accurate diagnosis of the disease, I insist on the remedy being applied, and applied at once, even though it may mean the amputation of a leg in order to save the whole body. And if a man has smallpox, he not only deserves to be treated for his own good—but the community is entitled to be protected against the contagion.

B.: The trouble is, you reformers act as though you thought every businessman had the smallpox.

R.: Continuing our discussion of yesterday, I am anxious to hear more of what is going on at the Preliminary Peace Conference. I suppose we ought to have some Whites and Blues at the conference to balance the Reds. I realize it would not do to try to make over the world too quickly, much as some of my zealous friends would like to undertake the job. Our own people, to say nothing of our much talked about backward races, it is agreed, may need a little more education before we can attempt too great a modification of the present order of things. The Blues and the Whites in this country, for instance, still regard the Constitution as sacred, overlooking the fact that we have amended

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it every few years since it was first adopted, and that their patron saint, Abraham Lincoln, took great liberties with the Constitution without even waiting to amend it.

W.: Judging from the preliminary discussions which are beginning to crystallize opinion on a number of questions, it looks as if the Reds will get a good deal of what they want. If nothing else, I hope the Whites and Blues will contribute a little sanity, common sense, and balance to keep the Reds on the ground. And don't forget that their patron saint, Franklin Roosevelt, once defined a radical as one who had his feet firmly planted in the clouds.

B.: I recently saw a good definition of a conservative: a man who has to take over and try to pay the bills for the reforms the radicals cooked up while they were in office.

R.: A man in office, whether conservative or radical, should realize as Vice President Wallace put it, that this is the century of the common man. It is an inspiring idea.

B.: I read the Wallace speech and approved of most of it. But just what do you mean by the common man? Am I not a common man, or do I cease to be a common man when I succeed by a reasonable amount of thrift, intelligence, and hard work in accumulating some property for myself and my family, and for my stockholders?

R.: Of course I do not sympathize with the view that the down-and-outs are the only ones deserving any consideration. Some of the forgotten men deserve to be forgotten because they have been too lazy and shiftless to be anything else. Society owes nothing to a man who is not willing to do his part to seize the rich opportunities that this richest

of all lands has made available for him. While I am in favor of social security, I hope the new laws will be sufficiently safeguarded not to reward mere idleness and indolence. And I am assured by Colonel White that that is their purpose. But you and I know that for several generations in this country the dominant class was the moneyed class, the successful industrialists, whose success helped them to continue to build up monopolies, to control legislatures, and even to bribe our courts. They were common men themselves until they got to the point where they were determined that other common men should not rise as they had risen, and thereby threaten their own position or endanger their mounting profits. These rugged industrial pioneers were often succeeded by a second generation which took on the airs and habits of an arrogant, selfish, and often useless moneyed aristocracy. These latter would have been highly insulted to have been called "common men." A common man is a man who merely wants an equal opportunity to make the most of his intelligence, industry, and thrift, and who usually has to start from scratch.

B.: Which reminds me that the greatest friend the common man ever had, the one who said the Lord must love common men because He made so many of them—this friend, Abraham Lincoln, had no illusions about poverty being a badge of superiority, and ownership of property a stigma of disgrace, as the radicals now seem to contend. Lincoln had this to say about wealth: "Prosperity is the fruit of labor; property is desirable; is a positive good in the world. That some should be rich shows that others may

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become rich, and hence is just encouragement to industry and enterprise. . . . Let not him who is homeless pull down the house of another, but let him labor diligently to build one for himself . . . I take it that it is best for all to leave each man free to acquire property as fast as he can. Some will get wealthy. I don't believe in a law to prevent a man from getting rich; it would do more harm than good."

W.: To continue our discussion of the foreign picture (I didn't seem to get very far yesterday), I see a committee of economists is to meet in London shortly, to make recommendations on inflation, international finance, world trade, the gold standard, war debts, loans to sick countries, currency stabilization, and most of the other subjects that have been giving us headaches ever since the War's end. The economists were all set to move in on the international scene as the generals and admirals moved out. It is too bad that Red is not able yet to embark for London, for no doubt he has a ready solution for all these nice questions.

R.: You flatter me! I have done some thinking about them, of course, but can do little until I am able to read. I cannot ask the nurse to read me a two-volume book on the Norwegian monetary system, for instance, even if it were written in English. I am glad to know, however, that the relation between overproduction, consumption, and transportation is receiving such intelligent consideration. You know my ideas on this subject: that with the rise in the standard of living there should be no such thing as over-

production, provided we have adequate transportation and distribution. I think purchasing power will tend to solve itself with the solution of the other problems. I am very optimistic about the whole outlook, because of the great improvement in all forms of transportation, and particularly by air; because of the lowering or removal of trade barriers of all kinds; and because of the greatly improved standard of living, which I am sure will continue to rise with the establishment of freer communications and freer markets, each working to improve the other. I believe we could do much to facilitate distribution by a wise use of our immense hoard of gold. But I would like to think a little more about that. I hope the economists and bankers won't overlook the vitally important question of establishing, and establishing very soon, an international bank of issue and some form of international currency control. If I could only get at my books I would like to enlarge on these questions. It does not seem to me their importance has been sufficiently realized in Washington and London. We should have taken some steps on both subjects before the end of hostilities, when it would have been much easier than today. Now the countries that were then begging for both guns and butter have become quite cocky since they do not need the guns and are getting all the butter they want and much else besides.

W.: I have had an idea that a common language for the whole world, a sort of medium of exchange for words, would also be a great contribution to international goodwill as well as to international business. I see that several

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such languages are now being considered, and apparently none of them are very difficult to master. But I am sure we shall have to settle another war first, a war of words, before an agreement can be reached. It is surprising how much heat can be generated over a comparatively unimportant matter. All this reminds me again how unfortunate it was that we did not go further before the end of the War in stating our aims and in perfecting our plans for the postwar period.

As I survey the whole world today, these observations in James B. Reston's *Prelude to Victory*, published in June, 1942, take on special significance:

The most incredible nonsense has been talked about the danger of stating our war aims now and telling these conquered peoples now what they can expect from us after the war if they help us win. If those who oppose discussing war aims now are opposing that small group of parlor peacemakers who will not fight but will insist on wasting their time and everybody else's on fantastic blueprints for Utopia, why then I am for them, but if they oppose a statement of war aims on the grounds that we have no time now to discuss war aims and should postpone that discussion until after the war, then I dissent. For let us be quite clear that we are not going to get that revolution among the conquered peoples until those peoples are convinced that when we say "democracy" we mean democracy, and when we say government "for the people" we mean all the people, and when we say "freedom" we mean freedom to work, and when we say "peace and security" we mean peace and security, and when we talk about leagues of nations we mean leagues in which we, the United States of America, will take an active part. It is not good enough for us to broadcast every night to Europe and

Asia that Hitler's New Order is a fake and a deception that is leading the world through slaughter to slavery. It is not good enough to tell the Indians and the Burmese that the Japanese are interested in India and Burma for their own evil commercial ends and will exploit them to the last square acre and the last coolie in the land. It is not good enough because too many people in Europe feel they were deceived by democratic promises after the last war, and too many people in Asia cannot believe that the Japanese will exploit them any more than they have been exploited by the British, French, Dutch, and Americans.

W.: I mentioned the other day the appalling multiplicity and complexity of the problems facing the Preliminary Conference. To clarify my own thinking on the subject, I have drawn a rough outline of the main heads with which the Conference must deal—geographical, racial, economic, political. And each country has its own problems. Certainly it will take years to frame a program for this disordered world of ours. And how this Conference has brought out both the best and the worst in our common human nature—a witch's caldron of selfishness, stupidity, hate, narrowness, bigotry, greed! All the elements that have made for wars in the past seem to sit around the peace table once more! But on the other hand we see unselfishness, wise statesmanship, Christian idealism, wide information, and broad-minded intelligence of the first order. The Conference has invoked the aid of an extraordinary body of men, students of every phase of the international scene, experts in every field. I have a new respect for that much abused class as I begin to

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see what a wealth of facts and sound scholarship they are contributing to the problems of the Peace. These men are not politicians, they have no ax to grind; they are merely trying to analyze the problems and then to work out some satisfactory solution for them in the light of their thorough knowledge of the facts.

R.: It is a sure mark of an ignoramus to ridicule the aid of experts. I think one reason why Congress fell into such disrepute was because so many of its members were too stupid to know how to use the specialized information that was so easily available for them. Many of these men talked the language of the backwoodsman of a hundred years ago, and seemed to think it smart to do so.

W.: One can begin to appreciate how indispensable is the aid of the international expert (however we may dislike to admit that experts know more than we do) when one considers that the whole world and all its peoples are immediately and vitally involved in almost every decision that the Conference will have to make. Verily, today no man liveth unto himself, and every man in one sense or another is his brother's keeper.

R.: I devoutly hope that as a result of all these conferences America will at last come of age, and become to a degree at least global in its thinking. We are beginning to realize that there is actually a world lying beyond our Atlantic and Pacific shore lines. What a shock it was to our isolationist friends when after Pearl Harbor it began to dawn on them that the two oceans were highways and not impassable barriers!

W.: Why don't you start a movement to put a good-sized globe in every schoolhouse in the land? Our young people at least can be taught that the world is round. To turn to the outline I have been working on—first, take the list of countries involved: (1) There are the Axis countries, Germany, Italy, and Japan, and their satellites in southeastern Europe; but we cannot lump these countries together, for each one has its own terrific problems. Germany alone could occupy our statesmen for years to come, and Italy and Japan each have their distinct and several groups of headaches. (2) There are the occupied countries of Europe, of Africa, of Asia, of the Pacific. (3) There are the countries that tried to maintain their neutrality and were not involved in the long years of the conflict, like Sweden, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland. (4) There are the United Nations themselves, the victors who have the responsibility of making most of these decisions. It will require statesmanship of the highest order to accommodate their natural differences and conflicting interests: America, Britain, Russia, and China—the CRABS, as Red calls them. (5) Then we have France, half victor and half vanquished, with its age-old rivalries and warring factions. (6) There is the problem of colonies and commonwealths which in turn fall into separate groups: (a) the colonies that belong to the victors and were never lost, or were lost only temporarily, to the Axis powers; (b) the colonies that once belonged to the Axis countries and now demand their complete freedom, or the protection of one or more of the United Nations; (c) possessions like the Philippines that are well on

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the way to independence, or like India, itself presenting a vast tangle of problems, or lands like Australia and New Zealand that want the protection of both the United States and the British flags, but prefer not to be under either; or like certain islands in all the oceans which might well be given complete freedom but for the fact that strategically their control is essential to the security of one or more of the United Nations and to the peace of the world, at least until we reach an ideal state when we need make no provision against war; (d) and among these, countries which ultimately deserve a complete measure of freedom but, for their own good, require a period of tutelage in democratic ways and methods—which, in other words, are not ready yet for complete sovereignty, or for complete independence of the protection of the stronger powers. All but a few visionaries seem to agree to this proposal, but these visionaries are trying to make trouble. (7) Countries that have in years past been alternately under German and Russian rule, but which Russia is occupying pending a decision as to their final status, and which Russia insists must ever remain to some degree under Russian control for her own security—Poland, Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania. Russia may ask for a voice in the Balkans, possibly a slice of Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Bukovina; she also wants some territorial concession in Manchuria as a shield against Japan. (8) China wants a protectorate over Korea and Formosa for the same reason. This enumeration suggests but a few of the territorial and racial problems to be met. But there are in addition a multitude of other problems:

I. Feeding the countries of Europe. This applies to most of them, as we found many millions of people were on the verge of starvation.

II. Policing the countries of Europe (in several of which there are disturbances amounting to civil war), and helping them to establish stable governments reflecting the wishes of the majority. In many countries there are rival parties, each claiming the right to take over the government, and especially to handle for the United Nations the aid to be extended to those countries—a political weapon of great power. In some countries there are powerful factions seeking the restoration of the old monarchies. But the demand for freedom is strong in every region of the world, though variously interpreted in various tongues.

The whole problem of policing Europe is complicated by that of the soldier returned to civil life, where there are millions of men who for years, in most cases during their most formative years, have been devoted to careers of violence. Many of these men are now at home fighting for what they consider a new social order, or against an old regime, or for some familiar political faction that once claimed their allegiance before the War; still others are fighting for revenge, some merely to prey on their neighbors—but all for bread. It has always been one of the grim aftermaths of war that great numbers of men are left unfit psychologically, if not physically, for peaceful pursuits, men who prefer to achieve their ends by violence—professional fighters and restless spirits seeking some outlet for their turbulent and uncontrolled energies trained only in the

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school of physical force. Fortunately there are not a few both in this country and in Europe who are willing to return to agricultural pursuits. The farms are waiting for them. There is no need in that case for an elaborate mechanized change-over from wartime work.

III. Industrial and agricultural restoration. Here again Germany presents her own peculiar problem, for she had systematically stolen the machinery from the countries she overran and had otherwise tried to wreck the industries of those countries. This machinery has to be restored or replaced, while Germany also is to be given some means of industrial rehabilitation.

IV. The development in the conquered countries of a means of trading with the rest of the world. They must have products to sell, and they must be given an opportunity to sell them.

V. The adjusting or removal of trade barriers. This is one of the most difficult of the problems to be handled. Here Allied statesmanship will be put to the acid test. Wealthier countries like our own will have to make sacrifices in order to restore the shattered fortunes of others which in turn, it is hoped, will become both good and profitable neighbors.

VI. The establishment of an international bank of issue with an international currency, and its control. America with its immense gold supply and its able economists, like Red, will no doubt make a great contribution to the solution of these problems.

VII. The trial of the Nazi criminals. At the same time

we shall have to protect the millions of Germans from mob violence. Since the end of the War there has been some lessening of bitterness and a disposition to let the international tribunals deal with the culprits. Some have committed suicide while awaiting trial. But while every effort is being made to expedite the criminal proceedings, it may take years to dispose of all the cases, as well as of the litigation involving property rights throughout Europe and the occupied countries elsewhere.

VIII. The regulation of immigration. Few of the rich countries of the earth are likely to open their doors very wide to the millions of miserable human beings in Europe and elsewhere desperately in search of the things these more fortunate countries have to offer. We in America cannot forget that this country was founded by the oppressed of Europe, and in the past we have been generous in continuing to admit them. Those are strong lines which were engraved under the welcoming light of the Statue of Liberty:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

But it seems to be the general opinion that immigration should be discouraged, while every effort is to be made to encourage expatriated people to return to their own homes and to rebuild on the old foundations. Financial and other aid is being worked out on a broad, humanitarian basis.

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Here again the Germans present a peculiar problem. They do not seem to be welcome anywhere in Europe (the memory of the military "tourists" is still fresh), but Germany is a poor country in natural resources, and with her industrial economy either wrecked or converted to war purposes there seems little inducement to a German to return to his beloved fatherland. Germany realizes, too, that when she gets back into normal peacetime manufacturing, in which for so long she excelled, she will find the markets of the world long since taken over by her old rivals. All this will at least teach her that war does not pay.

R.: But what are we going to do with these unfortunates in Germany and elsewhere? It was always considered a legitimate aspiration for a country to seek homes in other lands for its nationals. The mistake was in assuming that conquest was necessary for that purpose, when as a matter of fact until recent years the new and undeveloped and therefore most inviting regions of the earth were urging the people from other lands to come and make their homes there. That was the policy of America for a hundred years or more.

W.: Plans are being worked out to open many rich and unexplored regions to these people. There are great areas, especially in the south temperate zone, that would be suitable for Europeans, and of course the tropics offer immense possibilities. Here again the airplane offers its wonderful facilities for reaching and developing these remote, far inland, and once unexplored regions. Even in the short time since the end of the War, we have developed air condition-

ing on a great scale, making living comfortable in almost any climate; and because our troops had to live in almost every part of the earth our doctors have worked out cures or preventives for the diseases that made many regions uninhabitable by the white races of the temperate zones. But to come to the final and most important point in my outline:

IX. The framing of some kind of organization which will provide for the settling of international disputes in the future without resorting to war; for the punishment of those countries which may elect to resort to force instead; for the disarmament of the Axis countries, and later for a plan of general disarmament; and for a court of sufficient ability and standing, and with sufficient power behind it, to settle by judicial processes the disputes heretofore sought to be settled by a resort to arms. I have discussed all these questions with you on all possible occasions, as such an organization has been my dream for most of my life. At this moment it seems nearer realization than ever before. Even in our own country, the stronghold of isolationism, the sentiment seems overwhelmingly in favor of creating such a body and delegating to it the necessary power to enforce its decisions. But we still have some opposition by that same group that opposed cooperation and opposed our taking adequate steps for our protection before Pearl Harbor. We now call them confusionists. They are trying now to conceal their real purpose by a new slogan: Isolationism is dead. Long live nationalism! I ought to say here that I have the greatest respect for those honest and patriotic pre-Pearl-

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Harbor isolationists—and there were many thousands of them—who nevertheless had the courage thereafter to come out strongly for our participation in the War, and later for these international efforts to establish some sort of permanent peace. I can salute our friend Mac as one of this goodly company.

R.: I am glad to hear you speak of your plan in terms of a dream about to come true. I hope you will have more respect for some of my dreams for the future of our distracted but ever fascinating world.

W.: I see that the Czechs and the Greeks have shown a more than German efficiency in “encouraging” the Germans to leave their territory. But a brighter side of the picture in the Balkans has been the breaking down of both geographical and racial barriers, at least for trade purposes. This with the assurance of freedom from fear of aggression, which is indeed something new in southeastern Europe, has had a wonderful effect in pacifying the uneasy minorities throughout that region. This has given the more optimistic the hope that the age-old antagonisms that kept the Balkan states in constant ferment may in time disappear. The cynics have said that concentration of these antagonisms on the Germans has, for the time, exhausted the Balkan peoples’ hatred of one another. But I think there is a deeper explanation than this. The later period of the War brought about a remarkable spirit of unity in fighting for a common freedom from German domination. Even the Rumanians

and Bulgarians lost all interest in fighting against their Slavic brothers when they saw they were being used as mere cannon fodder by their arrogant German masters. The result was many thousands of these southeastern Europeans were to be found fighting together in the Allied armies, many of them deserters from German officered divisions under their own flag. People cannot hate one another very hard when they have fought together against a common foe. The Greeks, the Czechs, the Slovenes, the Serbs, and the Poles, who had endured so much from the Germans, united as brothers in hating their former oppressors with a consuming hatred. This feeling was common throughout all of the former occupied European countries, but it seemed to be bitterest in southeastern Europe where it showed no signs of dying out.

R.: Is it not one of the ironies of history that the feeling against the Jews, which the Germans sought in every way and in every land to inflame, has now been transferred from the Jews to the Germans themselves? They seem indeed to be the hated of all mankind.

W.: This feeling has made it hard to distinguish between Germans. But there must be some basis for distinction, even by those who accept the theories of the German mentality which we discussed some time ago. There are many, for instance, who feel that a possible solution of the whole German problem lies along the line of the restoration of the *status quo ante* Bismarck. The Saxons, the Bavarians, and other South Germans, for instance, seem a very different breed from the arrogant, war-worshiping Prussians

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for whom they have never had any great love. Even the Germans in Austria have shown no great desire to be under German rule again, strange as this may seem to some. The Germans everywhere, for a time at least, appear to be thoroughly sick of war and anxious only to be treated as the equals of other races and to be protected from the furies that are now sweeping through the world.

R.: I thought for a long time that Germany ought to be broken up into her old states—kingdoms, duchies and principalities—but few agreed with me. All the statesmen of the First World War period argued that if Germany was shorn of her colonies and was allowed to develop along peaceful lines within the limitations determined by the Versailles Treaty she would never again be a threat to the peace of Europe. But such procedure only made Germany angry without making her impotent. So I had the idea that it would have been wise to have broken up the plunderbund and kept its members from banding together again. But I can see that the policing of such a job would soon have become too much to expect of the other countries of Europe, who were more interested in their own selfish internal affairs. Furthermore, the national spirit was too strong throughout Germany, the spirit which Hitler found so easy to fuse into a single soul by playing up their common grievances.

B.: The old notion that the Prussians were such a different breed, and that therefore, if we could quarantine them, the contagion would not spread to the other states of Germany, is pretty well disproved by the history of the last quarter of a century. Don't forget that Himmler was a

Bavarian. Both the Prussian blood and the Prussian ideals have infected the whole of Germany, where both found congenial soil. No one could hope now to be able to stamp out the Prussian disease by any system of enforced segregation. It may be that with the disappearance of the present Hitlerized generation, plus an encouragement to whatever decent elements may remain in the country, we may in time have a Germany with which the rest of Europe can live in safety. The Germans remind me of bad boys who have been made worse by vicious associates, by perverted parental training and by a stupid system of penology in dealing with them as criminals, but who nevertheless have great natural abilities that might conceivably be directed into useful channels. But I must confess this hope fades when I think of the difficulties of the task of reeducation and of how poorly fitted the rest of us are to undertake the job. Like charity, that kind of education should start at home. I do not think we can assume a "holier than thou" attitude, and set out to teach the Germans how to be good when our own shortcomings are so apparent. Nor could the Allied countries with their own divergent views perhaps agree on the character of the teaching. In government, for instance, what brand of democracy—British, Russian, Chinese, Dutch, or Republican American or New Deal American—would be recommended for the new generation of Nazis? Furthermore, if there are not enough right-thinking Germans left to do the teaching, it would be hopeless for any one else to undertake the task. As I have said before, I am in favor of being generous with them economically, but severe politi-

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cally in keeping them within the bounds of good behavior. That is the extent to which we should take a hand in Germany's affairs. In time she may learn that hate and violence never pay, but that friendly cooperation always does.

R.: That reminds me of the startling fact (if it is a fact) that France and Italy are about to agree on a colonial policy of mutual concession and cooperation.

W.: I was just coming to that subject. Before the War was over, thousands from both France and Italy were fighting with the Allied Nations against the common enemy, and this developed a new feeling of friendliness. Both countries are now wise enough to realize that their interests lie in accommodating their differences. They both need free access not only to the Mediterranean but to the markets and sources of raw materials to be found in the colonial regions claimed by both countries. Neither the individual Frenchman nor the Italian has any great urge to become an empire builder. If each can be free from the immemorial threat of German aggression and of attack by the other country, both the Italian and the Frenchman are quite happy to remain at home and enjoy the art of simple living, which both have so long and so successfully cultivated. The Italian is far happier listening to grand opera or looking after his vineyards and flowers than in marching behind a band through the desert wastes of Africa. It seems likely now that most of their former colonial possessions will be restored to these respective countries with some assurance that each country will have free access to the colonies of the other, and that the colonies themselves will ultimately be

given a large measure of freedom with a voice in their own affairs. The Atlantic Charter, in other words, will be extended to the French and Italian colonies as Holland has agreed it shall be extended to her island possessions.

B.: This gives me an opportunity once more to put in a word about imperialism, and particularly British imperialism, of the shortcomings of which we are constantly hearing so much from our new school of international reformers, most of whom strangely enough are drawn from the ranks of our erstwhile isolationists. We hear little of how substantially the standards of health and education and physical comfort have been improved in the case of many Eastern peoples living under Western domination. We never stop to think that, as the *New York Times* once said editorially, these eastern peoples, in large part as a result of the protection given them by western powers, have enjoyed more years of uninterrupted peace than the West itself has had; that British imperialism particularly has been farsighted enough to encourage a gradual extension of self-government. In India for instance, four of the eleven provinces are governed by Indian ministries, and the other seven would have the same control if the Congress party had not chosen to abdicate responsibility. Those people who are now clamoring for the dissolution of the British Empire do not stop to reflect that it was the far-flung British Dominions that saved our civilization when the Nazi storm overtook mankind.

"Where would the world be today," asked Thomas W. Lamont a little while ago in the *New York Times*, "if in

September, 1939, Gibraltar had belonged to Spain, Malta to Italy, Suez to Egypt, Ceylon to some Eastern power, the Falkland Islands to Argentina, and so on through the whole list of strategic outposts that are the pressure points of great empire? Where should we be without the bases England turned over to us in Newfoundland, Bermuda and Trinidad? The critics of the British are tireless in their denunciation of British laxity at Singapore and Hong Kong. But what they lament is not that Great Britain possessed these bases but that she failed to defend them successfully.

"If America herself has no intention—which God forbid—to take over by herself the safeguarding of all these critical points here, there and everywhere; if we realize that most of the local peoples are wholly without the means to defend their lands; if we know, as we do, that those strategic points are among the chief ends that bloodthirsty Germany and Japan have for years been striving to secure; then why in the world does any of us suggest the dissolution of the British Empire—that empire for whose survival we prayed so fervently in the black days of 1940-41? . . . And what plan do our anti-British friends offer for the preservation of our world interests and our own land, as an alternative to ever closer and friendlier cooperation with the great Anglo-Saxon nation across the Atlantic? If Britain were to be crippled, can we then lean securely on Russia? on China? on the other United Nations? . . . It would be the act of madmen to demand that all backward peoples be promptly cut loose from their present moorings, and directed each respectively to construct a democratic state of its own to fare

as best it could in a world from which aggression has, through some unique form of gigantic international machinery—as yet existing only in the imagination—been banished, and the world thus set free from the thing it loathes.”

I have been as critical and impatient as any one of the stupidities, the blunders, the smug self-sufficiency of my British cousins, but I try to remember that we Americans have faults quite as glaring; and certainly in the matter of treatment of conquered or inferior races, and in seizing the territory we think we need, we have no grounds to boast of any moral superiority. We and the British should march hand in hand up to the altar of repentance. But I hope, for the sake of international amity, that the British won't have as much to say about our race problems as we have had to say about theirs.

R.: But let us not forget that times have changed and that we of the West must be prepared to deal in a wholly different manner with the subject peoples of Asia, Africa, and the South Seas, in the future. The white man can never return to the old status in those regions. I welcome the change, and welcome the pledge to apply the Atlantic Charter to the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as to the Mediterranean Sea, and to all the countries bordering on those waters. Our statesmen, I hope, will be equal to the task of facing the imperatives of this new postwar world. But referring again to the colonies, will this policy leave Germany out in the cold? Will she not continue to weep on our shoulders for a *Lebensraum*?

W.: As I understand it, Germany will certainly be al-

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lowed the privilege of trading in all of the markets of the world, but there will be restrictions on the migration of her people to British, French, Dutch, and Italian colonies. After a period of years, and after the peoples of these other countries have had an opportunity to settle in large numbers in their respective colonies, the doors will be opened to German immigration. But the Germans will be free of course to go to other countries, subject only to the general immigration restrictions which each country will be allowed to work out for itself.

R.: That sounds rather selfish and shortsighted. It is that kind of repression that breeds Hitlerism. One of the wisest ways it seems to me of reducing this threat of a militant Germany, say twenty-five or fifty years hence, is to encourage migration of enterprising Germans to other countries of the world where they may make good, thrifty citizens, as millions have done in America. That at least is better than a policy of extermination or of economic starvation, a policy to which some in Europe seem now committed.

W.: I agree with you. I am merely stating what is being discussed and which may not be finally adopted. I do feel, however, that Germany has not shown herself a trustworthy colonizer. Temperamentally, she seems incapable of handling sympathetically a subject people, and she uses her colonies as military outposts from which she may attack other countries. In other words, her whole colonial policy was framed in the light of military expediency rather than for the good of the colonies. Her talk about needing colonies to supply her with the essentials of living is all non-

sense. She has almost always gotten most of those essentials from other regions than her own. Her remarkable preparedness for this last conflict has shown very clearly that she had no difficulty in getting all of the supplies she wanted.

R.: But this does not mean that she will be able to get them in the future. It is understandable, therefore, that she should feel very insecure in a world where her former enemies have the power to cut her off and strangle her to death.

W.: She is responsible for getting herself into that position, and it is not unreasonable to ask that this should be one of the means of keeping her on her good behavior. No doubt the new League will be open to her and it will adjudicate her grievances, if she has any in the future. It is contemplated that she should be a member of the League and in time have a representative on the World Court. It will be an interesting experiment for her to find that she can gain much more by resorting to the processes of international law than by trying to slaughter all who stand in her way. She gained nothing and lost everything by that latter procedure, which she must surely realize now.

R.: Who is to judge when the colonies are ready for self-government?

W.: There again the League will no doubt have a voice if there has been any denial of freedom to a country ready for it. As a matter of fact, Britain has found it to her best interest to grant the largest measure of freedom to any particular colony or commonwealth prepared to assume it.

R.: What about Ireland? She has had to fight for every bit of freedom she has obtained.

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W.: I believe you will be fair enough to concede that, if Ireland could be cut loose from the British Isles and floated out to the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, England would be delighted to see her go. Ireland in the First World War as in the Second was always a potential threat to the safety of England itself, merely because she was so near and because there was always a large element therein that refused to cooperate effectively with England in the common defense. Had Northern Ireland denied bases to the Allied fleets as southern Ireland did, Germany's blockade might have been successful in 1942, and the War ended with a German victory in that year.

B.: Speaking as a Scotsman, I don't see how any patriotic Irishman could feel very proud of the part that that element in Eire took in embarrassing England in her years of extremity.

R.: I think I can understand why southern Ireland wanted to preserve her neutrality as long as she could, thereby hoping to save her cities from destruction.

B.: But what a shortsighted policy it was, as events later showed! Had it served their purpose, the Germans would not have hesitated to land in Eire in spite of her protestations of neutrality, and would have proceeded to plunder her as Germany had plundered almost every other neutral country in Europe. The German garrisons in Dublin would have left very little liberty to the liberty-loving Irish, and we would still be hearing about the Gestapo executions in that unfortunate city. But Ireland is only too glad now to share in the freedom that the common people in the Eng-

lish cities helped to buy at so great a price when they refused to be frightened into surrender in those terrible days of German bombings from the air. I saw quoted again in the morning paper these lines that appeared in 1941, reflecting that spirit:

The Jerries dropped another bomb,
Poor 'Erbert lorst 'is 'ead,
While Sister Nell got blown to 'ell
And maw-in-lore is dead.

I've lorst three fingers orf me 'and;
Got splinters in me knee;
But worst of all, down cum a wall
An' spilt me blooming tea.

If in the postwar settlement there should be any discrimination attempted against Ireland, you may be sure that England will come to her defense.

W.: In October, 1938, I had occasion to meet James Dillon, then a member of the Parliament of Eire, and I acquired a great respect for his intelligence and independence. Later, as I followed his career after England became involved in the struggle, my admiration for him was greatly increased. He had the courage to declare on the floor of Parliament that aid for Great Britain and the United States from Ireland was called for on spiritual and moral grounds; that the honor of his country was involved. "If we prove unequal to our duty in this time we shall stand forth amongst the nations of the world as a nation claiming all the privileges of independence but unequal to its burdens. . . . The

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only issue of significance is whether Christianity shall survive." But the only response this brave and sensible appeal provoked was the threat of imprisonment of the man who had the courage to utter it! Henry Steele Commager of Columbia University has pointed out that the Irish, in arguing that their neutrality had cost them nothing, failed to realize that it had cost them a considerable part of the American good will on which they have relied, and on the continuation of which they have rested their hopes for the future; that the people were blind, most of them, to the nature or the consequences of their moral isolation in the world today; that Eire was in the awkward position, not so much of having bet on the wrong horse, as having failed to place the bet on the right one. Americans did not relish the charge of de Valera that the American troops who landed in Northern Ireland as a part of the campaign to free Ireland and the rest of the world from German aggression were themselves guilty of aggression against the Irish.

R.: I think much can still be said for the attitude of Eire. And is it not true that England became quite reconciled to that neutrality and even found it an advantage? Let it be said to Ireland's credit, that she supplied England with much food and other material, and, what was more important, there were many thousand volunteers from southern Ireland in the British army. This in spite of the gross mistreatment of the minority in Northern Ireland that sought to bring about the union of the northern and southern Irish under one free rule. Had England dealt more generously with her in the preceding hundred years, Ireland would

have been just as loyal and self-sacrificing as were the Welsh and the Scots. It should be a great lesson to England in handling the other peoples under her flag. India for instance.

W.: I am glad to see that Britain's promises of independence to India are being carried out. At the moment it looks like India herself is not quite sure what she wants. Britain has left it to her to decide, and it may take a civil war to settle the question.

B.: Can I interrupt to interject a few more facts about India—although you may accuse me as a Scotsman of some bias in favor of Britain. My friend, General Sir Sydney Lawford, who lived in India about fifteen years and knows the whole country well, told me some interesting things in 1942 about her problems that Americans are apt to forget; for instance, that India has been for centuries a house divided against herself, with her scores of widely different and bitterly antagonistic races voicing their hatred of one another and of England in a thousand different tongues. The pacifist Hindus, followers of Gandhi, are in a very large majority and they heartily detest the Moslems, who, though a relatively small minority, are among the finest fighting troops in the world. Each group is intolerant of the religion of the other, and neither could worship in peace, except for the intervention of the British, who are completely disinterested. Then there are the twenty or thirty million "untouchables" who are looked down upon and exploited by both Hindus and Moslems alike. All parties are scared almost to death of the wild and warlike tribes on the North-

West Frontier and in Afghanistan, who appear to be a people apart and are only kept within bounds by respect for British bayonets and justice. The countless millions in fact still prefer British justice, and if a case is to be tried, ask for a British judge, confident that in order to get a fair trial they will not have to resort to the expedient of secreting a bribe in a basket of fruit to be delivered to the judge. Sir Sydney tells me that even the animals have to be protected, the cow being considered a sacred animal by the Hindus and the pig an unclean beast by the Moslems. The Moslem will cut off the udders of his neighbor's cow, and the Hindu will retaliate by burning a pig alive and scattering the ashes on a Moslem doorstep as a sort of "nonviolent" joke, while the "untouchable" will cook and eat what is left of both animals. These acts of violence are committed not by the gentlemen, the members of the All-India Congress, nor by the immediate "bed sheet" followers of Gandhi, but by the poverty-stricken Indians who know nothing about wars and whose only interest is in living through the next monsoon season, or in escaping the next scourge of the plague, but who provide the money for their luxury-loving rulers who live in magnificent palaces, or in the cleanliness taught them in British-built schools and colleges. To quote Sir Sydney further, "if you could make a Hindu think a Moslem a mine of good qualities, persuade a high-caste Moslem to marry his daughter to an 'untouchable,' convince a warlike North-West Frontier chieftain that the rest of India was not his for pillage and plunder, then it would be an easy matter to persuade a mouse that a black cat is lucky!"

R.: Don't you believe with Jefferson, or whoever wrote the Declaration of Independence, that all men are created free and equal?

B.: Not a few of the signers of the Declaration of Independence owned slaves, and I suspect that most of them favored a limited suffrage either of property or of intelligence, or both. Those men thought of freedom no doubt in a political sense. The freedom they were thinking and writing about and fighting for was for the way of life the colonists had established with a good deal of success in the American wilderness. Most of them being Englishmen, they wanted the kind of freedom the Englishmen at home were accustomed to enjoy. Is not the error in all this talk of equality the assumption that to be equal is to be precisely the same; that freedom, therefore, means that all men should be treated identically, irrespective of differences of mentality, of education, of special training, and need? The smaller, weaker countries may in the Jeffersonian sense be the equal of every other country, but it would be folly to treat them the same as some great neighboring power. What those little countries need is to be treated *differently*, to be given protection against their powerful neighbors, to be given an opportunity to develop politically before their people are armed with the dynamite of universal suffrage.

W.: You are on sound ground both legally and practically in arguing that equality of rights does not call for identity of treatment. That was established by the Supreme Court of the United States in a long line of cases upholding various race segregation laws, particularly with reference to

separate coaches and schools for whites and negroes—here we are running into the inescapable negro question again! But this whole subject of the races and their treatment both within this country and in our international relations continues to be acute, and we don't get very far by shutting our eyes to its existence. In our immigration laws the slogan now is "Japan for the Japanese"; and there seems no disposition to repeal the old Chinese Exclusion Act, which many, however, feel is very unjust to our good friend and ally, China, and for whom we all have the greatest admiration. It may be enlightening, therefore, to say a few words about those cases which hold that under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution negroes and whites were not entitled to accommodations in the *same* schools and trains, but only to *equal* accommodations. With separate but equivalent accommodations both races would be equally benefited, the court said, by the removal of causes of friction for which the law was not responsible but which rested in human nature itself. It is not the law but the Creator that has made one man black and another white, and we must take the world as we find it, using such wisdom as we can to minimize the differences of race and the friction that immemorially has resulted therefrom. Our Constitution requires that we must treat the whites and negroes as equals under the law, but not as precisely alike, since all of us are human and few of us are blind. That was in effect the argument in these opinions.

R.: I see you have again trotted out the old familiar biological argument always advanced by southerners to support

their legislation against the negroes. The trouble, as I may have said before, is that we carry over these discriminations into other fields, and we have often failed in practice to give the negroes even decent, much less equal, accommodations.

W.: You are on sound ground there. But the biological argument was not solely of southern origin. As a matter of fact, the first separate school law case was decided, believe it or not, in Massachusetts in 1849, Charles Sumner appearing as counsel for the negroes, and the great Chief Justice Shaw writing the opinion upholding the law; and the first separate coach law case was decided in 1867 not in the South but by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and the opinion contains the strongest statement I have seen of the ethnological grounds in support of such legislation. That Court held, as southerners have contended, that the question is one of difference, not of superiority or inferiority. "The natural law which forbids their intermarriage, and that social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of the races, is as clearly Divine as that which imparted to them different natures . . . When, therefore, we declare a right to maintain separate relations, so far as is reasonably practicable, but in a spirit of kindness and charity, and with due regard to equality of rights, it is not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to suffer men to follow the law of races established by the Creator Himself, and not to compel them to intermix contrary to their instincts." If I had not told you otherwise, you would no doubt have declared that this was some narrow-minded southern judge speaking,

and not a northern court rendering an opinion just after the end of the Civil War, when the negro question was probably the most acute in all our history. The Supreme Court of the United States in its first separate coach law case (which arose not in the South but in New York) pointed out that the underlying fallacy as mentioned by Blue, was the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps either race with a badge of inferiority, and the further erroneous assumption "that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races." The court made one statement that is especially applicable today, that attempts to abolish distinctions based on physical differences "can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation." If our northern friends could only grasp this obvious fact! Great progress has been made in the South and by the South in allaying old prejudices, but the work has been greatly retarded, as I said before, by all this talk about social equality. As the Supreme Court said, "if one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution cannot put them on the same plane." Neither can the northern agitators of the question. The negroes must achieve that on their own merits, as many have and will.

R.: That may be good law, but it sounds to me like an echo from the Dark Ages. I have not the slightest feeling against associating socially with the members of the negro, the Chinese or of any other race of another color, and I find it difficult to understand such a feeling. On the contrary, if anything, I have a deeper sympathy and interest and bond

of attachment for them because of what they have often accomplished against obstacles which we of the white race have too often put in their path. If we are to have a new world, let us begin with this very fundamental question of recognizing that color or race gives no individual, no country, the right to lord it over any other. I hope the day will soon come when no such distinctions will be made either socially or politically, and we should begin right now to break them down.

W.: You are talking about the millennium again—although I can say with you that I count among my dearest and most admired friends many negroes and many Chinese. The point is, *enforced* commingling breeds friction and not harmony, which latter *both* races should want. In viewing the problem realistically, I am speaking not of what ought to be, but of what is, and that is the first step in trying to solve any problem locally, nationally or internationally. If we do not see the difficulties, we will never see the solution. As a beginning, I think each southern state (but not by federal action) should repeal the poll tax, as Virginia now proposes to do and as Tennessee has done. Also, decent homes should be provided for the negroes, instead of the hovels and slums in which so many now are compelled to live, and who, in spite of such actual segregation, threaten the health of their white neighbors near by because of the unsanitary conditions of the negro sections of the town. I am glad I was able to make a modest contribution to better living conditions for the negroes by working for housing

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reform in a certain southern city some years ago. And the negro should be given a better chance in the courts to protect his rights. It makes me see red when I see the kind of treatment the negroes often get, especially in the lower civil courts, to which they usually have to resort because of the small amounts involved. The point to be kept in mind is that the negro agitators and their northern friends do not advance the interests of the negro in these essential matters by demanding the very nonessential of social equality. Whatever progress the negro has made in the South in the improvement of his condition—and it has been very great—has been through the cooperation and good will of his southern neighbors. Such an understanding friend is Mark Ethridge, the editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, who has in fact been criticized by southern extremists like Talmadge and Bilbo for his championship of the negroes. As a member of the President's Committee on Fair Labor Practices, he stated at the hearings in Birmingham in July, 1942, that "the southern negro cannot afford to drive from his side, in his march to a greater fulfillment of his rights, the southern white men of good will who have been his chief asset and his chief aid." I wish the friends of the negro in the North would ponder the further declaration by Mr. Ethridge: "There is no power in the world—not even in all the mechanized armies of the earth, Allied and Axis—which could now force the southern white people to the abandonment of the principle of social segregation. It is a cruel disillusionment, bearing the germs of strife and perhaps

tragedy, for any of their [the negroes'] leaders to tell them that they can expect it, or that they can exact it as the price of their participation in the War."

But here we have been around the world, and we come back again to our own rather petty local problems, which nevertheless have a significant resemblance to the problems of the rest of the world. I think it would be appropriate to close this discussion with some lines from our poet of democracy, Walt Whitman:

Sail, sail thy best, ship of Democracy,
Of value is thy freight; 'tis not the Present only,
The Past is also stored in thee.
Thou holdest not the venture of thyself alone, not of the
Western continent alone;
Earth's résumé entire floats on thy keel, O ship, is steadied by
thy spars,
With thee Time voyages in trust, the antecedent nations sink
or swim with thee,
With all their ancient struggles, martyrs, heroes, epics, wars,
thou bear'st the other continents,
Theirs, theirs as much as thine, the destination-port triumphant.
Steer then with good strong hand and wary eye, O helmsman,
thou carriest great companions,
Venerable priestly Asia sails this day with thee,
And royal feudal Europe sails with thee.

XIII. Science and the World of Tomorrow

WHITE: What wonderful progress has been made since the War in the art of seeing! The new uses and refinements of polarized glass for instance; the perfection of the electron microscope, which can enlarge a human hair to an apparent width of forty feet. Think what this will mean in the conquest of disease, in the study of the constitution of matter and the consequent widening of the great field of practical chemistry. At the other extreme of human vision, we have the remarkable disclosures made possible by the new two-hundred-inch telescope on Mount Palomar, of which a recent report has been made by Dr. Millikan and Dr. Hubble (whose scientific work contributed not a little to winning the War): an instrument that will expand our vision into space a distance of a billion light years, revealing eight times as much of the universe as we were able to penetrate before. If our hospital were on the surface of the moon, we could see it from here with this great telescope. Fascinating problems—whether there is any limit to the universe, whether it is constantly expanding as some maintain, the number, constitution, size, and distance of the great galaxies lying beyond our own immediate universe, the nature of variable stars and nebulae, and a thousand other mysteries of the heavens, some of which have intrigued mankind from the

beginning of time—astronomers working with this telescope may be on the way to the solution of these questions. Their speculations on the grandeur and the immensity of the universe help us to forget for a time the petty problems on this insignificant little ball we call the earth.

BLUE: As to whether Mars is inhabited, we can now say with certainty that—

RED: Just a minute. I have a contribution to make on that subject which might surprise you. Did I ever tell you of the interview I once had with a man from Mars?

W.: Now, Red, just be quiet and take it easy, and we will discuss Mars some other time. That radio broadcast from the Senate floor in Washington must have upset your nerves!

R.: I must confess it did. But I was just about to ask whether since the War our politicians can see any further than they did before? I doubt it very much.

B.: And how about our spiritual sight? We still see “through a glass darkly”—in most cases we are blind to our opportunities, blind to the profound significance of the things going on about us, blind to the obvious teachings of science and history and of our wisest men.

R.: I wonder if I am so badly off after all? It seems to me at times and in some things I see a little further than others, simply because I have to rely on what I might call my inner or spiritual vision, feeble as that often is. But perhaps that is just a fancy of mine.

W.: While we are on the subject of science, you might be interested in a few items I have been gleaning from the scientific journals. Incidentally, with my polaroid glasses

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and my new television set I was able yesterday to get a remarkably realistic view of the United States Senate in action, in color and in three dimensions. I have to confess it was not particularly inspiring, except as a scientific experience. But some of these new inventions have been decidedly revolutionary. There are, for instance, the prefabricated houses (about eight million of them are about to be built) with the extensive use of plastics and aluminum, radio heating and photoelectric cells, with air conditioning making them quite independent of climate. A vacuum cleaner cell can be left in the center of a room and two hours later it will be found to have removed every particle of dust from everything in the room. In addition to being cheap, these houses are remarkably flexible in both interior and exterior arrangements. Walls can be moved, rooms can be added, and changes made in the design to meet the changing needs or tastes and the improving financial condition of the particular occupant. The building of these houses is the greatest single industry since the War, and they represent perhaps the greatest boon—in adequate, inexpensive, and well appointed homes—to the greatest number of our people.

Both synthetic and natural vitamins are taking an important place in American diet, as new discoveries are constantly being made in that field. Both because of dietary discoveries and because of the great strides in medical science due largely to the War, we are raising a generation of Americans healthier in body and mind than ever before in our history. We learned much during the War about concen-

trated foods—dehydrated vegetables, dried eggs, meat, milk, and cereals; and this information has been greatly expanded into new fields, even to the creation in the laboratories of entirely new kinds of food, with flavors, colors and other properties supplied not by nature but by the chemists. Preparing a meal is a mere matter of warming on an electric grill precooked food in sealed containers. In fact, the improvements kitchenwise and otherwise are making the housewife almost independent of domestic servants.

Best of all, in homes, offices, and factories we can now have this perfected artificial sunlight with its ease on the eyes and its ultraviolet rays, adding much both to the health and to the comfort of all our people.

The automobile factories are still turning out 1942 models, as retooling for the new designs has taken time; but the new designs are radically different from the old. Costing four or five hundred dollars, with engines rating less than fifty horsepower as the machines are very light, and running fifty miles and in some cases even one hundred miles on a gallon of the new high octane fuel, they are also things of beauty with their graceful teardrop lines, and built with a combination of aluminum and transparent plastic. The new synthetic rubber tires will last, they say, for much more than one hundred thousand miles according to the tests, and repairs on the small, simplified engine, etc., will be both easy and cheap to make.

But this car will have a strong competitor in the new light family planes that are offered at less than the cost of some of the old-style automobiles. These planes are of the heli-

copter and autogiro type, capable of rising from and landing on a small yard or housetop. The common use of these new planes has wrought a striking change in the architecture of both homes and business buildings. When I lived in New York I had offices on the sixty-second floor of a building from which I could look down on square miles of unused and unsightly roofs; and I wondered if a time would ever come when that vast expanse of "unimproved" real estate would ever be put to a practical use beyond the rather silly smoke- and dust-infested penthouses one occasionally saw. Now all that has changed. Rooftops are at a premium as landing space for autogiros. Here in California from my hospital windows I can see changes being made constantly in the old houses to adapt them to this new method of transportation. Some one has predicted that in a few years we shall read, for instance, an item in the morning paper to the effect that "little Johnny Jones was badly injured while playing in a kiddie-plane above his home; he had run into the last car on an aerial excursion train, and the police have again warned parents against allowing their children to play in the congested air lanes." One great effect of the new methods of land and air transportation has been to decentralize the cities and to increase the value of farm lands, not in order to raise crops, but to raise children away from the dangers of the more crowded centers. Airplanes are speeding the development of the great interior regions of the earth heretofore inaccessible; Central Asia and Africa, the Amazon jungles, etc. Civilization will no longer cling to the coast lines, and trans-oceanic shipping and travel is starting

from interior cities as well as from cities like New York and San Francisco. Politically, buffer states will lose their value as such, since planes can fly across them in a matter of minutes; and the old geographical isolationism will seem more absurd than ever.

Much of our perishable freight is now carried great distances by highly efficient cargo planes and gliders, and passenger travel to Europe is carried on almost entirely by plane. One of my friends in San Francisco a short time ago left California at seven in the morning on one of these luxurious air liners, reached London in time for a business conference the next day, and was home again by dinnertime the following evening; and all at a cost of about one hundred dollars for the round trip. They tell us no part of the world is more than fifty or sixty hours by air from any other part. No one thing has done so much to increase our friendly, and profitable, relations with Latin America as has the new airplane; and we know from the daily news what a revolutionary influence it is having on our international relations—but almost everything we do these days seems to be “revolutionary!”

Great advances have been made in television, which, in addition to its entertainment, educational, and news value, has had a marked influence also on our international affairs. Recent inventions have made it possible by the use of relays to transmit at great distances, overcoming the old handicap of being limited by the near horizon. Americans for the first time are becoming “foreign-language-conscious.” We feel that we are missing a good deal over the radio un-

less we can understand at least two or three languages in addition to our own. But English is fast becoming the universal tongue.

In the more technical field even more startling advances are being made. There is a race on among scientists to see which of the old and much coveted reservoirs of power can first be successfully tapped: solar energy, the tides, the internal heat of the earth, or the heart of the atom. Notable accomplishments have been made in every one of these fields of research since the War. We know, for instance, that the sun showers on the surface of the earth every hour energy equivalent to twenty billion tons of coal. Dr. Abbot at the Smithsonian Institution has developed a highly efficient solar engine that is now coming into practical use. It would be difficult to forecast its great possibilities. Dr. Hottel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who is working along somewhat different lines, has also evolved an economical method of conversion of solar energy. One device is based on the principle of the thermocouple, the efficiency of the system depending upon the heat materials used therein. We have long used an instrument, the most delicate known to man, based on this principle, to measure the temperature of the stars. Still another method is an adaptation of the photoelectric cell made familiar by our camera exposure meters, in which there is a direct conversion of solar energy without first converting it into heat.

But the most thrilling of all the developments has been the release of atomic power. In our near-by University of California it is announced that at last a practical—and not

dangerous—method has been devised to release the vast energy imprisoned in the atom through bombardment of the rare isotope of uranium, U_{235} , with slow neutrons. But I do not want to get too technical. I dare not predict what will happen to the world when this strange power is made available to man for his multitudinous needs. The consequences of tapping such a stupendous source of cheap energy are almost beyond limit. For the first time in history man will be armed with sufficient power to undertake operations on a truly cosmic scale. It will be open to him radically to alter the geography or climate of the world. It is said that by utilizing some fifty thousand tons of water, the amount displaced by a large liner, it would be possible to remove Ireland to another part of the Atlantic Ocean. The heat obtainable from the same quantity of water would suffice to maintain the polar regions at the temperature of the Sahara for a thousand years. Production will become so cheap, wealth will accumulate to such an extent, that men will need to work only two or three hours a day as machine minders, and will be free to devote the rest of their energies to the different forms of activity they may enjoy.

But it is not to be presumed that all these scientific discoveries of the future will benefit mankind. A biological and chemical discovery might conceivably plunge the world into such a catastrophe as would destroy our civilization. Some researcher working here or in Europe might detonate an atomic explosion that would involve the entire world and reduce it to a burning vortex of incandescent gas.

R.: What biological discoveries did you have in mind

that might wreck civilization? I thought such discoveries were without exception helpful to the human race.

W.: I will come to that. Knowledge is power, and it may be a weapon of destruction, as we so recently saw. Biologists have already learned much about the living chemistry of the human body. It is confidently predicted not only that we shall be able to cure diseases, particularly the scourges of cancer and tuberculosis, but that we shall be able to arrest the ravages of old age. Some of the mysteries of heredity will be solved, we shall know more about the minute but all-powerful genes that determine heredity throughout the animal kingdom that are yet so small that if a hen's egg were magnified to the size of the world, one of the genes therein might be laid on a fair sized table. By intelligent combination of genes we might be able to predetermine the mental and physical attributes of children. This power, of course, has its ominous side for the human race. But even more ominous for good or for evil are the possibilities of ectogenesis, the development of a child from a fertilized cell in a glass vessel filled with serum on a laboratory bench. Scientists now tell us this is entirely possible; and if ectogenesis should become a procedure for carrying on the human race its effects on our present society would be shattering. It would take too long to speculate on its possibilities, but I leave the idea with you to think about. I hope for one thing that it will be the end of all morons on the earth.

R.: That might offer a more likely way to eliminate war from the world than educating the present generation of morons. Sometimes this process seems pretty hopeless. But

while you are talking about what science has done or may do for the world, I would like to tell you one or two things I learned from the man from Mars. I—

W.: I am afraid I have upset you with these scientific speculations. Suppose we leave you now to take a nice long nap.

R.: Not until you give me a chance to tell you how we expect to work out some radical improvements in this fool anatomical structure with which we are now burdened, and which I have been thinking about a good deal since coming to this hospital. Our bodies did very well for the antediluvian age for which they were originally designed, and when our needs were few. But no new models have been brought out for several hundred thousand years, and I think you will agree that a few improvements ought by now to be in order. For instance, since we no longer hang from trees by our toes, why can't we dispense with them, as we did some aeons ago with our tails? Profiting by a suggestion I once saw in an old magazine, I would like to carry this subject a little further. To begin with, this arrangement of our eyes is pretty poor in a number of respects. We ought to have an extra pair of eyes in the back of our heads, or at least one on each side, like the rabbits and other hunted creatures, and in addition a good strong telescopic eye in the front or top of the head. Few of us seem able to see much beyond our noses with our present inadequate vision.

W.: How about still another pair with which to see ourselves as others see us?

R.: Good! I am sure any of us could easily work out great

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improvements in this ancient and long since outmoded body setup of ours. I would have the arms and legs detachable. We might have a spare set of legs or arms for special uses: long legs for walking or playing golf, or looking down on our neighbors, and short legs for riding in a car or a train, or for looking up to economists and other superior people, and a good strong pair for kicking crooks and incompetents out of office. Politicians would find a short stout pair useful for standing firmly on their political platforms, or constitutional rights, while with a long agile pair they could run for office in any direction that promised the most votes.

W.: If the minions of the law had a pair of longer arms, maybe they could reach some of these criminals in high places. And do you think it would be useful to have a spare head or so—one you could carry along with you in your suitcase, for instance, when you are traveling? In fact, I would like to scrap the one I have—it seems to fail me when I need it most. Its chief function seems to be to cook up headaches on all possible occasions.

R.: I would suggest in that case having at least two reasonably good heads, heads which would stay level when screwed on; say, a high-brow head which you could send off to college, or have the chauffeur take to the opera or to the long-winded board meetings, or to take part in political discussions such as you and Blue so much enjoy; a head which under the bludgeonings of chance would be bloody but unbowed. The other might be a low-brow head kept on hand to do contentedly the dull routine jobs of life, to answer the

telephone, to listen to your neighbors' or your clients' troubles, to attend dinner parties, to read the morning paper, and to bow to adversity. Then there are the thick heads, the big heads, and the swollen heads—whenever they needed going over they could be sent to the nearest cranium service station to be retooled or oiled or ground down. Or one could have the brain taken out and dusted off, or even supplied with a few new ideas, though that might be fatal to the owner in many cases.

W.: But on further reflection and in spite of all these advantages, I am not sure I am in favor of detachable heads. I can conceive of some horrible mistakes being made in getting heads mixed up. Think what tricks the Devil could play on politicians, preachers, or reformers, by switching brains while their heads are in a shop or laboratory for refueling or repairs! I wish I had time to enlarge on this!

R.: I think the Devil is very successful in working that trick on us as things are now, especially when it comes to the second generation. How else can you account for the fact that two quite decent and normal parents will have half a dozen children, every one of whom mentally will bear not the slightest resemblance to either parent? I think my scheme, in fact, would offer a chance to correct that situation by having the brains of these children examined and replacing the cheap and worthless parts with some of the superior equipment their parents had gone in for.

W.: No doubt some of the children of the present generation would like to modernize what they consider the antiquated, worn out and very inferior equipment in their

parents' heads. But think of the risk of a man misplacing or losing his head (although I know you will say at once that that happens even now under the present poor arrangement). No, I would like to think over that scheme a little further before recommending it to the Almighty.

R.: But think of the bearing of my suggestion on the international situation. The job would be a long, tedious, and messy one, but it might solve the problem what to do with the German people if we could cut out of their brains all the sadism, paganism, war-worshiping, and "Deutschland über alles" complexes that have cluttered them up for so long.

W.: Still better—you might substitute timid, peace-loving calf brains for the arrogant, sword-rattling Prussian kind wherever you found them. Nevertheless, I don't favor detachable heads—too much risk of mixups and I don't want to lose mine. In the words of Touchstone, it is "a poor thing, but mine own."

R.: You may be right. But to continue, the mouth is a very poor arrangement, being designed (for economical reasons I suppose) to perform two entirely different functions, talking and eating, and doing neither job very well, which is to be expected. I wish we could have two mouths: one for eating placed in some inconspicuous part of the anatomy, perhaps nearer the stomach, which it is supposed to serve, and one for talking as close to the brain as possible, so that the connection between the two could not be so easily and constantly broken. In fact, the brain and mouth should be permanently wired together.

W.: If the result would be that men would say more and talk less, I would be in favor of that change. Most of us have entirely missed the point that the Creator evidently intended when He gave us two ears but only one mouth. "Even a fool, when he holdeth his tongue, is counted wise."

R.: You can see what a revolution, to use your favorite word, these few changes would make in the human race. What an agreeable and what an efficient world we would be living in! But there are other changes I could suggest. Why use bones, when we could use aluminum, or plastic, or reinforced steel, for holding together this mass of flesh? And why must we have the bones well inside our skin, leaving the soft, easily damaged flesh, veins, nerves, and muscles disposed around and over the bones which need no such protection? We can learn something here from the insects which have a tough bonelike structure on the outside of their bodies protecting the delicate interior, an improvement they evolved about a million years ago.

W.: As did the lobsters, crabs, oysters, and shrimps. Some of us would appear much more in character if we wore our bones on the outside of our bodies, as these creatures do.

R.: Profiting by these new automobile models, I would have the main trunk or torso enclosed in transparent plastic, so that we could see what was going on if and when there were any signs of trouble with the engine—with the heart, the stomach, the liver, or the lights. Then I would have the chest spring open like one of Mac's refrigerator doors, so that the doctor or efficiency engineer or service station attendant could easily get at the works, and make the neces-

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sary repairs or replacements. I cannot think of any device that would be more economical in money and time, and more satisfactory to all concerned.

W.: Except to the doctors, nurses, and hospitals. You had better not say anything about these plans for doing over the human body until you get out of here, or the hospital authorities might make off with you as a dangerous radical. You know how cordially the medical profession welcomes every new idea!

R.: One of the most desirable innovations I have not yet mentioned, which would also probably get me into trouble with the hotels and restaurants, is to dispense with the eating of so many meals a day—a great waste of time and money and energy, upsetting three times every ten or twelve hours the regular routine of life. This is made necessary for no other reason than because the fuel tank is so small that the human machine won't run more than a few hours without going again to a filling station! The thing is absurd when you come to think about it. Even many of the lower animals can get along on one meal a day, and some can go a whole season without eating, as the bears do when they hibernate. While eating is sometimes pleasant, there are many more intelligent and less expensive forms of amusement. What can be sillier than a group of well dressed, intelligent men and women dividing their attention between good conversation and, like one of their carnivorous ancestors of the Stone Age, masticating a piece of raw beef or tearing the flesh from a bone?

W.: I see in your chest arrangement some disadvantages

with respect to the heart. Would it not, for instance, be like wearing your heart on your coat sleeve? The fellow who strikes you for a loan could ask to see whether you had a big heart or a small heart, and the ladies would soon find out whether you had a hard heart or a soft one, or, by examining you a little more closely, a cold or a warm heart. They might also be able to probe the innermost thoughts of that supposedly secretive member. The solicitors for good causes could bring along an instrument to thoroughly warm up your heart before they tackle you for a contribution.

R.: But, on the other hand, if the heart got broken, it would not be a serious matter involving jumping off a bridge or going into a general decline. The damage could be easily, quickly, and cheaply repaired, or, if desired, the heart could be replaced with a tougher member. And our churches could keep in cold storage in their basements a large and varied supply of clean new hearts. Another advantage you may have overlooked: the fellow who is deficient in intestinal fortitude might be able very easily to lay in an extra supply of that essential equipment. As a matter of fact, those who are amply supplied, like our fighting men, for instance, might have a particular pride in giving a visual demonstration of the fact on all occasions—although some might consider this another drawback to my scheme.

B.: I am shocked and surprised that you gentlemen should be so frivolous in these serious times. But I suspect you are merely spoofing these impractical planners who are doing so much harm to a good cause. However, that idea of replacing the heart with a tougher one is what appeals to

me most in your scheme, Red. If I could just get rid of this old run-down clock of mine and get a new heart in its place, I might be able to leave this infernal hospital when you two leave next month, and renew my fight on these durned radicals. So I say—*sursum corda!*

R.: *Sursum cauda!*

W.: Before we adjourn, I would like to refer to another phase of our modern inventions, to the fact that many of them have had the effect of reducing the importance of state lines. I am rather sorry, as an old-fashioned states' rights Democrat, to see this happen. Fast transportation on land and in the air, the telephone, telegraph and radio, and the constant shifting of populations from one state to another, to which the automobile has contributed no little—all of these things have had the effect of making people forget that there are such things as state lines, and have made more necessary the federal regulation of all these activities. Since the War this has been more evident than ever in our history. The Supreme Court seems committed to the doctrine that practically every business activity is closely enough related to interstate commerce to warrant federal regulation—there seems to be no such thing any more as intra-state commerce, according to the Supreme Court. The tremendous taxing power of the federal government is now used to regulate many state activities that the federal government should never touch. I think the device is a wholly dishonest one to circumvent the provisions of the Constitution, but

the Supreme Court refuses to inquire into the motives of Congress in passing such legislation. So there you are!

R.: When you think how corrupt, how insular and how everlastingly dumb most state legislators are, I don't think this tendency to centralize legislation in Washington is an unmixed evil. The people of the states can still elect their representatives to Congress, and if they don't like what Congress does, they should endeavor to improve the quality of their congressmen. What we will have to do is to get the intelligent element in the community to go to the polls and vote, instead of staying at home and complaining afterwards about the laws their representatives pass or fail to pass.

W.: Of course we should do that. But to talk about Congress handling everything is to assume that the problems of the forty-eight states are identical, which they are not, and to ignore the universally conceded advantages of local self-government which we are prone to overlook. However, I must admit that these inventions I have mentioned will have a wonderful effect in helping people to keep tab on Congress, as well as to keep us all interested and informed on public questions generally. The radio has wrought a peaceful revolution in American politics, one which I heartily welcome. Red can sit here in his room in California, thousands of miles from Washington, and hear every word that Senator Hayseed has to say on the new tariff bill; if he makes any serious misstatements of fact, or advances some fool argument, the commentator who soon follows him on the air will show him up to perfection, and the senator

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knows it. How different from the old days of the stump speaker whose ignorance was only equalled by that of his audience, and who usually got into office by being a little more skillful than his opponent in using the tricks of the demagogue!

B.: I have been as severe a critic of Congress as any one. But I hope the public won't lose all confidence in that body, for the next step would be to lose confidence in our democratic form of government, which is a real danger. The remedy, as you say, rests with the people to do the electing. Let us get together to elect good men, or run for Congress ourselves, if necessary, as a matter of public service. If ever I get out of this hospital bed— But I won't go into that now.

. Postwar Art

BLUE: You were speaking yesterday of our fighting men who have come back from the front. I have just been reading that our boys—and girls—who were in Africa, Asia, and the South Seas have picked up an interesting amount of exotic culture which will probably have not a little influence on our own. Our modernistic artists, for instance, seem to have been somewhat upset to have their ambitious masterpieces taken for the works of African savages, and vice versa. Personally, I prefer the crude efforts of the savages, for the reason that these artists are at least sincere in doing the best they know how to represent in sculpture and painting the visible objects they want to copy—while our modernists, as it seems to me, are doing the best they know how to distort

what they see, claiming for these horrible perversions an inward or obscure significance that escapes the ordinary intelligence. It certainly does!

RED: I think I have learned of late that spiritual vision, as I mentioned the other day, has some advantage over physical vision, and I am willing to concede to these modernists that they may really see much in nature that the untrained may never discover. But they have certainly done a poor job in helping others to see what they see. All that I was ever able to make of their work was unrelieved ugliness, human figures less than human, animals the like of which never existed out of a museum of freaks, objects that did violence to the plainest laws of physics, and colors that reminded me of a child playing with a new paintbox. If the artists did not ask us to take their paintings and sculpture seriously, we would probably regard their efforts as crude attempts at humor. The only thing I found to admire in Hitler was that he chased the modernists out of Germany, or liquidated them in his concentration camps.

WHITE: I am not prepared to say that these modernists do not have something. The War has brought to America some examples of painting and other forms of art that most of us did not know existed, and while they were entirely different from our standards, it does not follow that we may not learn much from them. By all means let us approach this exotic art with an open mind. For instance, there is great beauty in Chinese painting, although so different from our notions of color and draftsmanship. I would be disappointed if the War did not make us more tolerant of the

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arts, customs and ways of life of other peoples. The average American is inclined to condemn or ridicule everything that differs from what he is familiar with in Great Falls or Kalamazoo.

B.: I cannot believe, however, that the fundamentals of beauty, like the fundamentals of goodness, are not universal. I could give examples of painting and music and sculpture the essential beauty of which is so elemental that they have won admiration in every part of the world; although ugliness may not be so quickly recognized and condemned, for it does require some degree of education and refinement to discriminate. And we should not overlook the influence of ugliness on our spirits. I agree with Plato that there is a close relation between beauty and moral goodness. I was just reading something in an English periodical, *Today and Tomorrow*, with which I am in entire agreement. It seemed to me that what was said of this cult of ugliness and gloom in England could be taken to heart over here:

Few of us really admire the crudeness and the blatancy which characterize so much of modern life; but to condemn blatancy is to condemn ourselves as out of date. So we withhold condemnation when we see ugliness and wait until its creator defends it—as he is prepared to do sooner or later, since he knows that he has struck across tradition and perhaps across decency. He will tell us, of course, that we do not understand it. This is unanswerable, as there is little to understand except that it is ugly . . . Our lack of sincerity about our likes and dislikes makes it easier for the creators of ugliness to “get away with it.” We are afraid to say frankly, “This means nothing to me—I can find nothing pleasing in it,” when a fresh hideous experiment is

put before us. Both critics and patrons of art prefer to translate their impressions into the modern jargon in which such words as "soul" and "rhythm," "mood," "sensitiveness" are used repeatedly without regard to sense, rather than judge them by the effect produced on the heart and conscience. Why do we tolerate hideous sculpture, noisy untuneful music, garish painting, indecent books and crude decoration? One of the reasons is that we mistake experimentalism for progress—and lack of self-control for originality.

This writer also shares with Theodore Roosevelt the suspicion that these people are playing practical jokes on us. He concludes with this reflection, with which I entirely agree:

The danger to the spirit which is the result of surrounding ourselves with unbeautiful things is very great. The cult of ugliness is growing among us like a disease and seems all the more deplorable when the remarkable energy and striving of this generation is considered. Never before has there been so strong an urge for expression. In all the arts there are signs of tremendous interest—a reaching out for new ideas, for new forms, for a wider influence. People want to know more, to feel more, to embrace more culture. The creative artist is making the most of his chances; he would rather have a quick, superficial success than build up a permanent reputation. Until there is more conscience behind the arts and we can regain our sense of humor and fitness, things will go on getting uglier. A gloomy reflection.

XIV. *Education and the World of Tomorrow*

WHITE: There is much in the papers these days about the plight of the small colleges. Over four hundred out of nearly eighteen hundred have folded up, and many more are on the verge of bankruptcy. Others have accepted Government aid or subsidies, which many consider means the loss of their independence, a thing we value above all else in higher education. The remaining institutions, including the larger universities, are continuing with very large enrollments, and there has also been a marked increase in total college attendance over the year 1941. Other changes have been equally significant and striking. There has been a noticeable shift in what the students want to study—a great demand for the sciences and for the modern languages, for technical training to the neglect of the more cultural studies. But there has been a demand for training looking towards foreign service and public and civic work at home. Students are beginning to look upon the holding of public office as a career, and therefore as involving the need for special training—a tendency for which many are grateful. There has also been a new emphasis on adult education, which I consider one of the most significant of the postwar developments. The theory that grown-ups have lost their capacity to learn has long since been exploded. I believe it is true that

every great educational reform has started in an immediate postwar period.

RED: I understand that only about six hundred out of the almost eighteen hundred colleges you mention are accredited institutions—that is to say, are really fitted to give an adequate college education. I have no regret, therefore, in seeing many of these smaller institutions disappear. Many of them are little better than rackets run to collect tuition from young people whose parents often had to make great sacrifices to give them a so-called college education, which these schools were not equipped to give. The theory that the smaller colleges are character building because of the close association of students and faculty had little meaning in many of these colleges, where the faculty were men of the most ordinary ability and training, and were negative, if not baneful, in point of influencing character. One of the good things coming out of the War, as I see it, has been the extinguishment of the feeble candles of these miscalled educational institutions.

W.: Don't be too sweeping in condemning the smaller colleges. Where they are reasonably equipped to give adequate instruction, I prefer them, especially for undergraduate work and for the less mature. I maintain that they not only are character builders but, because of the close association between students and instructor, are able to meet the individual needs of the particular student to an extent impossible in an institution that numbers its students in the thousands. I happen to be the product of a smaller college, although I don't offer that as a recommendation.

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BLUE: It is usually the big institution, or at least the state institution, that is under the domination of a group of politicians who happen to be in power at the time. I should be sorry to see these smaller colleges disappear. I too went to one, and the most I got out of it was not a knowledge of Latin and Greek, but the memory of two or three old fellows who gave shape and direction to my moral thinking for the rest of my life.

W.: I could pay a similar tribute to the teachers in my alma mater, and also to the influence of the students themselves. There was a sort of mutual respect and friendly rivalry among a decidedly superior lot of fellows who went to that school because their fathers before them had gone, and who had a fine tradition to maintain. I don't believe you could find that situation in any of these present-day universities with their enormous enrollments. I feel that there are two unfortunate trends following the War: the weakening or disappearance of so many of these smaller schools, and an undue emphasis on technical training to the exclusion of the training of the whole man. I have no objection to a college training a man how to make a living, but I am old fashioned enough to maintain that it is more important to teach him how to live, physically, mentally, and spiritually. It seems to me that the tendency of the post-war college is to emphasize technical training for careers, paying little attention to character. Hitler developed a unified and a rather efficient machine out of the body of German youth, but he did it at the expense of their character. The rebuilding of Germany on that foundation of sand is

one of the greatest problems that now confront us. Hitler took away the faith of these young men and women and gave them nothing but a false conception of the state in its place. Now when that god of clay has been shattered there is left only a bitter, hopeless, disillusioned generation without either God or country to cling to, and without character to anchor it against the storm.

R.: They might make efficient robots in the new Germany.

W.: If they were only robots, they would not be so bad; but they are human beings with all the potentialities for good and evil with which human beings are endowed; and most of these potentialities in their case have been perverted to evil. They are a leaven, but an evil leaven, in the world. I cannot forget Hitler's ideal of youth education which he expressed in these words, and which, I am afraid, he succeeded only too well in carrying out: "I shall eradicate the thousands of years of human domestication. I want to see again in the eyes of youth the gleam of a beast of prey. A youth that will grow up and before which the world will shrink."

R.: But don't you think the new development of international student exchanges may help them? That is one of the most constructive things in the field of education that have come out of the postwar planning. What Oxford did on a smaller scale through the Rhodes Scholarships, and what we in America did for Chinese students through the Boxer Rebellion Indemnity Fund, is now extended to practically all the colleges and universities of the world. I am

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tempted to write an article about this scheme, for it seems to me to have greater possibilities for good than almost anything I can at the moment think of in all our international relations. That interchange must mean for one thing a wider degree of international friendship and mutual understanding, the best possible assurance against war. As Colonel White said a few days ago, the best way to get rid of your enemies is to make friends out of them.

B.: I cannot help recalling that that is what the Norwegians tried to do when they gave shelter to the starving German children. In after years they returned to Norway as German "tourists," expertly familiar with the country that had befriended them. You know the rest of the sorry story.

R.: I would like to believe it is true that several hundred of these "tourists" were shot by their German leaders because they refused to betray their Norwegian benefactors.

W.: On the whole, I think there are great possibilities in the plan; but I am not sure I would want to send one of my boys to Germany, or even to an American school where there were any great number of these perverted Nazi youths. As I say, they are an evil leaven, and from my own experience I have great faith in the influence of students upon one another.

R.: Oh, I think the Nazi nonsense has been knocked out of them by the hardest and grimmest way—the discovery that their deified leader was a faker. They are fertile ground now for the wholesome seeds of democratic thinking, but we must not wait until the soil is hardened by cynicism. Looking at education in the large, I hope this new era will

address itself to the task of educating the whole man, as you say, and educating him in all the fields of human activity and of practical human thinking. We have failed woefully throughout the whole of our boasted educational system to teach men how to think and act like human beings, how to meet a given emergency, how to use the vast store of knowledge which science and human experience, history and research, have put at his disposal. Many of our tragic mistakes both as individuals and as states come from the fact that we are constantly stressing the importance of mere knowledge to the neglect of the moral and intellectual training so essential to translating knowledge into rational action. We should see that in our systems of education our moral training keeps pace with our teaching in the field of mere facts.

W.: I agree we should not emphasize mere knowledge unduly, important as it may be. "The great need of life," Thomas Huxley once said, "is not knowledge, but action. What men need is as much knowledge as they can assimilate and organize into a basis for action; give them more and it may become injurious. One knows people who are as heavy and stupid from undigested learning as others are from over-fullness from meat and drink."

B.: I, too, heartily agree on that. It seems to me that in our teaching we should discriminate between what I would call dynamic facts and mere static facts. For instance, it is of no great importance to know that the Washington Monument is 555 feet high, but it is of the greatest importance to know that the heart controls the circulation of the blood, a dynamic fact which has revolutionized medical science

and has contributed immeasurably to the well-being of mankind.

W.: That reminds me of De Quincey's famous definition of the difference between the "literature of information" and the "literature of power." The one teaches, but the other can move the spirit of man. I have read a good deal about the beginnings of our present-day schools and colleges. One fact has stood out in my mind, and that is that the founders of the American Republic in discussing education emphasized above all else that the aim of the schools should be to make good citizens. I am convinced that the present state of the world is in part at least due to the fact that our educational leaders have lost sight of that ideal. I am not referring particularly to religious training, but to the inculcation of the ideal of right living and of unselfish public service—the essentials of good citizenship; and in the study of history, an understanding of the great moral forces which have directed the affairs of mankind. The debunkers have been so busy with their destructive criticisms that they have lost sight of the constructive forces that have managed somehow to match and overcome the forces of evil in the world. In one of his editorials in 1940, Walter Lippmann had this to say on this subject:

The teaching of politics and history in American colleges has, for the most part, been emptied of all the elements of greatness—that is to say of the conviction that history is not the meaningless tale of a race of mercenary idiots, but the record of great men and great peoples struggling indomitably to rise out of the sloth and the squalor of their barbaric origins. So the young

men of our generation have been deprived of their birthright, which is to be conscious that they are the children of a high destiny, in the line of great men who performed great deeds, members of the noble company throughout the centuries who had faith when men were hopeless, who fortified reason against unreason, vindicated justice against violence, and in the jungle of animal passion cleared the spaces where the air is free and clear and tranquil. . . .

Who that has read the debates in Congress or talked with recent graduates of the colleges has not been impressed by the degree to which American political thinking oscillates between cynicism and sentimentality, between despair and credulity, between an absolute agnosticism and an extreme gullibility?

Dr. Douglas Bush of Harvard University said in an address made in 1942:

We have in the United States certainly the most elaborate and expensive educational system in the world, and perhaps, in proportion to the machinery, the most ineffectual. It is ineffectual, or worse, because in recent decades it has been more and more completely controlled by a well-organized army of professors of education and their offspring and allies. Their sociological, psychological, and generally progressive and cheaply utilitarian notions have, especially in the Middle and Far West, steadily undermined old ideals of intellectual discipline and solidity of subject-matter. . . . Throughout the past, until fairly recent times, teachers of literature thought of themselves as, above all, teachers of virtue and religion. That would not mean the substitution of inspirational journalism for solid learning, but solid learning can be given an ethical as well as a critical direction. It is only through such a positive ideal, through the recapture of the humanistic tradition of pedagogy, that we can combat the specious attractions of the educationists' gold bricks,

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and train the next generations of citizens and writers so that, in Miltonic language, "they may not, in a dangerous fit of the commonwealth, be such poor, shaken, uncertain reeds, of such a tottering conscience, as many of our late counsellors have lately shown themselves, but steadfast pillars of the state."

The result has been that we have raised up a generation of cynics, of men and women without any definite moral ideals, without any faith in fact in themselves or in the good that we know is found in the world. The moral lessons are much harder to learn than the intellectual; but without the vision that the moral lessons will give us, without faith, enthusiasm, and sacrifice, the people will indeed perish.

B.: I think the War has shown that we had made greater progress in individual morals than in national or international morals.

W.: But it also showed that we had made far greater progress in the realm of science than we had in the realm of morals, either individual or national. That leads me to this solemn reflection: What will be the fate of our civilization, which was so recently threatened with annihilation, if science continues to put into the hands of the race all the vast instruments for good or for evil, for the destruction or for the betterment of mankind, if governments and individuals are again actuated by no higher moral considerations in the use of those discoveries than cold, remorseless selfishness and greed? And now that the War is won, while we can see selfishness rather than sacrifice dictating many of the policies of the peacemakers, I hope I am not too much of an idealist in predicting that our schools of the future

will see both the necessity and their great opportunity to shape the character of the new generation by building on the rocks of the great moral verities, instead of on the sands of a barren scholasticism.

R.: Again I welcome you to the ranks of the Utopians! In Ibsen's *The Master Builder*, Hilda asked the great architect, "Do you build castles in the air?" and the architect answers, "Yes, but they have solid foundations."

B.: We might renew the suggestion made some years ago by the Bishop of Ripon, that our physical and mechanical laboratories take a ten-year vacation in order to enable the human race to catch up on the moral side with their discoveries. My cousin, J. A. MacDonald, of the *Toronto Globe*, once remarked that the glory of the twentieth century is that all the world has been made a neighborhood; the tragedy of the twentieth century is that the world has been made a neighborhood before people have learned to be neighborly. I agree that unless we bestir ourselves in the neglected domain of national and individual morals in an effort to keep pace with the progress of the world in material things, we shall see the disappearance from the earth of civilization as we now know it. The War showed how close we came to that very disaster. Our great institutions of learning are making magnificent progress in the field of applied science; but what contributions are they making towards the moral progress of the world?

Before we leave this subject of education, I would like to read you a paragraph from an editorial by Henry Seidel Canby in the *Saturday Review of Literature*. After defining

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the humanities as meaning all that teaches man how to keep his spiritual, moral, esthetic and intellectual being in control of his instincts and his technologies, Canby has this sage observation to make on postwar education:

It must be remembered that while technology is fighting this war, and a mastership of technology is necessary to win it, it was not too much but too little vital training in the humanities which was responsible for the maladjustments, the psychological wrongs, the economic stupidities and selfishness, the moral perversions which made the war break so unbelievably upon naïve and unprepared democracies. Science, itself a humanity, created an age of science, which became an age of materialism in which a just developing technology escaped from responsible hands. That is the oversimplified story. If the humanities did not prevent its tragic unrolling, the fault is not in the humanities, but in the way we used and taught them. We suspect that when the best of the young men and women come back they will be the first to demand a return of these humanities, and in such tough and vital forms as only those who have been faithful to the ideals of civilization will be able to offer.

The Radio and Motion Picture

WHITE: Speaking of education, I see that the technical advisers to the Peace Conference have made an interesting recommendation as to the new advances in motion picture photography. During the last stages of the War the Allied Nations were wise enough to have pictures taken of some of the most horrible scenes on the battlefields, in the bombed cities and in the field hospitals. In order to make them vividly realistic to the last degree, these scenes were

taken as motion pictures, in color, with the new three-dimensional quality, and finally with the sound effects recorded. No one who has not been on a battlefield where the fighting was going on at close quarters can possibly comprehend the hellish effect of hundreds of these modern engines of destruction all blazing away at once from every direction on the ground and from the air, the crash of shells, the confused roar of tanks, and anti-aircraft and other guns drowning out the shrieks and groans of wounded and dying men. I wish Red were able to see or even hear one of these films. It is impossible to describe their effect on an audience. One was shown in the hospital auditorium the other night to a small group strong enough to take it, of which I happened to be one. It is the purpose of the Educational Committee to use these pictures particularly in the Axis countries, to give their people an idea of what war means, as well as to show the new generation which has never experienced the realities of war just what modern war does to men's bodies and souls. It is the belief of many that these films will be exceedingly effective also in the effort to convince the skeptical in every country of the supreme importance of doing something to end all war.

RED: I think that is a fine idea, but I wish you could also reproduce the stench which I have associated with some of the scenes I have witnessed. Which reminds me we have neglected the appeal through the sense of smell for securing certain desired mental reactions. I am glad to know they are using perfumes now to make goods more enticing, in theaters and other public meeting places, and even in our books

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and newspapers. I can enjoy the odor of good literature, which my eyes won't let me read. All of this makes life a little more livable.

BLUE: In reading one of these postwar novels which I managed to wade through the other day, although it was brilliantly written, the author reminded me of nothing so much as John Randolph's description of Henry Clay: "Like a rotten mackerel in the sun, he shines and stinks." But, referring to these remarkable postwar films again, I see that motion pictures are being used to show how the Germans made life a good deal less livable for the people in occupied Europe. With their characteristic efficiency and lack of understanding of how their efficiency might boomerang against themselves, they accumulated and catalogued a very complete record of their atrocities, preserved in striking photographs, many of them in color also. There must have been some sadistic genius in many of their concentration camps to conceive the horrors these pictures portray. And, strange to say, it was the Germans themselves who made and preserved these extraordinary records of human depravity. The Committee on Education has been somewhat at a loss to know just how to use them. They will be useful, of course, in fixing guilt, as the chief perpetrators seemed proud enough of their performances to allow themselves to appear in these pictures. But beyond that the general feeling is that a showing of the pictures would not only arouse a consuming desire to exterminate every German in Europe, but react injuriously on the mentality of our own people, as psychologists tell us the contemplation of sadistic acts often

creates sadistic tendencies in the beholder, and otherwise tends to degrade. There is enough material in these German records to supply the Grand Guignol with morbid horror for years to come, but I hope they will be used only for bringing the guilty to justice.

R.: I do not think it would be a bad idea to show them in Germany, so that these benighted people can appreciate the general character of the men they allowed to rule them. I am not one who believes the Germans are all bad. I still have many good friends in Germany whom I cherish and admire, and I believe it would be a good thing if these and other Germans could be made to see themselves as others see them. Our anger may not seem so unreasonable to them in that case; and their own anger against the betrayers of their country might be aroused to action.

B.: The most we could do in that case is to hope that the better element in Germany would be resolute enough and wise enough to squelch the Hitlers and Himmlers of the next generation. I notice in the morning paper that the trials of the members of the Gestapo are being televised throughout Germany, so that the Germans can the better understand the character of the men they turned loose on Europe, and also can see that these scoundrels are nevertheless being given a fair trial, and that the death sentences imposed on the guilty are followed by their speedy execution; all of which, with the new technique now used in magnifying the scenes to life-sized proportions, is made immediately visible in thousands of homes by television screens. This, it is hoped, will impress upon these people

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the depths of depravity to which Hitler and his crew had led them.

R.: I think a further constructive plan will come out of this machinery for educating the people through the medium of the radio, and that is the fireside university which made such a strong appeal during the dark days—and nights—of gas rationing and black-outs. Now, with the almost unbelievable improvement in programs and in the art of transmission through television, the fireside university will be more of a threat to the existence of the third-rate colleges than the selective draft was during the War.

The Middle-Class Mind

BLUE: While we are on the subject of education I would like to read you a few notes on what I have called the middle-class mind, which were suggested by the remarks of Red the other day concerning the average American's indifference to the grim but insistent problems that affect so immediately his daily life. Cannot some system of adult education like your fireside university reach that type of mind? I saw a statement the other day to the effect that about 10 per cent of the Germans in the early years of the Hitler regime were violently pro-Nazi, while about 10 per cent were as violently anti-Nazi, and the other 80 per cent were indifferent, ready to be swayed either way by those whom this 80 per cent would allow to do their thinking for them. I am wondering if we do not have in America today a somewhat parallel situation. There are, I would say, not

more than 10 per cent of our people who seem capable of doing sensible and constructive thinking on their own account. There is another 10 per cent made up of warped but active minds: of agitators for various isms, political, religious and what not; of men who have a grievance against society because of real or fancied wrongs; and all of whom with their feeble and perverted but aggressive intelligence and violently crusading instincts succeed in making a considerable noise and stir in the world. These two extremes of intelligence, sanity, and balance seek to win over to their respective camps as many as possible from this mentally inert, indolent, indifferent, colorless remaining 80 per cent of our people, the dull mob of human sheep that may cry "Crown him!" today and "Crucify him!" tomorrow, according to the character of the leader from the other 20 per cent that may take them in tow. In times of great emotional stress this multitude has shown itself capable of doing incredibly foolish and dangerous things that may threaten our very existence, as we have seen in the recent past. The encouraging fact is that the level of intelligence in America has been high enough to carry us safely through such crises after the first period of tragic blundering and ineptitude. But I wonder if we should continue to trust to this small margin of sanity to save us against the next crisis that may overtake the country. Therefore, I ask again if we cannot do something to educate or raise the level of the middle-class mind. Let me take a little time to diagnose this type of mind as I see it, and then leave you two to work out a

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solution for society, as I am sure you can with very little thought!

RED: I believe Blue is making fun of us, but I suspect I will be in general agreement with his diagnosis, although I might revise his percentages. What do you think, Colonel White?

WHITE: Oh, I am sure I have more respect than has Mac for the ability and the innate soundness of what the British call the middle class. We tend to over-rate the knowledge and under-rate the intelligence of the average run of men, I have found in a long experience with them. I think our juries, for instance, on the whole come pretty close to getting at the truth. One man may not be very bright, but there is a lot of common sense in the aggregate in a group of twelve men or women bent on trying conscientiously to get at the facts. I remember Voltaire once said that the English people are like their beer—froth at the top, and dregs at the bottom, but very good in between. But let us have your notes, Mac. I am always interested in any study of human beings.

B.: You should be, since that is the material we all have to deal with in practically every relation in life. I will take as an example one out of the best element in my 80 per cent, a good friend of mine, a young banker in Boston, whom I admire, and in many ways greatly respect. He is a person of sound judgment in practical affairs, a decided success in his chosen work, of sterling character and accepted business ideals; a man who adheres to the moral code, ac-

cording to his lights, although having no particular interest in organized religion. He is much respected in his community, although taking no part in civic affairs, and contributing little time or money to community enterprises. He seems quite satisfied with his life as he lives it, and, being fairly comfortable financially, manages to lead an apparently serene and happy existence, seeking his pleasures on the golf course, in fishing or hunting or motoring, playing bridge or frolicking with his children, or entertaining his friends, who are, almost without exception, of his own taste in all these matters.

But while my friend unquestionably is a person of superior intelligence, all his reactions are those of what I can best describe as a middle-class or commonplace mind. He rarely reads a serious book, cares little or nothing for philosophy or poetry, music or painting, or for the companionship of those who are interested in such things. His conversation reflects his narrow mental outlook and equipment, and he is obviously bored by those whose tastes run to more cultural and intellectual things.

But, undoubtedly, he has achieved a sort of happiness which others more intellectually inclined, have missed. And one may wonder at times whether he has not chosen the better part. My friend has none of the divine discontent of the searcher after truth; is little concerned with the great problems with which our thinkers are constantly harassing us and themselves, and which so vitally concern him, whether he knows it or not.

But progress as we know it would be impossible if all men

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were of his type; and none of those who enjoy the finer things of life would for a moment think of exchanging places with him. They find a fascination in life, in its multitudinous concerns, in its infinitely varied appeal, which my friend would never understand. In a word, the difference, as it seems to me, lies between the happiness of the well fed and well cared for animal, on the one hand, and on the other, the deeper satisfactions in the realm of the mind, which some of us would like to believe are worth all the cost of attaining, costs in the more comfortable forms of animal happiness.

These reflections have led me to jot down some further notes on what I have referred to as the middle-class mind, the prevailing type in every American community. I am afraid our democracy and those leveling influences which Red has mentioned, will tend to increase that element in the community, unless we do something about it in the realm of education. But I think the radio is contributing not a little towards improving the quality of the middle-class mind, although the average radio program is the finest expression of that mind. Let me mention some of its characteristics—characteristics which vary in degree in different individuals, but which, I would say, unmistakably tag the person as the possessor of this type of mentality.

Taste in reading is, of course, one of the surest ways of classifying a person intellectually. The middle-class mind ordinarily restricts its reading to the daily papers. While it would be bored beyond expression by the effort required to read a book on a serious subject, as Red so eloquently ex-

plained the other day, it can devour every column in the morning paper, however trivial and ephemeral the matter covered. Such reading generally requires no effort of concentration and little or no independent reflection, and is, in fact, destructive of the power of continuous thought on a single subject.

Ignoring the editorials and serious comments on the news, the middle-class mind delights in the comic strips, to which it usually turns before reading even the daily social gossip, sports, crime, and scandal in which it revels. Its sense of humor runs to horseplay, to childish small talk, to pointless caricatures, and animal pranks which principally amuse children between the ages of five and ten. The delicate nuances, the subtle satire, the incisive wit, the skillfully turned phrase that one finds among the great masters of humor often bore the middle-class mind, or escape it entirely.

But the middle-class mind does sometimes read books in great number. It may even boast that it is well read and pride itself on its ability to discuss familiarly the books of the day. But on a little examination, it is found that these books are limited to the field of fiction—not the fiction that has made English literature great, but the current trash that is forgotten almost as soon as published, the neurotic and erotic stories which could by no stretch of the truth be classed as good literature.

Great poetry, the crown and glory of the literature of all ages—for this the middle-class mind has a fine contempt. It has a vague notion that poetry is something effeminate,

something that no he-man should be caught reading; and the male middle-class mind is particularly proud of its masculine taste and proclivities and its superiority generally to the female of the species.

To the middle-class mind, most history is "bunk," although useful enough for school children in the lower grades. As for books on philosophy or science or economics, why waste time on such impractical and useless subjects and academic theories which should be left to the scholars who really know nothing about the everyday problems of life, but which the middle-class mind considers itself preeminently fitted to wrestle with and solve.

R.: Thanks for that concession to the "textbook economist," Mac.

B.: They are extremely useful—in their place. But possibly the middle-class mind may be excused for not generally appreciating what the world regards as its greatest music. Love of good music is not universal; many of the most gifted and intelligent lack that appreciation. But the middle-class mind is an unfailing patron of cheap music. Jazz bands, crooners, the singers of the inane, degenerate love songs of the day, would soon be starved out of existence but for the enthusiastic following of our middle-class minds.

But while the middle-class mind is frank enough in its dislike of "high-brow" music, it is not indifferent to the supposed distinction that attaches to the frequenters of the opera, the symphony orchestra, and the classical recital or concert. Consequently, the financially prosperous take pains

to be identified with such music to the extent of guarantees or subscriptions and of occasional perfunctory attendance. The men usually admit, however, that they are terribly bored and attend only to please the womenfolk, who are not always so frank in expressing their likes and dislikes. And they strongly suspect that others in attendance are equally bored, since they cannot comprehend the music themselves. In fact, it is quite characteristic of the middle-class mind to assume that its own likes and dislikes are common to others, and to question, therefore, the sincerity of those who profess to a different taste.

Painting and the fine arts generally, rarely appeal to the middle-class mind. It, of course, delights in pictures, much as a child does, but there is no discriminating appreciation of the great masters. It has no time for great painting as such, although frequently a patron of the decorative arts which it can more easily understand. Genre painting it often likes, but artistic technique in form, color, and design has no appeal.

But the middle-class mind has great respect for appearances and for "front." It has a weakness for the material trappings that, according to its philosophy, indicate a man's station in life and his real worth. It is of the first importance, therefore, to live on the right street and in the right kind of house, to drive the right brand of car, to belong to the right sort of clubs, and especially to be seen with the right kind of people on all possible occasions. The right kind of people are generally those with its own particular philosophy of values. Consequently, one of the tragedies

that befall the middle-class mind is that, failing to see through the shams, it accepts at face value the human counterfeits, while at the same time passing up the genuine gold of human brains and character which lies all about it. Men and women who are living out of the glare, in more unpretentious places, without the trappings of wealth or station—whatever their brains, their charm, their character, their contributions to the thought of the time, to the worth while work and progress of the community—those men and women are rarely if ever discovered by the middle-class mind, for it is as a rule quite incapable of discovering them.

But the middle-class mind cuts across every section of human society—rich and poor, high and low—being found not only in the financially middle-class, but in the socially and financially upper classes of our society as well, its limitations being in the realm of the mind. In fact, among the socially and financially middle-class are found most of our highly superior minds.

The most tragic fact about the middle-class mind, and its most striking characteristic, is its utter dependence on external resources for all the satisfactions of life. It is utterly barren of internal resources and at the mercy, therefore, of capricious fortune which, in a moment, may destroy the very foundations of its happiness. But externals cannot satisfy forever even the middle-class mind. It achieves a sort of happiness, but only so long as it is physically busy, so long only as it can find diversion in external things. But it must keep moving to keep from being bored. Variety is not merely the spice, it is the very essence of its existence. And

the variety, after awhile, begins to pall, to run dry. There are then no internal springs to which the thirsty middle-class mind can turn for refreshment. Solitude, instead of being a boon, is the greatest misfortune that can befall it.

But the middle-class mind has many good qualities to commend it. It is loyal, friendly, sociable, patriotic; intensely, one hundred per cent American. It is provincial, both through untraveled ignorance and from a deep prejudice against all that is foreign; but it can acquire a liking for strangers on very short acquaintance, especially when business reasons are present. It gets much satisfaction out of clubs, fraternal orders and business organizations of all sorts where it can meet men whom it regards as in its own class. It is easy to appeal to its gang spirit; in fact, it almost always follows the crowd, tries to be "in the swim," to shape its opinions and conform its actions to the prevailing mode. It would never think of trying to row against the stream. It is never found fighting with the small minorities, for a new or apparently losing cause. Followers always, but leaders rarely are recruited from its ranks. Its women would almost rather be out of the world than out of the fashion, and its men try to climb on all the band wagons at the earliest moment.

Having little interest in cultural things, or time therefor, the middle-class mind usually is remarkably successful in the business world in amassing the money which furnishes the means of gratifying its desire for material things, and particularly for impressing others with its worth and social station and all that goes therewith.

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But the middle-class mind has other good qualities: it is industrious and intensely practical and resourceful, because so largely dependent upon its own powers and so inept in the art of using the wisdom and experience of others, especially as found on the printed page. The women are correspondingly good wives and mothers and "domestic scientists," although failing often to profit by the wealth of practical help to be found in so many of our current books and periodicals.

While the middle-class mind is generally indifferent to the profounder appeals of religion, it is sometimes deeply religious, but in a somewhat primitive, emotional sense, rather than through any processes of reasoning concerning the spiritual verities. And, except when spoiled or blinded by the corruptions and tinsel of modern life (as it often is) it is fundamentally moral and honest.

R.: If I may interrupt you, your statement that the middle-class mind is provincial, both from untraveled ignorance and from a deep prejudice toward all that is foreign, interests me very much. I saw that quality of mind over and over again in my work as a newspaperman, as well as while I was in the Army, and it is one of the discouraging facts in the realm of our international relations. The British Tommy showed a more intelligent grasp of world affairs and a livelier interest therein than even some of the most intelligent of our doughboys, as was often remarked during the War. And yet our boys had been abroad quite a bit—in a good many parts of the world—and may have been expected to have widened their horizons. What could be expected of their

untraveled contemporaries back home? Now, when we must take a more important part in international affairs, whether we want to or not in order to save our own skins, the problem will arise of getting the political support of the majority of our people for some practical scheme of international co-operation. You may be sure that the middle-class mind will be a fertile field for the shallow appeals of the demagogue who will shout about entangling alliances, the self-sufficiency of America, and other like reasons for letting the rest of the world go to the devil—arguments that in the past contributed to the most appalling blunders in our national history.

W.: I might add that such reasoning makes a twofold appeal to the middle-class mind: to its quite understandable vanity in all things national, and at the same time to its small-town prejudice against all things foreign. Nevertheless, I do not quite agree with you that our doughboys did not come back with very definite convictions that something should be done to prevent another such war from overtaking the world. They may be vague as to just how this can be done, but they will support any reasonable plan designed to do it. And I think this is true of the majority of our civilian population. As I said before, I have a good deal of respect for the middle-class mind.

B.: It is a mighty force in political life for both good and evil. For its ideas on politics and public affairs generally it is chiefly dependent upon the periodical harangues of its favorite political leaders, or upon its favorite daily paper, rather than upon any original reasoning based upon an intelligent survey and analysis of facts. It is easily led by those

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who march under familiar banners, and is quickly aroused by the familiar thread-bare slogans and clichés. Being swayed by emotions and old prejudices rather than by reason, its reactions are often unpredictable and its theories generally unsound. Not that it is always unwise in its results—its political intuitions are often right. As Colonel White once said of the opinions of a certain judge, “even when his conclusions are right, his reasoning is generally rotten.” Herein lies the hope of our democracy. The average of good results is remarkably high, considering the character of intelligence out of which the results are evolved. But sometimes the results are very discouraging from the standpoint of good government. Any outstanding instance of political corruption will, for the moment, mightily stir the middle-class mind, but its indignation is both short-lived and unproductive of any constructive or remedial thinking. In other words, the middle-class mind, although it may be quick to see the disease, is slow almost to the point of hopelessness in working out either a system of prevention, or a permanent cure. It falls an easy prey to the demagogue because it is not sufficiently grounded in the elements of political science, history, and practical politics to discount the glittering promises, or to see through the clever political tricks. Although not stupid, it is essentially superficial. It is incapable of thoroughly investigating facts, of distinguishing sharply the false from the true, of judging soundly the relative importance of things.

While the middle-class mind is often a very efficient and capable mind within its limited and narrow sphere, it is

generally a mind of neglected talents. Edison once stated that the most painful task in the world is the task of thinking, that we rarely use more than a small fraction of our brains throughout a long life. The statement is eminently true of the middle-class mind. It is a mind that has been allowed to go to seed, that has cultivated only a small area, with the result that the rest of the mental territory is either a dry waste, or is cluttered up with noxious weeds.

The vices of the middle-class mind are the vices of unteachable ignorance. Its virtues are the virtues of the mind that lives and moves and has its being in the realm of the senses, on the surface of things. Here lie both its happiness and its doom. It is a slave to the tyranny of *things*.

But I am getting too serious. I must quote some lines that appeared years ago in the old *Life* on this same middle-class mind:

Hail! thou constant spectacle of inchoate mediocrity.

No matter where I gaze, I view but thee:

Before the ubiquitous bulletin board, swarming the bleachers,
covering the city flagstones, thy multitudinous presence
ever chokes me.

Here—everywhere—is thy face. So full of mild, of platitudinous,
of vicarious

Intelligence.

Thou never goest below a certain depth;

Thou never risest above a certain height.

Thy ambition, fixed like the fly in the amber,

Ever keeps true to newspaper headlines, to the dull gossip of
the market place, to the cost of food, to all systematized
and commercialized

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Vulgarities.

No beauty of the stars, no sound of nature, no Divine forgetfulness seemingly essential

Stirs thy dull soul.

Blind thou art, the veil of Ancient Maya covering thy middle-class eyelids.

Hail to thee!

Comrade!

XV. *Religion and the World of Tomorrow*

RED: I lose all patience with men and women who indulge in generalities. In many cases they are shallow-minded people who would find it impossible to reduce their generalities to the specific and concrete. Generalities furnish for them the illusion of thinking. When people who indulge in such comfortable escapes from hard thinking are asked to pass on to the particular, they almost always expose the vague and fuzzy character of their mental processes. They have never thought through their airy generalities to a concrete application, which is what we all want in these busy and intensely practical times. Generalities are mental soporifics that dull the power to think. They tend to crystallize into meaningless platitudes and clichés, the stock in trade of commonplace minds. I am particularly impatient with generalities, glittering or otherwise, in the realm of religion and morals. Men talk about social justice, about dealing honestly and fairly with all men, about being our brother's keeper. I feel like standing up in the meeting and saying: "Be specific, brother. Exactly what do you advise doing about the slums just back of your church?" I don't want to be unduly critical, because I realize we have to start with general principles, but somehow it seems to me many of our preachers never quite get to the point of grappling with

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the daily problems of the men and women in the pew. I suppose it is all right to be taken up to the spiritual mountain tops for an occasional excursion, but I want also to know how to live along the dusty highways of life, how to meet the economic and moral problems that wake me up every morning.

WHITE: I am glad to see that in religious matters, at least, you are in favor of keeping your feet on the ground. Why don't you give us an example of the kind of sermon you would like to hear? I am sure it would be both original and helpful.

R.: Now that is a challenge, and I suppose I ought to try to meet it. My sermon would probably be original at least, and it might be rather shocking to some. First, I assume I would have to choose a text. I enjoy the Bible as literature. The nurse has read me almost the entire "Book of Books" while I have been here, and it was an interesting experience for one who had only a nodding acquaintance with the Bible. But most of the Old Testament leaves me cold, other than as a magnificent literary experience. Barring some great passages in the Psalms and the prophets, and in the book of Job, about all I can get out of the Old Testament spiritually is that it is a terrible thing to fall into the hands of an angry God. In fact, the Old Testament God comes pretty close to meeting the specifications for my New Testament devil. Hitler could have found therein some excellent precedents for his bloodiest performances, as well as support for his favorite doctrine of racial superiority, with the corollary that other and inferior races should either

be exterminated or reduced to slavery. And it is rather amusing to see your fundamentalists, as I believe you call them, foolishly trying to use the Old Testament as a scientific handbook—for which, of course, it was never intended. They seem torn between accepting its legendary statements about the physical world and the alternative of being tried for heresy by their religious brethren. I have never understood why the early fathers of the church who assembled the various books of the Bible thought it necessary to include the Old Testament books in the canon of Christian Scripture. I believe that the Old Testament and the emphasis of some old timers on its doctrines and statements have alienated not a few young people of my generation from the church. I hope therefore, while we are making over the world, we will do something about the Old Testament on which the Christian church has been impaled for so many centuries. But I have gotten away from the subject, as usual. I was going to say that I would pick my text from some of my favorite passages in the New Testament. Take, for instance, the graphic pictures we have of the Pharisees of that day, so like the pharisees we find all about us now, men who devour widows' houses, but who love the chief seats in the synagogues and for a pretense make long prayers. One of the things, in fact, that has impressed me most about the Bible is its modernity. Money played an inordinate part in the lives of these Pharisees, and, as today, usually warped the moral sense. They stupidly thought, for instance, that by bribing a few soldiers with their gold they could conceal from the world the fact that Christ had risen from the dead.

W.: The school of Gamaliel probably had no able economists like yourself in its faculty to set them right on such matters.

R.: Thank you for the compliment. Or did you intend it that way? But you remember how careful were the Pharisees about the disposition of the thirty pieces of silver with which they purchased the treachery of Judas and the accomplishment of the murder of Jesus. They were evidently willing to pay any price in money, or sacrifice of moral principle, to bring about the death of this gentle preacher of righteousness, because He had exposed their hypocrisies and had turned the spotlight on their graft. How like the pharisees of today! But, having achieved Christ's betrayal, they suddenly became scrupulous to see that not one jot or tittle of the Law should be violated in the disposition of the blood money. It should not be turned into the Temple treasury, since it was admittedly the price of the life of an innocent man. How scrupulous they were now about mint and anise and cummin, having done violence to the weightier matters of the Law, to justice, mercy and truth! And notice how next they even became charitable with this money that had been thrown back at them by the guilty Judas. They must devote it to some good purpose, so they used it to buy a burial place for dead strangers. But don't forget how in the parable of the Good Samaritan, after the stranger had been set upon by thieves, the Pharisee passed by on the other side, leaving him to die. Here was a chance really to help a stranger when he was alive and in need of help. But it would have been rather inconvenient, if not

politically embarrassing, to do so then, so he was left to his fate. If I were preaching a sermon, I might then go on and draw a few more comparisons with the pharisees of the present time, so like the breed of Christ's day! I do not believe I should be very popular for long in one of your fashionable metropolitan pulpits.

BLUE: I suspect I have heard a good many more sermons than you have, Red, and not a few on those very passages you have talked about. I have also heard eloquent discourses on other passages, which we all might take to heart: On the poor publican for instance, praying in the Temple, "Lord, have mercy on me, a sinner"; on the verse, "Let him that is without sin cast the first stone," and, "Before you take the mote out of your neighbor's eye, cast the beam out of your own eye." Not all of the pharisees are in the churches. Also, I know a lot of churches that minister to the slums in their back yards. Let me add too, that I hope those sadistic Germans and Japs will fall into the hands of an angry God—Red's Old Testament God. "We do not want a grandmotherly and indulgent sufferance of evil," as Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr once expressed it. "We forget that God is also a God of justice, that His wrath against evil is terrible, and that His mercy does not cancel out His wrath."

R.: I get you on the Pharisees! And I can smell the Calvinistic brimstone in your last remark!

W.: And how many of us consciously or unconsciously are like the Pharisee in that parable of the two worshipers in the Temple, "I thank Thee that I am so much better than other men, far better than this miserable fellow be-

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side me who is confessing his sins." I think we are going to see a good many pharisees of all stripes sitting around the peace table during the next few years.

R.: Now, why don't you give us an idea of a good sermon? You are more given to exhortations to righteousness than I am. I don't think I did very well.

W.: On my occasional trips to Paris, I attended the American Cathedral there, presided over by my good friend Dean Beekman. I thought some of his sermons were, as Red would say, too far removed from mundane affairs, and on my last visit, in the spring of 1940, I ventured to tell him so. Whereupon he invited me to try my hand at a sermon, which I did. It was read on Palm Sunday, commemorating the only day of worldly triumph in Jesus' life of which we have any record, when He rode into Jerusalem riding on an ass borrowed for Him by one of His disciples. I took my text, not from the Old or the New Testament, but from a sermon by Phillips Brooks. I thought the passage appropriate, as dictators were then having very much their own way in Europe. This is the passage:

Here is a man who was born in an obscure village, the child of a peasant woman. He grew up in an obscure village. He worked in a carpenter shop until He was thirty, and then for three years He was an itinerant teacher. He never wrote a book. He never held an office. He never owned a home. He never had a family. He never went to college. He never traveled two hundred miles from the place where He was born. He never did one of the things that usually accompany greatness. He had no credentials but Himself. He had nothing to do with this world except the power of His divine manhood. While still a

young man, the tide of popular opinion turned against Him. His friends ran away. One of them denied Him. He was turned over to His enemies. He went through the mockery of a trial. He was nailed upon a cross between two thieves. His executioners gambled for the only piece of property He had on earth while He was dying—His coat. When He was dead He was taken down and laid in a borrowed grave through the pity of a friend. Nineteen wide centuries have come and gone. Today He is the centerpiece of the human race and the Leader of the column of progress. I am far within the mark when I say that all the armies that ever marched, and all the navies that ever were built, and all the parliaments that ever sat, and all the kings that ever reigned, put together have not affected the life of man upon this earth as powerfully as has *that one solitary life*.

B.: An old-fashioned Scotch Presbyterian like myself delights in religious discussion, and I would like to add a contribution to this debate from Sir Stafford Cripps. Speaking during the War but thinking of the conditions we are now facing, he said:

Many of us believe in some higher power greater than any human force, whether we be Christians, Jews, Moslems, Hindus, or of other creeds. With that higher power we associate better and finer standards than our own, standards which we know to be right and just, but which only too often we have neglected in our human relationships. We are by these beliefs bound into a fellowship which goes far beyond all national boundaries, and it is strength, that spiritual fellowship and high endeavor that can and will give us strength to override the evil and establish a better, happier and fairer society, both within our own countries and throughout the whole world for the lasting benefit of all peoples.

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What men of Cripps' type feel and I feel is that Christianity has a tremendously important contribution to make toward international unity when "the tumult and the shouting dies, and the Captains and the Kings depart." First, the churches will, as Kipling expresses it, call for the "ancient sacrifice, a humble and a contrite heart." As nations and as individuals we shall all have sins to confess and ways to mend. Then I firmly believe the churches will be a strong force to bring about a unity among Christians throughout the world. In support of that prophecy, I want to read some extracts from a remarkable statement made in 1934 by a person who is the shining symbol of the new friendship between Asia and the West, and of the eventual breakdown of the old racial barriers that separated us in the past. I refer to Madame Chiang Kai-shek whom I consider in many respects the greatest woman in the world today. After speaking of the influence of her devout Methodist mother on her and her distinguished husband, she makes this confession of faith:

Thus I entered the period of my life where I wanted to do, not my will, but God's. Life is really simple, and yet how confused we make it. In old Chinese art, there is just one outstanding object, perhaps a flower, on a scroll. Everything else in the picture is subordinated to that one beautiful thing. An integrated life is like that. What is that one flower? As I see it now, it is the will of God. But to know His will, and do it, calls for absolute sincerity, absolute honesty with one's self, and it means using one's mind to the best of one's ability. There is no weapon with which to fight sincerity and honesty. Political life is full of falsity and diplomacy and expediency. My firm con-

viction is that one's greatest weapon is not more deceptive falsity, more subtle diplomacy, greater expediency; but the simple, unassailable weapons of sincerity and truth. I used to pray that God would do this or that. Now I pray only that God will make His will known to me. God speaks to me in prayer. Prayer is our source of guidance and balance. . . . I do not think it is possible to make this understandable to one who has not tried it. . . . With me religion is a very simple thing. It means to try with all my heart and soul and strength and mind to do the will of God. I feel that God has given me a work to do for China. In this province of Kiangsi thousands of *li* of fertile rice fields now lie in devastated ruin. Hundreds of thousands of families have been rendered homeless. In fact, China's problems in some ways are greater today than ever before. But despondency and despair are not mine today. I look to Him who is able to do all things, even more than we ask or think. At this time of writing, I am with my husband in the heart of the bandit area. Constantly exposed to dangers, I am unafraid. I know that nothing can happen either to the General or to me till our work is done. After that, what does it matter?

W.: That is indeed an extraordinary illustration of world-wide Christian unity and faith. It reminds me of General MacArthur's statement that there were no atheists in the foxholes of Bataan. It is encouraging to see that the Catholics and Protestants have worked in closer collaboration in many countries than at any time since the Reformation; and the incipient movements by some reactionaries to try to exclude missionaries of other faiths than their own from some particular country have been quickly crushed by the intelligent leaders of all faiths. Nothing would have been a clearer violation of both the letter and the spirit of the guar-

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antee of religious freedom, and would have worked more destructively against the very people who advocated such a reversion to the age of religious bigotry. The Anglo-Saxon practice of giving every faith a fair hearing, and letting the best faith win, is general throughout the world. We must remember that in religion as in other matters, it is human nature to try to restrain freedom when we are in the majority, while we insistently demand it when we are a weak and struggling few. The spirit of tolerance is the best assurance of the ultimate unity which we all seek.

B.: Even the least religious agree that there has been a marked revival of a world-wide interest in Christianity since the War, in the consolations it has to offer, in the faith which points to a better way of life, and especially in its emphasis on sacrifice and service and brotherhood. Eminent laymen like John Foster Dulles, and Professor Hocking of Harvard's Philosophy Department, have had much to say on this subject of late. I think it was Henry P. Van Dusen, who, while recognizing the limitations, also pointed out the great possibilities of World Christianity, which he believes is the one basis on which world order can be securely founded—as he expresses it, “the conviction of the essential brotherhood of all mankind and the common fatherhood of the Living Sovereign of all Humanity.”

R.: That sounds rather vague and unattainable to me—and coming from you men who are always talking about my not getting down to earth! But I am all for this dream, and I cannot say too often that you have to have your dreams and your dreamers if humanity is ever to free itself of its

shackles. We had a good deal to say years ago about "the American dream," of which James Truslow Adams wrote so brilliantly in his *Epic of America*.

B.: Americans, until after the First World War at least, felt strongly that we had a mission to perform in the world—first to achieve a measure of freedom for ourselves, and then to share that freedom with the oppressed of other lands. But our great hopes failed of realization, and disillusionment had its inevitable psychological effect. Dulles has thus described that disillusion: "The beginning of this century showed a steady exhaustion of our spiritual springs. Woodrow Wilson, it is true, inspired a wartime idealism that did much to bring us victory. But that was a flare-up that quickly subsided. We emerged from that war—the French, the British and ourselves—as burnt-out peoples. We no longer felt a sense of mission in the world. We had nothing so big that it had to be shared. Indeed we had so lost faith in our institutions that we felt it necessary to shelter them from contact with the outer world. We sought only to be left alone, and in our isolated and, as we thought, 'matured' economies we found little to do except to squabble over the partition of the material wealth we had theretofore created. Upon the world there descended a spirit of disillusionment and discouragement. The youth were without opportunity or hope, the workers were without employment and the aged were without security. All were without faith. Even in church circles where the word 'faith' was still used, it had lost any real significance."

But no nation, as Dulles well says, can be great without

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a deep and righteous faith, and unless we manage to regain that kind of faith our military victory will serve no permanent good. Alien faiths will again attack us, and each succeeding World War will go down in history as a series of rear-guard actions by disillusioned peoples equipped only with the material products of past greatness, who sought vainly to resist such faiths. So we must not make the mistake again of raising high hopes and then doing nothing to realize them. We were wise to formulate the ideals, but we did nothing to carry them through, and the consequence of the disillusionment that resulted, not only here, but throughout the world, did more than anything else to make possible this Second World War. When our house was swept clean of these ideals, we were like the man in the parable who then took unto himself seven other devils, and the last state of that man was worse than the first—a penetrating diagnosis of the effect on the spirit of great ideals allowed to die. We must put our Atlantic Charters into effect, or else not frame them. The tragedy of liberal statesmanship, as Frank Altschul and others pointed out, is that it so often furnishes reaction with its most effectual weapons. Losing touch with reality, it becomes the victim of its own Utopian dreams and makes promises which the hard facts of life will never permit it to keep. Yet, because these promises respond to a universal longing, they gain wide acceptance. Thus the way is prepared for profound disillusionment, and "when masses of men are disillusioned, reaction is waiting to take over the direction of affairs." That may explain why, as Woodrow Wilson once said, "people will

endure their tyrants for years, but they tear their deliverers to pieces, if the millennium is not created immediately." It seems to me a large order to try to establish the Four Freedoms and the Brotherhood of Man throughout the world, but I agree we must try to build a bridge between our ideals and a realizable objective. I hope we won't have to lower our ideals too far in order to do so. Possibly the answer is in what we have said about a righteous faith, and I suppose that takes me back again to the fundamentals of religion. I would like to refer again to the quotation I made from Sir Stafford Cripps on this subject.

W.: Since our discussion relating to religion and the Peace, I have been reading again the brilliant chapter on the "Moral Crisis" in Edward H. Carr's *Conditions of Peace*. Red will probably agree with me that the economic crisis is in essence a moral crisis. What interested me especially was the statement by Carr that the present crisis in world affairs cannot be solved in constitutional or even in economic terms—the fundamental issue is moral. A clever critic has said that civilizations before us have died in the midst of their ignorance, but our civilization, if it is doomed to perish, will have the evil distinction of dying not only with the cure at hand, but on the eve of such a life as has never been known since the days of Eden. Our civilization, says Carr, is in danger of perishing for lack of something with which we have dispensed for two hundred years, but with which we can dispense no longer: A deliberate and avowed

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moral purpose involving the call for common sacrifice for a recognized common good. "We cannot escape from war until we have found some other moral purpose powerful enough to generate self-sacrifice on the scale requisite to enable civilisation to survive."

R.: As a good economist I hope Carr is a little more specific in telling us just what he meant by that statement.

W.: He is. He goes on to say that there are two movements today purporting to offer to the world a universal principle or purpose which supersedes war: Christianity and communism.

R.: I agree with that, if by Christianity you mean the great teachings of early Christianity of the real brotherhood of man, of a common unity therefore to achieve common ends, of the willingness to surrender individual rights for a common cause—in other words, a willingness if need be even to lay down one's life therefor. I do not see much of that spirit in your modern Christianity, but there is certainly a great deal of it in the communism of Russia which we are now for the first time beginning to understand.

W.: My objection to communism is that it deals too much in terms of material values, and in that respect the true Christianity of which you speak has a great advantage, since it emphasizes the importance of spiritual or moral gains. Much as it may shock Mac for me to say so, I think there is a strong likelihood that in the next few decades Christianity and communism will come much closer together in their aims, because both teach the importance of sacrificing the individual interest for the common good. I

am almost tempted to say that the War was not altogether in vain if it results in a fusion of the best in communism with the best in Christianity, even if in the process a rugged individualist like Mac must yield some of his rights. Our advocates of completely sovereign states, and the British imperialists, must both be reconciled to the surrender of some part of that sovereignty. That principle will go also for big corporate organizations and strong labor unions, as well as for the great imperialistic states. There will be organizations, but they will be for the good of the whole of society, and not merely for that of a particular organization or state, although I agree with Henry Wallace that the spirit of competition will and must continue, as well as private initiative, private capital, and private enterprise. All this will involve the principle of Christian self-sacrifice. It will also call for equality of opportunity, and this too will involve some sacrifice. There will be more emphasis on obligations and less on rights—that is, on our own rights as distinguished from the rights of the less fortunate. And let me take this occasion to say that I think the Atlantic Charter in two respects is the most Christian document in modern international politics: in its universality (it includes all mankind in its terms), and in the fact that the parties to the document were not so much concerned with guaranteeing their own rights as with the obligation to see that others not parties to the Charter were guaranteed the rights defined therein.

B.: That suggests to me a possible criticism of the Atlantic Charter. Is it not too negative in its emphasis on

mere freedom? Freedom of course is highly desirable, but when a man is free his constructive obligations begin. A man in prison has few if any obligations, because he has no freedom of action. But freedom is merely opening the door of his prison house. What will he then do with his freedom? What responsibilities will he in turn assume for himself and to society? I would like to have seen something more specific on that score. However, that may be looking too far ahead.

R.: You are quite right. The mistake we have made in the past has been in dealing in a purely negative way with the ills of society, with palliatives rather than with preventives. We hand out doles for unemployment instead of tackling the problem at the source and providing more employment by free markets and a higher standard of living throughout the world (which the Atlantic Charter may later make possible). In all our talk about peace, we are constantly calling for security instead of trying to remove the evils that make the world insecure: political and economic inequalities that breed hate, that in turn breeds war. If we constructively remove these causes of war, we shall not have to worry about security. Let us substitute unselfishness for greed, and humility for vanity (and I believe we consider unselfishness and humility Christian virtues). Security, disarmament, the removal of trade barriers, the peaceful settlement of disputes, human brotherhood, democracy and freedom for all peoples—all these catch phrases which took the place of constructive thinking in the past will begin to mean something if we are willing to make the sacrifice to obtain

them, if we will stop harping on our rights and talk a little more about our responsibilities.

W.: One disturbing thought that all this discussion brings to my mind is that we have fallen so far short in the past twenty or thirty years in meeting the great problems of war and peace, although I do not agree with Carr that the War has brought the final proof of the bankruptcy of the political, moral, and economic system which did duty in the prosperous days of the nineteenth century. But I do agree with him that the War brought forth an increased moral purpose, a sense of cohesion and mutual obligation, and with it a hope for a new ordering of human affairs. But it is only a hope.

All that can be said with certainty is that the War will not leave us where it found us. It will be the prelude either to the fairly rapid decay—or perhaps the violent overthrow—of the civilisation which has prevailed in Europe for the past three hundred years or else to a decisive turning-point and new birth. . . . But there is no excuse for mistaking the character of the issue. The crisis cannot be explained in constitutional, or even in economic, terms. The fundamental issue is moral.

B.: I wonder if our religious teachers will be able to agree on the issue we face. Since the War there has been a noticeable decrease, it is said, in denominationalism. Nevertheless old distinctions that seem to mean so much to our religious leaders and so little to every one else still persist in many quarters. These leaders do not seem to be fully aware of the injury they are doing by their continued emphasis on these divisive doctrines at a time when the effort in every

field is to get people together, to help them to forget the ancient and often meaningless shibboleths of race, religion, or tradition that first keep men apart and then make them hate one another. Soldiers back from the War, where they fought side by side with men of every race and every creed, and learned to respect them, will have little patience with those religious teachers at home who now unduly emphasize mere doctrinal differences in a world that is in need of a religion of practical service. To illustrate what I mean, it is a rather startling fact that the three issues that have divided the church, led to heresy trials, kept denominations apart, and confused and distracted the whole religious thinking of millions of laymen for the past century or more were doctrines about which Jesus never said a word, or even left a hint that He cared one iota: The virgin birth, the infallibility of the Bible, and the historic episcopate. The church will have to turn its attention to more important matters if it expects to minister to the religious needs of the men of today. The church must think in terms of the whole world, a world in desperate need of what the Christian church has to offer. This means it must not be indifferent to the social problems and the problems of political and economic life that have a moral side, as most of them have. This does not mean necessarily to dispense with denominational lines, since men cannot be expected to agree on all things in religion, any more than they do on all things political. But there must be essential unity on all essential things.

R.: That is what I have said more than once. Without pretending to know anything about church doctrines, I

heartily agree with that diagnosis. We are in a changing world, with more bewildering changes than in any time in history, perhaps—although I recall a story to the effect that, as Adam and Eve left the Garden of Eden, Adam said to his wife: “My dear, do you realize we are passing through a time of transition probably more severe than any heretofore known in the history of mankind?”

W.: Red spoke the other day about the importance of passing from the general to the specific, especially in the realm of moral generalities. I quite agree, if he means that we should practice what we preach, that we should try to resolve our moral and religious principles into the actualities of daily living. But let us not confuse the function of the pulpit with the duties of the man in the pew. Is it not the primary purpose of our religious leaders to declare the principles that shall guide our conduct, and then let us in our daily life, and in the infinite variety of specific cases as they arise apply these principles thereto? Most lawyers will agree that those constitutions are best that are general in terms, leaving the legislature to meet the changing conditions. Red spoke of the great difference between the Old and New Testaments. As I see it, a fundamental difference between Moses and Christ was that Moses burdened his people with endless details of conduct, with a code that regulated what a man should eat and drink and wear, what he should do or not do on the Sabbath day, how often and when he should wash his hands, etc. The inevitable and

final product of that kind of moral code was the barren, the soulless, the positively immoral ritualism of the scribes and Pharisees of Christ's time which stirred Him to a white heat of righteous indignation, because they lost sight of the great moral principles in their observance of the unimportant details of conduct. Christ's method on the other hand was just the opposite. In reading the Gospels one is surprised how rarely He laid down specific commands or prohibitions concerning the ordinary activities of daily living. What He did was to declare the great principles of the moral law that should guide and govern all human conduct under all conditions and for all time to come. The result is that His teachings are universal in their appeal—men of all ages, of all lands, of every shade and grade of intelligence and development find in His simple language which they can easily understand a guide for every detail of their everyday life. But there were men in Christ's time who, like Red, wanted Him to be more specific. "You talk in general about right and wrong, about allegiance. What about paying tribute to Caesar, for instance?" "Let me see a coin. Whose image and superscription is this?" "Oh, that is Caesar's." And then Christ laid down a general principle that is true for all time and for all men, and is vitally true today as never before in all human history: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." Those ignorant Jews in Christ's time knew exactly what that meant, and the most sophisticated American today knows exactly what that means. It is a matter of a man's own conscience how he will apply that teaching to his daily

life, and to the solution of the problems of this present chaotic world. Again, the Pharisees were constantly criticizing Jesus for violating some petty sabbatical regulation that they considered vital to salvation. Christ's answer given to them can guide us two thousand years later: "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath." A successful young businessman came to Christ, much as you and I might have done. He had scrupulously observed all the commands of the Mosaic Law, and when he asked Jesus what else he should do to be saved he no doubt expected Jesus to commend him as an example for all to admire and follow. But Jesus saw that he had been following merely the letter and not the spirit of the Law, and that he needed to display a genuine interest in his fellow men instead of concerning himself only with saving his own miserable little soul: "What you need to do is to take that wealth you have been worshipping and devote it to a better cause—give it to the poor." Here in a few words was the eternal problem and its solution of the relation between man's technical observance of all the commandments of the civil and moral law, and his larger duty to his fellow man. How many today feel that they have done enough if they observe these lesser laws, and would "go away sorrowful" if they were asked to make a real sacrifice for some greater cause?

R.: I begin to see what you mean by first establishing in men's minds the broad principles of right conduct; but we find it hard to apply them. Most of us are quite willing to make a great sacrifice if it has some element of the dramatic in it, such as going to the front. The difficulty, as I see it, is

in getting men to make the undramatic sacrifices that the unending commonplaces of life require. It will be interesting to see whether our present-day young businessmen will be willing to give up very much for the international common good. My guess is that many will not only "go away sorrowful," but very mad: "Am I my brother's keeper?"

B.: Since our religious discussion yesterday I have been reflecting on the description which Colonel White gave the other day of the vistas which our great scientific advances are opening up for the human race. I suppose I should have been greatly thrilled thereby, but I was left with the very uncomfortable feeling that some great, soulless monster was not only about to crush out my life, but destroy all the things that for generations past we have striven so hard and at such a cost to attain—the things of the spirit, things without which life itself is a vain and empty dream. There is to me something oppressive and stultifying about these great potentialities of a material, or materialistic, world. These are not the things that men live by, or that they die for. You probably expect me, a hardheaded businessman who has a wholesome respect for the power of the dollar in human affairs, and who has contributed his part to the progress of this age of the machine, to express very different views. I rejoice in the betterment of living that material progress brings to the race, but what I fear is that we shall become slaves to the machine, slaves to these perishable things, while the enduring but invisible and insubstantial

values will be obscured by the blatant and obvious, the insistent and ever-present but too often very alluring material world in which we have to live. Looking ahead to the world of our children and grandchildren, I wonder whether in the great essentials of life they will not be infinitely poorer than our fathers were, with all their lack of material comforts and labor-saving devices? These thoughts led me to read again that fine last chapter of John Buchan's (Lord Tweedsmuir's) *Pilgrim's Way*, in which he expresses some similar misgivings. Let me tell you briefly some of the things this wise fellow Scot has had to say. What he feared was not a return of barbarism or of the Dark Ages; but he feared a civilization that had gone rotten. The machine when mastered and directed by the human spirit, he declared, often leads to a noble enjoyment of life; we have all the elements tamed to man's uses, research laboratories constantly bringing forth new and thrilling discoveries, man already the master of his world. But suppose science has gained all its major victories and has wrested from nature a full provision for human life so that there is no longer need for monotonous toil and a bitter struggle for trade. Victory having been won, the impulse to construct is gone, and the world becomes a huge, smooth-running machine. Would that be the perfecting of civilization? Would it not rather mean decivilization, a loss of the supreme values of life? Suppose a world in which improvements in transportation had caused the whole earth to huddle together, with no corner left unexplored, no geographical mysteries to fire the imagination, great airliners carrying week-end tourists to the wilds of

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Africa and Asia—luxury hotels and wayside camps and filling stations everywhere—a globe full of pleasure cities where people go to escape the rigor of their own climate and enjoy perpetual entertainment. In such a world, says Buchan, every one would have leisure, but every one would be restless, for there would be no spiritual discipline in life. Some kind of mechanical philosophy of politics would have triumphed, and everybody would have his neat little part in the state machine. Everybody would be comfortable, but everybody would be slightly idiotic, for there would be no great demand for intellectual exercises. Our shallow minds would be easily bored, and therefore restless, and life would be largely a quest for amusement. A jazz-cocktail existence would be the normal existence of large sections of society. Some kind of intellectual life would remain, but the old stimulating political disputes would have canceled each other out. Scientists and philosophers would still spin theories about the universe; art would be in the hands of coteries, and literature would be dominated by *petites chapelles*. There would be religion of a kind in glossy upholstered churches, with elaborate music. It would be a feverish, bustling world, self-satisfied and yet malcontent, and under a mask of a riotous life there would be death at the heart. For the soil of human nature which in the Dark Ages lay fallow would now be worked out. "Men would go everywhere, and live nowhere; know everything, and understand nothing. In the perpetual hurry of life, there would be no chance of quiet for the soul. In the tumult of a jazz existence, what hope would there be for the still small voices

of the prophets, philosophers, and poets? A world which claimed to be a triumph of the human personality would in truth have killed that personality. In such a Utopia, where life would be rationalized and padded with every material comfort, there would be little satisfaction for the immortal part of man. . . . Life would be lived in the glory of neon lamps, and the spirit would have no solitude."

W.: This is a gloomy picture of the world into which we are now emerging. We all might well ask how are we planning to meet such a world, we who might prefer to live in a simpler age, but must take the world as we find it. It is hard to be an optimist when we think of the implications of this fast changing civilization of ours, while man moves so slowly to meet its challenges.

B.: This discussion brings us back to the eternal verities, to what we said the other day is the only hope of the human race, a righteous faith. Buchan, who remained an optimist in spite of his fears for the future, agrees:

Religion is born when we accept the ultimate frustration of mere human effort and at the same time realize the strength which comes from union with the superhuman realities . . . I believe—and this is my crowning optimism—that the challenge with which we are now faced may restore to us that manly humility which alone gives power. It may bring us back to God. In that case our victory is assured. The Faith is an anvil which has worn out many hammers.

XVI. *As Others See Us*

BLUE: I am afraid I shall have to organize a little personal peace conference of my own one of these days with particular reference to the next world rather than this one. Not that I am thinking about taking off right away, but the doctor warned me again about my old heart. I thought I would ask you, Colonel White, before you and Red leave the hospital next week, to redraft my will as you offered to do some time ago.

WHITE: You and Red make me feel a little like Joseph and his two friends, the butler and the baker in Pharaoh's prison. Joseph was later to be released, you remember, and given a high office in the state; and the butler was to be restored to his old job in the royal palace, while the poor baker was to be hanged. Here I am with a commission to do what I would rather do than anything else in the world, to have some small part in the rehabilitation of Europe; and here is Red going back to his old work as an economist, this time in Washington, where he will no doubt try to put over some of his fool ideas; and here is Blue, the baker—

B.: Oh, I have fooled the doctors before, and I am going to fool them again. Red and I will yet meet in Washington, when I am elected from this district to Congress. But, like the baker in your story I had an interesting dream the other night after my talk with the doctor. I dreamed that I had

a lively conversation with our old friend Death. I will write out the interview and read it to you when we meet next week—it isn't as macabre as you might think, and it might do you both good. My old Scotch Presbyterian pastor used to say: "Fear not that thy life will come to an end, but rather fear that it never shall have a beginning."

W.: I have sometimes had that same fear. I remember Justice Holmes once quoted an old Latin poet who wrote: "Death plucks my ear and says, 'Live—I am coming!'"

RED: I have not told you yet of my interview with the man from Mars. It will be my last chance when we have our farewell meeting next week, and I will read you the few pages just to show you I can now use my eyes. The interview might also help you both to direct your thoughts toward a better world.

W.: Well, Blue, what is this you were telling us about the Grim Reaper? I cannot quite imagine even Death being too grim when you are around.

B.: Here are the notes I made the morning after the doctor's visit, and which I will call—

A Friendly Warning

Blue: Won't you come in, neighbor—for a little chat? I am at last becoming somewhat accustomed to your presence at that door. After all, I suppose you are my friend. But please leave your hourglass outside—it makes me nervous

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to watch that sand trickling so remorselessly. I can stand a calendar, a clock, but not that infernal glass.

Death: Men do, sooner or later, come to regard me as a friend, and many even pray for my coming. It is too bad that I am not recognized in my true character except by a few of your great philosophers and religious teachers—whom the multitude, as usual, refuse to follow. Your poets and painters and story-tellers have made my position difficult by representing me generally as a grinning skeleton rather than as what I am, a messenger of peace, a humble and necessary instrument in the progress of your race, a friend that brings relief to many a sufferer, release to many a prisoner of the flesh, the keeper of the keys to a better and happier world.

Blue: Speaking for myself, I would be very happy if you would leave me here to a gray old age. Why do you have to interrupt our lives this way?

Death: If you were a better philosopher you would not reason thus. But my visit, indeed, is but an interruption in your life, and you should welcome a chance to try your fortunes in another and a better world. Your brief sojourn here is but a beginning, and there is much that lies beyond. Does not this bright horizon beckon you?

Blue: I have little interest in exploring another world when there is so much here that I have yet to learn. I am very happy on this present earth.

Death: You have a very earthly and limited conception of happiness. How can you be truly happy with all the encumbrances of human clay, with its frailties, its incapacities, its ever-present defects and diseases to thwart your best

laid plans. At best you but limit your possibilities here. The soul, the mind, are prisoners in your house of flesh, and you should welcome the escape which I have to offer, as a bird welcomes a release into the blue from a dark and noisome pit.

Blue: Death, you but poorly understand us if you suppose we would willingly flee from such things. The handicaps of the flesh which you describe, and which are common to all mankind, are but challenges to us, who welcome a struggle from which so many have come forth more than conquerors. What have you to offer that would better try the metal of our souls? We know this life, we know its hazards, its defeats, its heartaches; but, knowing all this, most of us mortals accept its challenge in a confident spirit. We can, therefore, offer you little welcome here for all your bright promises of a better world.

Death: But all men are mortal—life is only a matter of a few years on one or the other side of the average line. So you must reconcile yourself to leaving your good earth sooner or later. Can it make a great deal of difference, therefore, how soon? If by reason of strength, you should linger on to fourscore years or more, you may find with those wise old writers of the East that the lengthened span but added trouble and pain to the years that have gone before. I might indeed be a more welcome visitor then than now, and you might be a wiser man.

Blue: I could say much on that last point with respect to compensations which you seem to overlook, and which with the wise make life not only bearable but a joyous adventure.

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But you have seen so much of the best and worst of life—Christ on the cross, Cain with the blood of Abel on his hands—you should be something of a philosopher yourself.

Death: Perhaps I am; I have, at least, tried to teach men wisdom. But they insist on regarding me in the character of a Messenger of Grief.

Blue: I fully agree that you are too confoundedly lugubrious. Our familiar associations with your coming tend to accentuate your unwelcome and unlovely character—if you will excuse my plain speaking. Black is your favorite color, for instance; and all the ghastly ritual that has grown up to celebrate your easy victories over us! I think our funerals are barbarous and pagan affairs. If we really believed that death is but a sleep and a forgetting, or a gentle transition to a happier world, we would make our funerals cheerful and even hilarious occasions. But of course I know, and you know, this is not our real feeling about you.

Death: I know of one burial ground that has tried to stress the truer conception. There is not a suggestion of death in the gruesome sense anywhere about the place, no solemn gravestones, no mourning marbles set amid dark, dank shrubs, no tearful reminders of “dust to dust.” But all is cheerful and bright and full of hope, with emblems of youth and life and joy and song—there are growing flowers everywhere, and inviting green lawns. I feel very much at home when I walk through that pleasant, lovely *campo santo*. There, at least, is one place where I am not misunderstood.

Blue: I wish we had more such places. But one reason

why you are regarded by many with dislike and dread is that the time of your coming is so uncertain. You strike us down and drag us off when we least expect it, when life seems both sweet and sure, when we are least prepared for such a denouement. If I had a great deal longer to live myself, I would like to write a story of a community in which every human being, at the time of birth, is given a card indicating how long that individual is to live on the earth. What a different world from ours that would be! Your coming then would lose much of its terrors both for the one who must go with you and for those he leaves behind. And how much more wisely one's life would be ordered. If life is to be short, will it not be closely, carefully planned and lived? If life is long, what great things can be projected that may require years for their completion! A man could make such plans knowing that he would have the satisfaction of seeing the fruit of his labors, of carrying on to his chosen goal.

Death: A mere idle fancy! In such a state of society, I doubt if life would be very different from what it is now. The fact is, practically every one of you mortals hopes to live to a great old age, and you live and plan accordingly. Most of you would probably continue to squander your time, to throw away your opportunities, even if you knew that you had but a few years to live on this earth. I think a greater incentive exists to live what you like to refer to as the abundant life where the time of my coming remains uncertain, but where it is, nevertheless, certain that I will come, and come always too soon for the man who is trying to get the best out of this present world.

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Blue: I am sure I would not have loitered through all these years if I had been told ten years ago, or five years ago, that my tenancy of this flesh might terminate soon.

Death: The fact is, you had early and ample warnings, warnings over and over again, that your life might end at any time. But you refused to apply those warnings to yourself. And in spite of your eloquent declarations now that you would have lived differently, I have my doubts. I know human nature better than you, and I think I know you better than you know yourself. Life as you yourself have often said is not a matter of years; it is a matter of how you use the time at your disposal, whether it be much or little. Life at best is for you all too short, and yet most of you mortals throw away most of your waking hours on trifles, or worse than trifles. You seem incapable, even the wisest of you, of organizing your time so as to extract the maximum of good from your days. When the end is imminent, as it may be with you, you may have your regrets; but with even a little respite, would not your outlook change?

The devil was sick,—The devil a monk would be.
The devil was well,—The devil a monk was he!

Let me leave you to ponder that wise old saying. There is more in it than may appear on the surface.

Blue: My doctor and I will outwit you yet! I am already making my plans to run for Congress next fall; and please don't come around bothering me when I am busy in Washington scotching these durn radicals and crackpots!

B.: Now, Colonel White, I understand you have been consulting the Devil—which I can well believe when I recall some of your opinions—and you promised to give us the benefit of your interview today.

W.: I thought it might be interesting to you to see what a fellow who plays such an important part in our affairs thinks about us mortals. Here are my notes.

Who Wins?

White (*reading*): "Peace is a necessity of international law based on the interdependence of nations. War will be eliminated by reasonable men for economic reasons." "War—what is it that the people get but widows, taxes, wooden legs, and debt?" How Satan has blinded the eyes of mankind, that we cannot see the utter absurdity of war as a means of settling human disputes!

Satan (*overhearing the remark*): There you go again blaming me for your own follies and giving me no credit for teaching you wisdom through the bitter school of experience. War—what a glorious adventure, and how misunderstood by even the wisest of you mortals! (*Sings snatches of a national anthem.*)

White: Your Majesty seems in a gay—and a patriotic—mood this morning. Has another great disaster overtaken mankind?

Satan: You are indeed blind, if you do not see through disasters to their ultimate good. Yes, I am quite happy this morning. I have just been attending a so-called peace con-

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ference in Geneva and doing my modest bit in spreading hate, suspicion, and dissensions among its members. What music to my ears their angry accusations, their loud demands for their precious national rights! And I seem to hear another kind of music just as sweet to my ears, the lingering echoes from the latest but not the last Great War, the sound of bursting shells, the shrieks and groans of dying men on land and sea, the weeping of women and children and old men, the despairing cries of soldiers, sailors and civilians alike, on the decks of sinking ships, the mad clamor in the streets of bombed and burning cities, the prayers of hate and anguish arising from the churches, and the dirges sung for the dead. What a symphony, what a symphony! Aye, speaking with all due reverence, what a grand oratorio, depicting the passions, the suffering, the heroism of the human race, all dedicated to the God of War! But let me tell you something about war. War is the most powerful of our social institutions, as one of your great philosophers has said. In the old days I brought on wars between the rich nations and the poor, for the necessities of life. Now I wage wars between the high and the low, wherein war becomes the Great Leveler. And who will say war never pays when millions were never better paid than during the War just past? Poverty and unemployment and discontent, you don't have such things when I plunge the world into war. Some say all that the people want is work and peace. I have convinced them that they can't have both. Just look at the misery in your peaceful world right now. Your greatest poet, Homer, once declared: "Men grow tired of sleep, love, sing-

ing and dancing sooner than of war." During the long armistice after your First Great War I did everything I could in preparing for the Greater War which was to come. I first taught great bodies of people to hate war, while at the same time I taught that war is the greatest thing in the world, a real test of national character, as my good friend, Robert Ley, expresses it. So those passionately devoted to war were ready to jump at the throats of those passionately devoted to peace when I gave the word. A perfect setup for a certain, long, and devastating war! I taught my lovers of war in the words of the great Spengler that "the democratic nations must disappear because they put their trust in illusions, more particularly the illusions of truth and justice. There is only one reality in the world—force. If you listen closely you can hear the tramp of the Caesars who are coming to take over the world." There! I have made a long speech, but I could talk forever on this great theme, which I am beginning again to teach men more fully to understand.

White: So you are engineering another world war! It makes me shudder when I think of the ghastly consequences to the race of such a calamity. Did you not bring enough misery on the world in the past two wars to satisfy your hatred of mankind?

Satan: Oh! Do not say that I hate mankind; rather that, in my love for your race, I am ever devising blessings in disguise—well disguised at times, it is true, but blessings, nevertheless. To prove which I need only to quote your philosophers, poets, preachers, historians, and saints, as I have

often done. Volumes have been written in praise of suffering as a purifier of the human heart, in praise of the heroism, the courage, the patriotism and sacrifice that shine brightest on the field of battle. Death for one's country—what sweeter, surer way to salvation, what more certain badge of the favor of God? So the more misfortune I can contrive, the more heartily I should be proclaimed the benefactor of mankind. In fact, I wonder why some one has not erected a great white monument to me in recognition of my good deeds. However, the human race is proverbially ungrateful to its greatest benefactors. But your endless war memorials, your grand generals in marble and bronze, your sculptured angels and Victories and fighting men—I am satisfied to regard all these as monuments to my great service to your race. You can imagine the solid satisfaction I feel when I stroll through the great military burial grounds of the earth. They renew my zest to continue the great work which I started in a small way after Eden, with the clumsy bludgeon of Cain. But his technique I have perfected and enlarged exactly in proportion as the human race has grown in intelligence, in orderly government, in what you like to call the refinements of civilization, and especially in true morality. If I can succeed in carrying science and morals and pure religion to a little higher level, I may blot out entirely the human race from the earth—although I am disposed to stop a little short of this, as it would not do to have a world without human beings, since it would then be a very happy world. And you must agree, quoting your moralists again, that happiness is not a thing to be desired

above all else, since it too often weakens the moral fiber, enervates the body and dulls the mind.

White: You are distorting, as any one can readily see, the teaching that out of suffering comes the refined gold of great character. The existence of suffering and misfortune in the world calls, it is true, for the glory of self-sacrifice. But the murderer deserves no praise because he has compelled one man to lay down his life for another. That same nobility, but for the murderer, would have found expression, I am sure, in a long life of modest if unspectacular service of others, or of usefulness to his community. War merely dramatizes the virtues in some and the vices in others: virtues and vices that would still have found expression in some other sphere. As respects our vices in a state of war, we seem at once to revert to primitive savagery. You deserve no credit, Satan, for degrading great masses of mankind in order to exalt the virtues of a few, if indeed that is your real motive, which, of course, it is not.

Satan: But I could quote hundreds of your eminent and respected writers to the effect that war is necessary to preserve the virility and the courage of the race, to prevent it from being weakened and corrupted by the politer vices of peace, by luxury, indolence, sensuality, greed, and selfishness which flourish most in highly prosperous and peaceful times. "Sweet are the uses of adversity"—you have probably used this quotation more than once yourself.

White: But it is easy to show that virility and courage are cultivated by the arts of war only that they may be the more effectually destroyed. The stronger the races that fight and

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the greater their courage and their skill in employing the instruments of war, the more surely will those vigorous, virile, and intelligent human beings meet destruction at one another's hands; the virile and courageous are the ones destroyed, while the weak and old survive. "Science finds out ingenious ways to kill strong men, and keep alive the weak and ill, that these a sickly progeny may breed, too poor to tax, too numerous to feed." In war, the old men send the young men to their death. War, as we now wage it, as you now teach it, is the most effective means your Majesty has ever devised for arresting the progress of the human race. War seeks to glorify the very vices which we try to suppress in times of peace. Hatred of other races, cruelty, heartless indifference to the suffering of the innocent, the old and the weak, killing, starving, and maiming the greatest possible number of other human beings, deception in all its forms, appropriation or ruthless destruction of the property of others, and even of the works of art, the common heritage of the race, a studied purpose to destroy the cities, the culture, the homes, the means of livelihood, even the liberties of our fellow men—all these are the recognized goals of war, a part of your ghastly creed. What we glorify as conquest in war, in peace we punish as murder and rape and robbery, as arson and vandalism and fraud. War turns our virtues into vices and exalts our vices into manly virtues worthy of all praise. Through no other means have you succeeded so well in blinding the moral sense of mankind.

Satan: But you do me great injustice. Was there ever any war in which each nation did not feel that it was fighting

in defense of those very virtues you have mentioned, and against a diabolical enemy which would destroy them? If you doubt me, just read the hymns the soldiers sing, the prayers their chaplains offer and the exhortations their political and religious leaders utter with so much fervor during every war. Does the human race ever rise to greater heights of fanatical piety, of self-effacing suffering and zeal, than when it is busy in a great war of conquest, or of self-defense—according to the point of view?

White: There again, Satan, you do your most perfect work. You succeed in convincing the poor devils in the ranks, at least, that they are fighting for home and country, however clear it is to every one else that it is a war of aggression and conquest. These cruel deceptions make your wars all the more despicable on the moral side. And the race will expend its strength in trying to survive instead of trying to move forward and upward, toward the great planes of culture and happiness and peace which we all dream about but never attain. Every great war seems to move us backward a hundred years or more.

Satan: You are very wrong there. Every war makes marvelous contributions to science, to the arts, to the methods of conserving life. I could give you a long catalogue of the advances that were made during both Great Wars (how well named they were!) in the science of engineering, of aviation, of navigation, of communication, in medicine and surgery and whatnot. Don't you think the human race is far richer for all that?

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White: You would have us forget that the world was already making great progress in all these things; but when war came science was diverted to the single purpose of using all its skill for the destruction of human life, and the other developments were only incidental to that end. We would, beyond the shadow of a doubt, have been much further along in everything you have mentioned had we not wasted our resources, our money, our brains, our men in these terrible wars. And this is not taking into account the millions of men whose useful lives were cut short thereby, and who otherwise might have contributed beyond our power to conceive to the material, cultural, and spiritual wealth of the world.

Satan: I cannot agree with you that death is a misfortune. It is more often than otherwise a blessing. Many, in fact, seek it without awaiting the coming of the Grim Reaper, because they want release from the burdens of this life. War brings a quick release, certainly, to thousands and thousands of men. That I count one of the great blessings of war. If you look at the matter coldly, you should reflect that practically all these men whom one sees slain on the field of battle, or who die a little later from wounds, starvation, or disease, would, in ten or fifteen years, have been dead from some other cause. So are they not indeed fortunate that, in dying, they should also be dying for a great end, even though death may be a little premature? And reflect further how much misery that additional ten or fifteen years would, in almost every case, have brought to

these men and to many others as well. Death on the glorious field of battle saved them and those others from we know not what of suffering, sin, and shame!

White: Your logic certainly is quite consistent with your theory that annihilation is a thing to be desired for the human race. With that, of course, I cannot agree, for I maintain that life for even the humblest, the most neglected of us mortals is a blessed thing. There are rewards in life not to be measured in material things, rewards that make life very precious for even the least fortunate of God's creatures. And your very argument of the suicide proves this. With all the suffering, poverty, cruelty, and disease in the world, how few mortals seek release by taking their own life? As Plato says, every galley slave holds in his own hand a passport to freedom. But only the mentally unsound prefer death to life. Why cannot nations settle their disputes as most civilized individuals do, by the orderly, peaceful methods of the law?

Satan: Oh! I have effectually prevented that false idea from gaining a foothold in the national mind—that is to say, in the minds of my great diplomats and statesmen who shape public opinion on this subject. There are points of national honor that cannot be submitted to a court—and, of course, each nation is the judge of what in its case is a point of honor. There are enough such points of honor latent in the affairs of the world to keep it in a state of war until your cosmos has resolved itself back again into star dust, or into dead, cold rocks like the moon. I have succeeded in persuading the great nations of the earth that to

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yield any part of their sovereignty in the interest of world-wide peace would cost them their cherished freedom, when of course exactly the contrary is true.

White: But I do not believe that the intelligence of the world and the morals of the world will continue indefinitely to accept such a false and fatal philosophy. What is gained by either party through the uncertain hazards of war? The cost of a war just about bankrupts victor and vanquished alike, and leaves a heritage of misery, hatred, and confusion that far outweighs any possible advantage that either party to the conflict could have hoped to gain.

Satan: The trouble with your argument is that you again refuse to recognize the function of suffering, of adversity, and especially of poverty in elevating and purifying mankind. In fact, some men deliberately seek poverty in order to save their souls. I make that easy to do. Read your Scriptures again. You will probably then recognize that I am in fact a Messenger of Light though disguised at times as the Demon of War. Hence I say the more versed in Scripture and the more moral, in its professions at least, a nation may be, the more surely I can count on it to wage a terrible and cruel war, a war to the end, followed by a peace even more killing than war, thus sowing the seeds for the next war and the next. A perfect system, you must agree.

White: Scripture nowhere teaches that misfortune must be visited on men by one another in order to bring greater good to the race. On the contrary, the Prince of Peace taught and exemplified the gospel of good will and service, of joy and love, all of which is utterly inconsistent with your

teaching of murder, hate, and greed, the ingredients of every war that has ever been fought.

Satan: Now you surely do not mean that. How about the wars for independence, the wars of self-defense, the wars to protect weaker peoples, which your glorious America especially has so often carried on?

White: A great American, Benjamin Franklin, once said that there never was a good war or a bad peace. Every war you mentioned was the result of human greed; not one of such wars would have been necessary if one or the other country involved had not been actuated by national selfishness or national greed. Their claims should have been first tested out in some peace tribunal and the judgment accepted without a resort to arms.

Satan: A beautiful theory. But how many countries would have achieved independence at the hands of peace tribunals?

White: Territorial independence would not be so necessary if nations or parts of nations worked together for their mutual good. On the contrary, states would be more closely cemented than ever if there were mutual forbearance and cooperation for the good of all. Our own federated states bear witness to that. The widely diverse dominions of the British Empire show how great nations not only can live together in peace, but can make the greatest sacrifices to maintain that friendly unity and to serve in a common cause. They found, as we did, that only through enlightened interdependence could they be assured an enduring independence. And now, when the world is more closely knit

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together than ever before into one great commonwealth of mankind, shall we have to learn again the lesson which the War underlined with blood and tears, that cooperation and mutual concession are absolutely essential to the preservation of the freedom of our country and of every country, be it great or small? Why cannot we teach that simple lesson and extend that kind of spirit to the whole wide world?

Satan: If it were so extended, I would have to abdicate; but I have no fear that it will be so extended, certainly not in your day and generation or in many yet to come. For while others may teach underlings their duties, I shall teach nations their rights. When I run out of other means of making nations sensitive to the small encroachments on those rights, I shall erect trade barriers and stir up territorial disputes which by the way rarely, if ever, arise among federated groups living under a common flag. I must encourage alliances directed against other countries, but must discourage all forms of confederations of states for peaceful and commercial ends.

White: I concede we must continue to regard pride of country or patriotism as a virtue, as something which has made nations great and strong, and individuals better citizens, patriots ready to make any sacrifice for home and country.

Satan: It is a virtue, a beautiful virtue, although inadvertently I had catalogued it in my little book as among my most useful vices. As I have tried to show you, war is either a virtue or a vice, depending on your point of view. But what I started to say is that patriotism begets war and war

begets patriotism—a most virtuous circle you must admit. Patriotism is really of little value, practically speaking, except in time of war. You Americans, for instance, rarely seem to think of patriotism when you are running your party politics, or operating your great corporations or labor unions, or administering the affairs of your great cities. Love of country then fades into another one of my choicest virtues (or vices): love of self.

White: So you have catalogued love of self among our virtues!

Satan: In fact I have. It is one of the strongest and most useful of virtues. Without it, man would cease to strive, and your beautiful civilization would revert once more to the state of the jungle. Every now and then I whisper in the ear of your enterprising public servants and your industrial and financial leaders, "Every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost." And you may be sure I am right behind. Furthermore, all of you are selfishly striving for bread.

White: Some of us are trying to teach that men cannot live by bread alone.

Satan: Quite true, quite true! But I have been able to spread an even more important doctrine throughout the world: that, without bread, men cannot live at all. Bread is life, and as your Scripture says, "all that a man hath will he give for his life."

White: There you are misquoting Scripture again. The Bible indeed contains that statement, but it attributes that false doctrine to you, where it belongs. But we were discussing bad government and business corruption.

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Satan: I was discussing patriots and patriotism—a favorite disguise for lovers of self, by the way, although I would not go as far as that wise old observer, Samuel Johnson, and say that patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel. And this virtue of self-love shines with particular brilliance, strange as it may seem, when thousands are displaying the other virtue, patriotism—laying down their lives for their native land. War, indeed, brings about a beautiful jumble of virtues and vices, which is one reason I am so fond of war. The mutilated soldier on the field of battle and the profiteer back home, his pockets bulging with gold, both ostensibly serving their beloved country! Both acclaimed heroes when the war is over and the bands march down the street! I wonder how long I can keep up the fine illusion.

White: Not very long, Satan, if men would use the same amount of common sense in settling international disputes that they use in settling their private affairs. In spite of your efforts in sowing discord everywhere, we have become fairly civilized and fairly moral in the settlement of personal misunderstandings involving our so-called rights. I am speaking now of our more civilized and intelligent individuals, of course.

Satan: I might whisper in your ear that they are quite right; I must not let such dangerous and subversive ideas get abroad among the nations of the earth. I hope and expect to be among you for long ages to come. But my war activities at least would soon end if, in these matters of so-called patriotism, nations had half the common sense of your dumbest businessmen who generally know enough to sub-

mit their rights and wrongs to the courts, instead of shooting one another down on sight.

White: You are very clever, Satan, for so long as you can persuade some nations that they can only settle their disputes by fire and sword, I am afraid that makes it necessary for all the others to be prepared to do likewise, or else expose themselves to the risk of destruction at the hands of such national brigands. For that reason, with all my hatred of war, I find it difficult to reconcile myself to a policy of complete disarmament. What would have happened to America, for instance, if she had completely disarmed in this present world with its national hatreds, its greed, jealousies, and ambitions?

Satan: The very argument I have in my notebook here! Nothing short of universal disarmament would make the world safe, of course, and I have thus far successfully balked every plan that looked to that end. I trembled on my throne when I saw with what enthusiasm the proposal for a League of Nations was once greeted by a war weary world. But the sowing of a few seeds of partisan jealousies, and an appeal in your country to your crude provincialism, pride and greed, were all that was necessary to defeat the whole grand scheme. I was determined to keep America out, and I succeeded much more easily than I ever thought I would, dealing as I was with a country with supposedly noble ideals and traditions of unselfish action. And what a beautiful mess the world is in now! I dread to think what would have happened to my plans had you stood shoulder to shoulder with England and France to further peace in your sick and

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troubled world. Certainly I could not have engineered a Second Great War. But you were wise to continue to spend your billions for self-defense, and later your billions to win a second war. This you might indeed have avoided had you joined the efforts to make the League effective; but in not so doing, you at least saved your self-respect and preserved your traditional isolation—until the Second World War caught you unawares.

White: But I think true patriotism might require one country to consider its own future and the happiness of its people as superior to that of the happiness of the rest of the world; and many thought we had a condition in the world where we should withdraw from the selfish counsels of other peoples and try patriotically to serve America first.

Satan: Excellent! Excellent! America first! That is my brand of patriotism. I neglected, by the way, to tell you that my definition of patriotism is not love of one's own country (although that might exist) but hatred of *other* countries. That is essential to true patriotism, and without it this virtue would never be translated into effective action.

White: Do you mean to tell me that men who lay down their lives in battle are not actuated by love of country?

Satan: Nonsense. They are actuated by hatred of the enemy; not, it is true, of the individuals in the ranks whom they do not even know, but that personified thing, "the enemy," which your statesmen have created as the target for your soldiers to attack. All your patriotic war literature is designed to inflame that hatred.

White: I think there is a vast amount of unselfish patri-

otism that manifests itself in every war, and which is actuated solely by love of country; and I also disagree with you that this is not to be found in large measure also in times of peace and among our business leaders and public servants.

Satan: True, there is a surprising amount of peacetime as well as wartime patriotism in public and private life which takes the form of serving others. But as I have succeeded in ordering human affairs, the particular form of patriotism that gets the headlines in the papers, the long chapters in your histories, the monuments in your great cities and the acclaim of the multitudes everywhere, is what I call destructive patriotism as distinguished from constructive patriotism. The scientist who saves a million lives by a great discovery often dies in obscurity and poverty, and the honest politician who tries to give his city or his state a clean and efficient government, is soon voted out of office and forgotten, while the Napoleon who has plunged his country into war and brought it out a victor with millions of maimed and dead, and a national debt that will burden generations to come—he is your national hero whose praises are on every lip. This war psychology, which is common to even the most intelligent races of mankind, and is found among their most profound thinkers and humanitarians—this psychology is one of the most useful instruments for perpetuating the misery of mankind that I have been able to devise since the fall. And speaking of Eden, even though I know human nature and its failings so well, I am constantly surprised at the ease with which hatred can be engendered between two individuals, even between brothers

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like Cain and Abel, or between two once friendly nations and their peoples. I had feared that with the increase in education, with the rise of the general level of intelligence, and with the evident happiness and many material gains that follow the policy of brotherhood and cooperation, men would have seen the futility of hate, and I would have been compelled to seek some other method of destroying the human race. But hatred has never been so universal as in the world today. Fortunately, it does not yield to logic, but is the product of the most elemental of animal instincts, the instincts of the jungle, the instincts of acquisitiveness and of self-preservation that find most effective expression in physical conflict. And to quote Scripture again, your Christ also said—and how truly!—"I came not to bring peace, but a sword." And don't forget that but for the valiant sword of Charles Martel at Tours you would have no Christian Bible in either Europe or America to quote against me; you would probably be carrying the Koran—and on the point of the sword—to the remaining savage races of the earth.

White: But how truly Christ also said that "all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." And you forget, Satan, when you go back to the Dark Ages for an illustration, the great fundamental teaching of Christ that the Christian life is a matter of *growth*—painfully slow, it may seem through the centuries, but growth nevertheless, until, I firmly believe, we shall yet reach that plane when, as the prophets of both the Old and the New Testaments foresaw, we shall beat our swords into plowshares, and wars shall be no more.

Satan: Nonsense! "Let him that hath no sword sell his cloak and buy one." The fact is, I repeat, national hatreds, greed, jealousies, pride, the causes of war, were never so strong as now.

White: I am not at all sure that that is true, but I am certain that such a state of mind is artificially created by designing and ambitious men for their own selfish ends; that the average human being, anywhere you may find him on the face of the earth, if left to his own thinking, not only would have no hatred of his fellows of a different race or country or creed, but on acquaintance would have a friendly feeling for them, and would certainly prefer to live in peace with all the world.

Satan: Now you are touching upon a very delicate subject and one to which I have given a great deal of study—the art of making men hate one another. The fact is, the better men know one another, the more surely racial hatreds and prejudices disappear. One of your great writers once wisely remarked that the only people he hated were the ones he did not know. You may see how, with the improvement in intercommunications, my task of stirring up national hatreds is becoming increasingly difficult. If every man in Europe had even one friend in every other country, wars would be rare, if not impossible.

White: I dream of the day when something like that state of international friendship will be achieved. Private organizations, peace societies, the churches, and the like are probably doing something already to bring that about.

Satan: The trouble is, your peace societies and your

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churches spend most of their energies in fighting among themselves. I have a good laugh when I think of it.

White: You have been active also in designing new instruments of destruction—in which enterprise I am hoping, however, that you will defeat your own ends. That is to say, war may become so horrible to contemplate in its destructiveness that men will finally unite to prevent such a catastrophe.

Satan: I have that very situation in mind. My most terrible weapons are still secret, and I hope to keep them so until the next war. Your blood would run cold if I told you what ingenious machines I have yet to bring forth; and at the proper time I will use them all to the complete destruction of your race—unless your country and a few others unite to insure peace in the world. But you will have to excuse me—I have already talked too much. I must hurry back to Geneva. What fools, what fools, these mortals be!

W.: Now, Red, is your chance to wander up among the stars again and tell us about the man from Mars.

R.: Such excursions at least give me perspective, which some of my friends seem to lack. This interview occurred several years ago when I was working on a newspaper in the East:

A Celestial Visitor

One pleasant Sunday afternoon, I strolled down to Washington Square in New York, seeking a little open space and something green in the heart of that great stone city. One

can also usually find a cross section of lower New York there: Greeks, Italians, Syrians, European Jews, mingling with the native Americans from the near-by residences, apartments and hotels—an interesting study always of our very successful melting pot. Now and then I struck up a conversation with some one who seemed to be observing life there as I may have been doing.

This particular afternoon, near sunset, I found such a visitor whose nationality I could not make out, but whose strong face and clear, deep-set eyes caught my attention, although he had the appearance of wearing a mask. I jotted down our conversation, as I recalled it, on returning to my room. It was about as follows:

Red: I suppose you are a stranger to New York?

X: Yes, I have been here once before but only for a short visit. The place fascinates me even more than some of your European cities where I have been in recent years. New York seems to me to be most vitally and vigorously alive of all the cities on this planet. But if I might say so without offending you, your city is like your civilization, rich in great possibilities but inexplicably blind to all of them. How many hundred years will it take you to begin to see? And yet it may not be so long, as I find you have been increasing your stride of late. In my own land, these early savage stages were the slow-moving stages of groping in the dark. But when the light began to break, it was not long before there was, as it were, the burst of noonday, and progress was at a rapid pace. If I should come back in one or two hundred years, I am sure I would find considerable advance.

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Red: You flatter us! Do you consider your own country is one hundred years ahead of America?

X: Oh, a thousand years ahead! But again I am afraid I offend you.

Red: Not at all. I am anxious to learn from one so much wiser and so much more fortunate. But I confess I am interested in what you say as to how blind we are. I have had occasion to make a similar remark myself. I cannot understand, for instance, the blindness of nations (including no doubt your own favored country) that persist in the folly of war, nor the blindness of individuals who, for all the teachings of their wisest men, fail to extract either beauty or happiness or peace from their misdirected and jumbled lives. Perhaps you can tell me how you and your fellow countrymen have succeeded better, if you have. And might I first ask the name of your country? I am afraid that in my ignorance I have never heard of it.

X: You would not believe me if I told you my story. I am here merely as an observer. Furthermore, if I told you too much it might prove very awkward for me. But—on reflection, I believe I can trust you with my secret. I am a visitor from the planet Mars.

Red: Remarkable! And you speak such excellent English, which I had not suspected was the language also of the Martians.

X: We are familiar with every language spoken on your earth, although we have only one language for our own use, and far superior to any which you employ. You see we have greatly perfected what you call the wireless, and one of our

favorite amusements is to listen to your broadcasts, and in fact to eavesdrop on all of your varied activities. It is surprisingly easy to learn another language in this way.

Red: And I suppose you floated down to Washington Square on one of these radio beams.

X: It was not quite as easy as that, but easier than you might imagine. You see this little instrument I have here that looks like one of your watches? It is an old invention with us, which operates not only to neutralize the attraction of gravitation; by turning this little switch, I can put the power of gravitation in reverse. In other words, we can project ourselves through space in any direction and at practically any given speed we desire.

Red: I suppose your watch generates heat to keep you warm on your long travels through space, and supplies you with air to breathe. Or possibly you can thrive in a vacuum or with a temperature a hundred degrees below zero.

X: I could explain this also, but I see you do not believe me from what I say. I think I can let you see something under my coat here that will convince you I am really not, as you suspect, an escaped inmate of one of your institutions for the insane. Now look at this!

Red: My stars! I believe you are telling the truth. A man indeed from Mars!

X: Mars—I often smile that you Earthians should have named our planet after your God of War. War, or anything resembling what you call war, has been unknown to us for thousands of years. The name we have given our world is "The Serene." That word describes our life and the

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kind of life we have been living for many long centuries. But we have a name for your world that may not seem so complimentary: Dementia—I am translating for you. Our scientists long since evolved the theory that the inhabitants of your earth, with all their brilliance in certain directions, are mentally unbalanced or mentally deficient or diseased. The reactions even of your greatest statesmen and leaders of thought are impossible for us to explain on any other theory. And the defect seems to be practically universal, since all of your organized groups, large and small, constantly act as no sane creatures would act, according to our standards at least. We have also studied the careers of thousands of your individuals. They often act with great wisdom in many things, but on the whole their lives are the lives of people without any apparent guiding sense. Your dumb animals and especially your insects act with a far greater degree of intelligence for the purposes of their particular existence, showing that they have progressed much further, or have lived much longer on the earth. In fact, some of our thinkers believe that with their superior intelligence and organization, insects will, in a few hundred years, exterminate men from your earth and take possession themselves.

Red: That sounds rather discouraging, but I am afraid there is some ground for what you say, judging from what some of our own scientists have been writing of late. But tell me more about your life, and how you have escaped from that under which we are still suffering. It may be you can show us the way out.

X: The fact is, I came here as a missionary with a resolve

to try to give you the benefit of what we have accomplished. But I soon concluded that this would be foolish and vain. In the first place, you would probably crucify me for my pains; and in the second place, I decided that it would be better for you to evolve by slow stages as you have been doing for hundreds and thousands of years, rather than to try to show you in a day the wiser things to do. Your people are not constituted to absorb more than a few good ideas in a given number of years. I am afraid you would become more demented than ever if too many notions were thrust upon you all at once. The formula for your development seems to be one of slow progress, followed by retrogression, then another stage of slow and painful progress until, at the end of fifty or one hundred years, you do show some net gain. The question with us is whether on this tedious schedule, the insects will not overtake you before you have reached the plane of sanity. You know insects are millions of years older than you already.

Red: It seems rather silly to compare us with insects when you consider the extraordinary achievements we have made in science, and which we believe will, in time, make man the complete master of the earth and all its forces.

X: On the contrary, we Martians—to use your term for us—consider that prospect the most sinister aspect of your so-called civilization. Your scientific growth has far outstripped your moral and spiritual progress, with the result that, as many of us fear, your civilization may bring about its own destruction. You will probably use your power over the forces of nature, your great inventions, to slay your fellows

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and to destroy your fairest works. You actually did that in your last great wars. Your modern airplane, for instance, combines about the greatest of your scientific achievements; but you have devised it not for your spiritual or physical welfare, but to attack other planes and ships, to destroy cities and to kill men—a procedure we find utterly incomprehensible from the standpoint of sanity. The wealth, the brains, the effort which you have for thousands of years used in trying to destroy one another, we have, during that time, used for a broader education, the prevention of disease and the prolonging of physical life, for the stamping out of poverty and crime, and for the general happiness and well-being of the Martian race. In fact, we reached our highest scientific development about five thousand years ago, and since that time we have passed from what we call our scientific age into our spiritual age. But our moral development was fortunately such that, although when we were in our primitive times we had something like your monstrous wars, we had long since abandoned that method of settling disputes when we began to make rapid progress in the sciences.

Red: But don't you have great economic struggles and rivalries among different countries, such as bring on all our wars?

X: We learned the folly of such rivalries when we first emerged from a savage state. A thing you in North America should not find difficult to understand, we are now a people of one language, one system of government, one religion, a common literature, a common interest in the social, economic and spiritual progress of our different peoples. There

is no occasion for rivalries because we are culturally and otherwise a unit. Why can you not organize your world on that basis as you have organized the forty or fifty states of your own Union? According to our ancient histories, we were at one time as diverse as are the races of your present world, but we did not try to achieve unity by exterminating those who were different from us. We soon found that we could greatly help one another by working towards a common end—in fact, this seems quite self-evident to me as applied to your own present world. Can it be that I am wrong?

Red: I think you are absolutely right. But with no wars and no disease to reduce your population your little planet must be overflowing with human beings by this time.

X: Unlike your people, we, many thousands of years ago, saw that neither births nor deaths should be matters of mere chance, but should be properly and scientifically and humanely controlled. We determine, to the entire satisfaction of all concerned, the number of human beings to be born into our world in a given time; and with our knowledge of health and almost complete control of disease, the length of human life with us is practically uniform—about a hundred years. Death comes as a normal, natural thing without shock and without suffering, without economic or other disturbances at the end of our normal span of life. Our scientists long since discovered the means of prolonging life much beyond that period. But neither the individual nor the state has found that desirable, with rare exceptions. From the standpoint of the state, it is advisable that old age

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should make place for youth; and after one hundred years an individual is usually ready and willing to pass on to the other life. But our years are longer than yours.

Red: Then you accept immortality, or at least a life after death, as a fact.

X: We have a doctrine of immortality which it would be impossible for me to translate into your language—we have reached a moral and spiritual development of which you could have but a faint conception. I can only say that our people are happy to live and happy to die. Death has no terrors for them. They live serenely happy while they live, but death is never unwelcome. It comes when they are ready for it and when they expect it.

Red: But there is surely not work enough for all? How do you occupy those hundred years?

X: Not as you do, in a wild struggle for wealth and more wealth, or in hard grinding toil to make wealth for others. Work is not the great aim of our lives. We find it difficult to understand why so many of you human beings make slaves of yourselves and of other human beings in an effort to pile up riches that, when so accumulated, generally become both a burden and a curse. We make it a point to see that both capital and earnings are so graduated that there is neither idleness on the one hand nor poverty on the other, and that every one is able to enjoy the things that wealth can bring—a policy I understand your leaders and statesmen frequently condemn as a vicious form of socialism. The trouble, I suppose, is that you have so neglected the mental and moral education of your people that most of

them are not prepared for such an advanced economic order; and your present masters of wealth may be right, therefore, in saying that its adoption would be a curse rather than a blessing to your race. But are not your leaders responsible for not having prepared their people to enjoy wisely the wealth that all have helped to earn? We, too, once had great extremes of poverty and riches, but that was during our Dark Ages.

Red: But what do you do with your leisure? You must have a great deal.

X: Our leisure, like our work, is well organized. Not an hour is wasted; nor do we spend half the amount of time you spend in sleep. But we do give our subconscious mind some time to function which you do not. We devote much time to contemplation, to the improvement of our minds and to a development of our spiritual and social side; and with our progress in the natural sciences, we have opened up worlds of which you have not the slightest conception in your present state of knowledge. We have made great advances in the study and enjoyment of the world that lies beyond the reach of the unaided eye, such as the world your powerful glasses are just beginning to disclose. And the stars—if I could but tell you about the stars! But we should have to talk another language. And I think we have a conception of God that would bring every one of you to your knees in reverent worship. God is a real person with us. But here again I may be talking in a strange tongue. It seems to us your spiritual development has been for some reason arrested and your senses strangely dulled of late, and

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we wonder what the end of your race may be. Your gods are the things we despise. Did not some of your people once actually worship a golden calf, fit emblem of your present age of brainless materialism? But perhaps I should not speak so plainly.

Red: I suppose you have a rich and very beautiful world physically?

X: We have indeed found it so, but in this respect it is not comparable to your wonderful world. Nature has done far more for you than it has done for us. Yet most of your people still remain blind to all its marvelous beauties, its undeveloped possibilities. Even at our great distance, we enjoy lights, colors, changes, and forms on your beautiful earth that your people evidently never see. Were your world a happier world for human beings, we might pay you friendly visits now and then to share with you these lovely things; but I feel homeless and unhappy among your people and anxious to return to my poorer but better planet. It makes me very sad to think of what you miss, and sadder still to reflect what the end of your race on this fair earth may be, unless some radical change in your scheme of life should soon take place.

Red: I am sorry that you are leaving without more of an opportunity to talk over these things. I suspect we have much in common, and I and my world need to learn more of what you can tell us. But I suppose I shall never see you again.

X: You may see me again some day, not here, but beyond on that little star near the sunset, my own planet to which

I am returning tonight. In the meantime, here is a little memento of my visit. If you will look through these glasses, you will see all about you a marvelous and beautiful world that lies beyond the rays of your spectrum—this just to give you a taste of the glorious creation which you mortals have under your eyes, but to which you are blind. But these glasses have also another use. If your own heart is free from guile, you may, through them, read the hearts of other men. And what a revelation it will be to you! You will doubtless be greatly shocked and surprised to find how large an amount of human conduct is designed to deceive; and most of you Earthians begin by deceiving yourselves; then you strive to have others think you what you are not. You live in a world of make-believe. With these glasses, much good you will also find in unsuspected places and much ugliness, meanness, and wrong among the outwardly good. We on Mars have found that with the common use of these glasses (we all wear them now) we have developed a better race and a happier world. You can doubtless see how it has made possible the elimination of hypocrisy and crime, as well as the lesser faults of men, since most wrongdoing first involves deception, or at least the successful concealment of motives and thoughts; and when men know that their thoughts are like an open book, they are more circumspect in what they think, whether good or bad, and it is not long before the general character of thinking, of acting, of living, is immensely improved. But I leave you to speculate on this. You can, with a little reflection, soon see how your whole social order would be revolutionized by such a sim-

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ple device, although there might be chaos and confusion for a time. But try the glasses out first yourself—and on yourself! Now, I must be going. As we say in Mars, “Good friends will make occasion to meet again.”

W.: What became of those glasses? I should like to see them.

R.: It's a sad story! I tried them on, looking at myself before a mirror. I was so shocked by what I saw that I dropped them on the floor and they were broken into a thousand pieces!

THE END

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War's End and After

An Informal Discussion of the Problems of a Postwar World

By STUART CHEVALIER

"This book," its author says, "is offered as a modest contribution to the general discussion of a postwar world, in an effort to supply some grounds for the hope of many that a better order can and will ultimately emerge out of the present chaos."

It is difficult while War rages to detach ourselves from the ever-present problems of trying to win it. Mr. Chevalier has attempted to attain a calmer perspective by projecting his discussion into a time after the present War's end, and by considering the problems of the peace through the eyes of three typical Americans, with widely different points of view and backgrounds. There is no claim to any particular originality in their ideas. An effort has been made, rather, to reflect the current thinking and at the same time to meet the need of a brief, impartial statement of the problems to be solved after the War. It is a primer for tomorrow, an attempt to outline the political, the economic, and the moral issues which will arise, and to suggest possible solutions.

The Author

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